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1 Introduction: Coming to Terms with Biopolitics,
Temporality and Historic Justice
1.1 From Times Believed Long Overcome
In June 2020, nine citizens filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal
Constitutional Court in Germany. The complaint was directed against guide-
line recommendations issued by the German Society of Intensive Care Physi-
cians together with further medical societies on the question of health care
rationing and treatment in situations of scarce resources due to the Covid-19
pandemic (DIVI 2020). When intensive care units face an acute shortage of
resources, the societies argued, physiciansmust decidewho should receive in-
tensive medical treatment and who not. The guidelines suggested criteria for
making these decisions and thus prioritizing some patients over others. The
medical societies stated that these decisions should not be based on criteria of
age, social characteristics, disability or chronic illness but only on the chances
of treatment success.The claimants, however, argued that the criteria spelled
out by the guidelines for establishing the chances of treatment success, like or-
gan dysfunctionality, frailty along the Clinical Frailty Scale, neuronal diseases
and ‘prognostically limited life expectancy’ effectively discriminated against
many people with disabilities. “The criteria presented,” writes the disability
rights organization AbilityWatch, which supports the constitutional claim,
could thus become the death sentence of a large number of disabled people.
The fact that the president of DIVI publicly raises the question of ‘whether it
really makes sense to intubate and ventilate in an intensive care unit people
of very old agewho have been unable to live on their own for a long time and
whohave severe chronic concomitant diseases’ awakens theworstmemories
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of justification patterns from times believed long overcome. (AbilityWatch
2020)1
It went without saying what times these were. In July 2020, five foundations
and memorial sites commemorating the Nazi ‘euthanasia’2 crimes issued a
common statement to express their concern about the discussion on with-
holding intensive health care for people with previous illnesses or disabilities
in the course of the pandemic.
The signatory memorials to commemorate the Nazi euthanasia crimes
commemorate the devaluation, exclusion and murder of people under
National Socialism. […] Against this backdrop, we view with concern the
discussions about intensive medical care for elderly people and people with
previous illnesses or disabilities (keyword: triage) in the corona pandemic.
(Gedenkstätte Hadamar 2020)
Similar discussions popped up in other countries. Many people in the United
States also felt reminded of practices associated to ‘eugenics’ and ‘euthanasia’:
The debates on health care rationing unveil how our society devalues vul-
nerable populations. Draftguidelines from various states and health systems
identified people with dementia, cancer, intellectual disabilities, and many
other pre-existing conditions as those who will not benefit from treatment
compared to younger, healthier, non-disabled people. […] Eugenics isn’t a
relic from World War II; it’s alive today, embedded in our culture, policies,
and practices. (Wong 2020)
The Center for Public Integrity in the United States has analyzed policies and
guidelines from 30 U.S. states on criteria for rationing ventilators and other
resources in the case of a shortage. The Center found that all but five states
had provisions in place that in effect “send people with disabilities to the back
of the line for life-saving treatment” (Center for Public Integrity 2020). In
Alabama, for instance, a state policy had postulated that people with “severe
1 My translation from the German source. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations
from German to English in this book are my own.
2 I will hereafter seek to avoid the euphemism euthanasia and rather speak of institu-
tional killings, meaning the systematic killing of children with disabilities and people
in psychiatric and other institutions under Nazi rule. However, since the term euthana-
sia is still in common use and even these memorial sites use it, it cannot always be
avoided.
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mental retardation […]may be poor candidates” for treatment with ventilators
if hospitals run short during the pandemic. The states of Louisiana, Penn-
sylvania, Texas and Utah, the Center reports, directed hospitals to take de-
mentia into account when allocating ventilators. After a wave of complaints,
the state of Alabama withdrew the policy, if only to replace it with less specific
guidelines. Ensuing protests, however, from disability rights advocates as well
as numerous experts and policy-makers persuaded some states to reconsider
their triage policies, as the Center for Genetics and Society (2020) reports.
Aside from manifest triage policies, more indirect selection strategies,
such as that of fostering so-called herd immunity, have also evoked concerns
about a return of eugenics, albeit in amore indirect, economically based form.
Referring to corona policies in the United Kingdom,Norway and Sweden,Vito
Romer and Louis Philippe Laterza argue:
It is hard not to read eugenic implications in this kind of thinking: the ‘herd’
will survive, but for that to happen, other ‘weaker’ members of society need
to be sacrificed. (Romer and Laterza 2020)
Policies that prioritize the stronger and sacrifice the weaker, they posit, stand
in continuity with eugenics policies which were not confined to the Nazi state:
The Norwegian and Swedish states have a long history of adopting policies
based on eugenics that continued well after World War II. Eugenics was de-
ployed throughout the 20th century as a branch of scientific state manage-
ment, part of a social engineering project that envisioned a society made of
physically healthy and ‘socially fit’ individuals. (Romer and Laterza 2020)
One does not have to claim that we have already entered a new form of totali-
tarianism to realize that policies of health care rationing, whether on the hos-
pital or state level, that refer to an individual’s capacities in terms of health,
strength, or fitness are effectively establishing a system of differential value
of human lives. It is the practice of calculating the value of human lives that
evokes reminiscences of Nazi practices, as Lennard Davis puts it:
Social politesse, charitable involvement, religious concern all crumble in the
face of the grand bargain of choosing those who appear ‘normal’—not those
who are seen as weakened, abnormal, debilitated, less-than. There is a term
for this demographic, and the Nazis used it with abandon: Lives Unworthy of
Living. […] It is easy for us to blame theNazis for these egregious and unimag-
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inable deaths, but the current calculus about which lives are worth living
provides a sobering if less overtly dramatic parallel. (Davis 2020, emph. i.o.)
Maybe the times believed long overcome are not so overcome after all. In any
case, we can see that debates about the past are not simply about the past.
They are about the present. These debates about triage, herd immunity, Nazi
eugenics, Nazi ‘euthanasia’, eugenics in the US, or eugenics in the Scandina-
vian welfare states refer to the present situation.They address the scandalous
treatment of people with disabilities in the past in order to scandalize the
way they are treated today; they address the injustices of the past in order
to counter the injustices of today. If we want to be different, these debates
say, if we want to be a different kind of society than those that allowed these
things to happen in the past, we have to act differently. It will not do to name
selection practices differently.
In the context of these debates, but also in the wider context of the corona
pandemic and governmental politics to contain it, the term ‘biopolitics’ crops
up again and again. It emerges in relation to life-and-death decisions, allo-
cation of health care treatment, ableism and disability rights as well as in the
contexts of quarantine and mobility restrictions, surveillance mechanisms,
behavioral monitoring and control, disciplinary measures, appeals to self-
discipline and more.3 At present, as far as I can see, references to biopoli-
tics in relation to the corona pandemic are still rather cursory. Some refer to
the work of Michel Foucault, others to Giorgio Agamben, some to both, but it
is too early to expect a systematic review of which concepts of biopolitics and
which aspects thereof are useful to understand the politics of the pandemic.
I, too, am unable to undertake this endeavor here; rather, I indicate why I con-
sider biopolitics in the Foucauldian sense a key concept for understanding a
specific political rationality that emerged alongside modernity and is still op-
erative today; it is not necessarily dark and destructive throughout, but it is
problematic in that it implies an inherent tendency toward differential valu-
ation of human lives.
3 To name only a few contributions: Agamben 2020; Ahrens 2020; Davis 2020; Gerhards
2020a; Kitchin 2020; Lorenzini 2020; Sarasin 2020.
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1.2 Coming to Terms with the Presence of the Past
The focus of this chapter is the nexus of biopolitical rationality, the temporal-
ity of increase and optimization, and what I term the ‘injuries of normality’.
I will argue that modern biopolitics is characterized by the logic of increasing
the human life force and that this logic implies norms and standards of dif-
ferential value of human lives. Taken to the extreme, as done under Nazi rule,
it involves policies of preventing, destroying and eliminating the lives of those
categorized as being deficient according to its norms and standards. Not only
the systematic murder of disabled new-borns and patients in psychiatric in-
stitutions, but also Nazi selective sterilization policy, the persecution of male
homosexuals and persons categorized as ‘asocials’, I argue,were driven by this
biopolitical rationality.4 I explain my term for these types of crimes—injuries
of normality—below.AlthoughWest German efforts to come to termswith the
Nazi past are often lauded as a model case of historic justice, it is less well-
known, particularly outside Germany, that for a long time the Federal Repub-
lic denied the status of systematic wrongdoing that requires official acknowl-
edgement, rehabilitation and reparations to many types of crimes, includ-
ing selective sterilization and the persecution of homosexuals and ‘asocials’.
The victims of these injuries of normality were not entitled to reparations
as victims of Nazi persecution, and it took the West German state until the
2000s to formally acknowledge that these were severe injustices committed
by the state.The reason for this failure, I argue, was the unwillingness to con-
front the underlying biopolitical rationality that had driven these crimes in
the first place. The prevailing sense among reparation policy actors was that
it was—in principle—reasonable for the state to take actions against those
who were mentally ill, retarded, disabled, ‘work-shy’, homosexual or other-
wise found weak, abnormal or dysfunctional, because, after all, these people
posed a threat to state and society. In short, rehabilitation and reparation
4 I refer here toMiller and Rose, who define political rationality as “a kind of intellectual
machinery for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to politi-
cal deliberation” (Miller and Rose 1992, 179). Political rationalities are more than a set
of governing technologies; they comprise substantial goals and principles of govern-
ment, and they also have an epistemic character, definingwhat can be known and thus
become an object of government. The concept of biopolitics covers both the dimension
of political technologies and the dimension of particular goals and motives revolving
around the idea of increasing the life force in the collective.
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claims were refuted as long as the post-war elites shared the biopolitical mo-
tives of the perpetrators, even if they may not have accepted any means used
to achieve them. By denying entitlement to rehabilitation and reparations,
policy actors not only represented but performatively confirmed and re-en-
acted the very biopolitical rationality that had driven the crimes themselves.
Conversely, the pertinent struggles for historic justice challenged the legiti-
macy of this rationality, and in this sense, they were, and are, as much about
the present as they are about the past.
In the following pages, I unfold the nexus of biopolitics, temporality and
the injuries of normality. I begin with an explication of how I read the concept
of biopolitics and why it is a specifically modern phenomenon. Subsequently,
I lay out the temporal logic of increase and optimization that characterizes
modern biopolitics and argue that it inevitably generates systems of differ-
ential valuation and differential vulnerability. Finally, I explain the concept
of injuries of normality as a specific type of historic injustice that has been
largely overlooked in the field of historic and transitional justice. Moreover,
I argue, injuries of normality are disregarded precisely because of their pre-
sumed ‘normality’; they are taken as more or less ‘normal’ policies and prac-
tices and not as wrongs because and to the extent that the underlying biopo-
litical rationality that drives them remains unchallenged.
1.3 Biopolitics and the Threshold of Modernity
Biopolitics is an ambiguous and contested concept that assumes different
meanings in different theoretical traditions. Oftentimes, it is used in an
unspecific sense to denote any kind of relationship between ‘politics’ and
‘life’; sometimes it refers more specifically to the policy area concerned with
medicine, biotechnology and the life sciences.5 These bilateral conceptions,
so to speak, assume that ‘life’ and ‘politics’ are universal features of human
existence that may or may not be connected to each other. Biopolitics, here,
is this external connection. Michel Foucault, in contrast, has shown that the
notion of ‘life’, the modern type of state, and the type of politics he terms
biopolitics are not universals; rather, they co-emerged at the threshold of
modernity in a move that “made knowledge-power an agent of transforma-
tion of human life” (Foucault 1980, 143).The era of biopolitics begins when the
5 For a more extensive discussion, see Braun and Gerhards 2019.
1 Introduction 15
human becomes the object of systematic strategies of shaping and improv-
ing. It is the historic moment when the modern state with its technologies
of governing, the focus on man as a living being, and the construct of the
population as an object of government co-emerge. What Foucault terms
biopolitics is the connection between them.
Already before he started working on biopower and biopolitics, Foucault
had shown that ‘life’ was not a biological fact but a relatively young category
that emerged at the particular historicmoment thatmarked the shift between
the classical and themodern episteme around 1800 (Rentea 2017). Before that,
‘life’ did not exist, only living beings (Foucault 1994b, 127f.). Life as a category
and possible subject of study emerged with modern biology and the concep-
tual opposition between the organic and the non-organic. The same historic
moment gave birth to the secular modern state with its technologies of gov-
erning and its new area of activities called ‘police’ (die Policey) (Foucault 1994a;
2000).The modern state, Foucault argues, takes over the principle of pastoral
conduct from the church, assuming responsibility for the welfare of both the
individual and the collective, guiding, guarding and protecting them. How-
ever, the modern state combines pastoral conduct with new forms of knowl-
edge and new means of enforcement. Moreover, it secularizes the purpose of
conduct; the aim is no longer to save any individual soul but to preserve the
general, this-worldly welfare in terms of health, longevity, wealth and pros-
perity. While salvation as an aim was absolute, individualistic and universal,
the general welfare is relative, gradual, politically confined to a certain collec-
tivity, and open to constant improvement. Salvation was absolute in that it
was ultimately about heaven or hell, salvation or perdition; it was individual-
istic insofar as the goal was to save every human soul, no matter how weak,
corrupt, or evil; and it was universal in that it was not limited to the mem-
bers of a particular collective. Promoting the general welfare, by contrast, is a
matter of gradual but in principle unlimited progress. And it is not a universal
task; the modern state takes care of its own population within the boundaries
of its own territory. It may strive to expand its territory, but it has no jurisdic-
tion over the people living beyond it. On the contrary, improving the relative
welfare and the relative strength of its own population, as compared to oth-
ers, is now a way for the state to improve its own relative strength and power
in a world divided into competing states (Foucault, 2000).
The modern state, in this account, performs its pastoral power through
the ‘police’ (Foucault 2007, 312f.). Police—die Policey—was the Prussian proto-
type of what we now know as public policy. Police connects the welfare of the
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individuals to that of the collective and vice versa; it seeks to improve the in-
dividuals’ welfare through improving the general welfare and to improve the
general welfare through guiding the individuals’ behavior and way of living.
Thus, the political rationality of early police, as Foucault describes it, was al-
ready a biopolitical one, targeting, shaping, managing and improving the life
processes in the population as a means to strengthen the power of the state.
The political rationality that emerged here targets life both at the level of
the individual—health, birth, death, survival, procreation, morality and way
of life—and at the level of the collective—its composition, growth, develop-
ment, average health status and life span, mortality and birth rates and so
forth. Note, however, that it is not confined to shaping and improving life in
the biological sense.The life governed according to this biopolitical rationality
was not merely the life studied by medicine or biology. It was also the life that
was being led, the orderly life, the way of living, the standard of living; the
life that became governed through police referred to public health and well-
being, but also to trade, work, public order, and even entertainment.
In short, life is the object of the police: the indispensable, the useful, and the
superfluous. That people survive, live, and even do better than just that: this
is what the police has to ensure. (Foucault 1994a, 321)
Hence, Foucault does not establish an opposition of biological and social life;
there is no ‘life itself ’ underneath social and cultural life that would somehow
form a more fundamental layer of human existence. Biopolitics in this sense
is not the production of ‘bare life’, as Agamben (1998) terms it; it is not the layer
of life that is laid bare after the social layer is taken off, after the social being
has been stripped of its rights, social status and social relations. Unlike Agam-
ben, Foucault does not assume a conceptual opposition between the biological
and the social, between bare life or life itself and social life. There is no ahis-
torical, non-social, biological ‘life’ in Foucault. Also, in contrast to Agamben,
Foucault does not conceptualize biopolitics or biopower as essentially nega-
tive forces that would operate through subtraction, taking away individuals’
rights, status, social relations and ultimately lives. For Foucault, unlike Agam-
ben, biopolitics is not quintessentially thanatopolitics. However, this does not
mean that biopolitics and thanatopolitics are mutually exclusive. Rather, for
Foucault, biopolitics may operate through a repertoire of political technolo-
gies ranging frommore liberal tomore disciplinary or even repressive ormur-
derous ones. They may range from promoting individual self-determination
via incentivizing or supporting socially desired behavior to more disciplinary
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technologies, control mechanisms and negative sanctions, and ultimately the
use of force and actual killing.There is no causal necessity that leads from one
step to the next, from fostering life to taking life, no biopolitical determinism
that starts with freedom and inevitably ends with force. Many twentieth-cen-
tury states had eugenics policies in place, but not all of them killed psychiatric
patients and committed genocide.
The point is, however, that strategies of managing, improving, and opti-
mizing human life are never only supportive. They have a dark side as well.
They inevitably involve norms and standards for measuring achievement, cri-
teria for what qualifies as better, desirable, or improved and what does not.
Thus, they constitutively imply scales of differential value of humans. The
more systematic such strategies are, the more they involve measurements for
determining success or failure, calculating the relation of means and ends,
risks and benefits, distinguishing one from the other, stating progress or
stagnation, and criteria for positioning individuals at some point on the spec-
trum. In this sense, biopolitics includes strategies and mechanisms for pre-
serving and improving, but also for assessing, rating and calculating the rel-
ative health, fitness, productivity and functionality of individuals and collec-
tivities—strategies that constantly establish, apply, confirm, refine and rein-
force systems of differential valuation of humans. It strives to increase the
level of health, fitness and productivity in the collective and ascribes differ-
ential value to individuals according to whether and to what extent they meet
these standards. Thus, biopolitics, as Lennard Davis puts it, “is always a pol-
itics of differential vulnerability” (Davis 2020, emph. i. o.); those individuals or
groups found not to meet the standards become vulnerable to the other side
of biopolitics: to strategies and mechanisms of neglect and discrimination or,
in the worst case, of selection and elimination.
The Nazi state took biopolitics to the extreme, pursuing the improve-
ment of themaster race through strategies of systematically eliminating those
deemed to contaminate, weaken or burden it.This does not mean that biopol-
itics can be equated with Nazi biopolitics. Rather, we can see a continuum of
biopolitical technologies ranging from promoting, supporting and improv-
ing life by means of social policy, urban planning, public health and the like
to selection and ultimately elimination practices. Biopolitics is not limited
to elimination, nor is there any kind of causal mechanism that necessarily
leads from more benevolent forms of biopolitics to a politics of elimination.
However, it does mean that the latter is always a possibility, the reason being
that biopolitical rationality inevitably implies systems of differential valuation
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and, accordingly, differential vulnerabilities.These systems do not necessarily
refer to biological categories; in fact, it is a commonmisunderstanding, as the
following chapters will point out, that Nazi biopolitics in general was based
on biologistic assumptions and that it was biologism that made it murderous.
Nazi biopolitics, I will argue, selected along the lines of qualities the Nazis
deemed useful for improving the Aryan master race, such as health, strength,
fitness, productivity and performance capability6; superiority and inferiority
were ascribed along these lines. Actually, the Nazis were not particularly in-
terested in whether what they saw as inferiority was caused by social circum-
stances, genetic conditions,misfortune, political opposition, insubordination
or a combination thereof; what mattered was whether someone conformed to
their standards or not. Liberal democratic societies also allocate social posi-
tions, life chances and value along these standards; they also valuate health,
productivity, functionality and performance even if they like to think of them-
selves as being the antithesis to Nazi biopolitics given that their systems of
differential valuation are not based on ‘biologism’. Nevertheless, they may es-
tablish and apply systems of differential valuation as well. Actually, as I will
argue in Chapter 7, themode of production still underlying liberal democratic
societies today, namely capitalism, is characterized by a logic of accumulation
that strongly converges with the logic of biopolitics in that both are directed
at optimizing the forces of life and making them productive. Thus, following
the Foucauldian line of thought, I understand biopolitics as a set of strate-
gies and mechanisms flowing from a political rationality of optimizing the
vital qualities of individuals and collectivities with a repertoire of strategies
and mechanisms ranging from promoting, supporting and preserving life to
devaluating and destroying it.
1.4 Biopolitical Temporality
Seen from this angle, biopolitics is an essentially temporalized affair. It is
constituted by temporality in three regards: it is an essentially historical phe-
nomenon, it targets temporal objects, and it is characterized by a specific
future-oriented temporal logic of increasing, improving and optimizing.
First, biopolitics is a radically historical phenomenon. It is not a univer-
sal, timeless feature of human existence, but co-emerges with the modern
6 Leistungsfähigkeit would be the German term; there is no direct English equivalent.
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episteme, the modern state and the modern technologies of government at
a specific historic moment: the threshold of modernity. Following Reinhart
Koselleck (2003; 2004), we can go one step further and say that it is not even
one historic moment among others but rather the moment at which eschato-
logical time was superseded by historical time; one could say that it was the
moment at which historical time entered history. Between 1600 and 1800,
Koselleck shows, a new order of time arose. Time opened up into an un-
bounded this-worldly future, no longer delimited by the final judgement and
the end of time. The new future was amenable to, but also required, fore-
cast and planning; the modern, secular state adopted the responsibility of or-
ganizing it. The secular state replaced prophecy with rational prognosis and
drew on the latter for policy making and planning, that is, for bringing about
certain futures and preventing others. Together, the notion of an unbounded
future and rational prognosis as a form of knowledge allowed for what Fou-
cault terms the formation of the Policey and the corresponding technologies
of government. Government as the conduct of conduct now meant to bring
about desired futures and prevent undesired ones.
Second, biopolitics targets temporalized objects. As argued above, police
and its technologies of governing were the first manifestation of biopolitics
in the Foucauldian sense. Emerging at the threshold of modernity, police was
a set of government strategies that was geared at shaping the future through
governing the conduct of individuals, their way of living, working, behaving
and procreating, as well as life processes in the population on an aggregate
level. On both levels, that of the individual and that of the collective, biopoli-
tics strives to govern temporal phenomena: behavior and processes both take
place in time; they exist only insofar and for as long as they take place.7While
sovereign power operates according to a territorial logic—defending the terri-
tory, expanding the territory, issuing laws for a certain territory, drawing lines
between what is permitted and what is prohibited and sanctioning trans-
gressions8—biopolitics operates according to a temporal logic, targeting the
movement of bodies, the behavior of individuals, the way they lead their lives,
their carrying out of work, family, and sexual life, and the life processes of the
population on an aggregate level. On the aggregate level, it links past, present
7 It is a curious thing to characterize temporal phenomena as those that takeplace, but I
cannot think of a better term.
8 For a more detailed outline of the various forms of power in Foucault and their respec-
tive relation to different temporal regimes, see Portschy 2020.
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and future through generating statistical data in the present, constructing
larger processes through ordering and articulating them, extrapolating state-
ments from past processes into the future, informing governmental policies
in the present that are geared at shaping the future. In a sense, it constitutes
time by articulating past, present and future. In short, biopolitics targets tem-
poral events and sequences and seeks to shape and direct their future course.
Third, biopolitics does so in a particularly temporalized way. Others have
already pointed out that biopolitics in the Foucauldian sense is critically fu-
ture-oriented and that this orientation towards ‘futurity’ defines it as a con-
stitutively modern affair (Tellmann 2017). However, it is not simply its future-
orientedness as such that characterizes modern biopolitics; rather, it is its
specific mode of future-orientedness, namely the dynamic of constantly in-
creasing, improving and optimizing the forces of human life. Modern biopol-
itics is distinct from earlier historic forms of ruling human behavior in that
it does not only aspire to preserve, control or stabilize certain ways of life9,
including their sexual, procreative and otherwise bodily aspects but strives
to enable and optimize both the exploitation and the growth of the human
life force. It emerges at the intersection of scientific, economic and political
rationalities that are all directed at increasing the vital productivity of the hu-
man. Hence, it is not simply the fact that biopolitics is oriented towards the
future but that it is oriented towards increasing and improving the function-
ality of human life that we must come to terms with (Wehling 2008, 251). In
the modern era, Foucault states:
‘Deduction’ has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely
one element amongothers, working to incite, reinforce, control,monitor, op-
timize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generative forces,
making themgrow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to imped-
ing them, making them submit, or destroying them. (Foucault 1980, 136)
In this sense, biopolitics is about the calculated, rational, systematic improve-
ment of the human, driven forward bymeans of knowledge production as well
as political technologies and various combinations thereof. It includes a type
of strategies and mechanisms that are directed at managing, increasing and
9 This is what Mika Ojakangas (2016) fails to acknowledge when he argues that biopoli-
tics is not a specifically modern phenomenon but is already present in the writings of
Plato and Aristotle.
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optimizing the human life force as a means of increasing productivity and
functionality in the population.
The problem, for one thing, is that strategies of optimizing human life,
whether through political, medical or other technologies, involve norms and
standards for measuring achievement and establish what qualifies as better,
desirable, or improved and what does not.Thus, such strategies constitutively
imply scales of differential human value.Therefore, there is an inbuilt danger
in biopolitical rationality, a dangerous tendency that may remain latent over
long periods of time and be kept in check by systems of rights and a culture of
solidarity but that may linger and be actuated under changing circumstances:
the tendency to sacrifice less valuable lives for the life of the collective. It is
rooted in the fact that individual human life is limited but the life of the col-
lective is not. Optimizing the life force of an individual is limited by death,
but optimizing the life force of the collective is not. Thus, strategies of biopo-
litical optimization must capitulate in the face of individual death and shift
their ambitions instead to the level of the collective. When the life of the col-
lective is reigning supreme and/or when represented as being in danger and
in need of defence, sacrificing those who do not meet the standards can ap-
pear perfectly compatible with biopolitical rationality as such. This is what
happened in selective sterilization policies and in Nazi ‘euthanasia’, and I will
argue that it also what happened in Nazi persecution of homosexuals and so-
called ‘asocials’. It is also what happens when calculations of future healthy, fit
and productive life years determine who shall live and who not. At this point,
we can approach the relationships between biopolitics, temporality, historic
justice and what I term injuries of normality.
1.5 Biopolitics, Historic Justice and Injuries of Normality
The past thirty years have seen an increased preoccupation with the legacies
of past atrocities and systematic human rights violations. A fast-growing field
of scholarly discourse and political activity has emerged, marked by concepts
such as restitution, reparations, apology, and commemoration10. In political
science, international relations, and law the concept of transitional justice (TJ)
10 Indeed, the volume of the literature has undeniably become unmanageable. For an
overview, see De Greiff 2006; Palmer, Clark, and Granville 2012. A classic for a concep-
tual outline is still Martha Minow’s (1998) Between Vengeance and Forgiveness.
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prevails. TJ has grown into a well-established field of inquiry and intervention
since the late 1990s. Despite the consolidation of the field, transition is still a
contested concept; there is no unanimous understanding of whether it should
more narrowly refer to transitions from autocratic to democratic types of gov-
ernment or be expanded to include transitions from conflict to peace, from
instability to stability, or any major changes in the form of exercizing author-
ity, which would also include changes within established democracies (Win-
ter 2014). Furthermore, a number of efforts have been made to expand the
scope of transitional justice in order to cover hitherto neglected issues such
as social and economic injustices including forced evictions, the destruction
of homes, or long-term social inequity (Arbour 2006; Miller 2008), sexualized
violence and gender-related structural inequality (Buckley-Zistel and Stanley
2012; Hitzel-Cassagnes and Martinsen 2014), or systematic harm to indige-
nous people (Balint, Evans, and McMillan 2014; Corntassel and Holder 2008).
Here, I want to draw attention to a further type of historic wrong that has
been largely overlooked by transitional and historic justice studies: system-
atic harm inflicted on people categorized as abnormal, deviant, deficient or
inferior with respect to norms and standards of health, fitness, functionality,
productivity and usefulness. I term such violations injuries of normality.They
refer to notions of normality in a threefold sense:
First, injuries of normality emerge from biopolitical strategies of detect-
ing, marking and selecting out the ‘abnormals’, the weak and the unproduc-
tive, whose lives, according to this logic, pose an impediment to the enhance-
ment of the vital capacities of the collective, whether the latter is constructed
as society, the nation, the race or another entity. Within a biopolitical ratio-
nality, the lives of those deemed abnormal, deficient or inferior pose a threat
or a burden to the improvement of the collective. The logic of normality and
deviance may overlap or intersect with notions of race, ethnicity, gender, re-
ligion or other markers but is also distinct from these. It targets people not
primarily as members of a given social or cultural group. Members of a dom-
inant, unmarked social group can also fall victim to injuries of normality if
and when they are found to deviate from the standards of normality.
Second, this type of harm is not confined to situations of exceptional cri-
sis or regimes of exceptional evil but also occurs in situations that generally
qualify as normality.The logic of marking and selecting people categorized as
disabled, deviant, dysfunctional or simply useless is not limited to situations
of strife or war, nor to autocratic regimes, although these may aggravate it.
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Third, the norms and standards underlying injuries of normality tend to
be deeply entrenched in social, political, cultural or legal practices, institu-
tions, discourses and thought systems, so much so that practices and policies
of enforcing them are largely considered normal by contemporaries, even if
they involve grave harm to those who are targeted.
In this book, I refer only to some cases of injuries of normality, namely
the persecution underNazi rule of people categorized asmentally ill, disabled,
hereditarily ill, homosexual, or ‘asocial’. Note that this is only a small selec-
tion of extreme cases and by no means a conclusive list of this type of historic
injustice. The focus here is not so much on how and why these crimes were
committed in the first place but on whether and to what extent the demo-
cratic successor state, the Federal Republic was prepared to reflect upon the
wrongness of these crimes.
The Federal Republic of Germany is often referred to as a model case with
regard to coming to terms with the past. Post-war (West) Germany, it is said,
has confronted its Nazi past through education policies, apologies and pay-
ments of compensation in ways that could serve as a model for other coun-
tries that have committed human rights violations (Buruma 1994). German
Holocaust reparations have been called “the prototype of all reparations pol-
itics” (Torpey 2006, 4). Yet the history of German Aufarbeitung und Wiedergut-
machung is also a history of denial and disregard, most notably with respect
to so-called forgotten victims. The term ‘forgotten victims’ is a misnomer,
since some groups of Nazi victims were not forgotten at all but deliberately
excluded from reparations, such as communists, deserters, homosexuals, or
those who had been forcibly sterilized under the Law for the Prevention of
Hereditary Diseases. The 1953 Federal Indemnification Act (Bundesentschädi-
gungsgesetz, BEG) clearly and conclusively defined who was to be considered
a victim of Nazi persecution, namely someone who had been persecuted for
“racial, religious, or political reasons or because of the victim’s world view”
(BEG §1(1)). Thereby, the law sharply delineated those injuries that would be
identified as Nazi injustices and qualify for reparations from those that would
not.11 Victims of selective sterilization, the persecution of homosexuals and of
11 The wording goes back to the so-called Bermuda Conference formula of “racial, reli-
gious, and political refugees” framed by the U.S. and British Allies in 1943. Regula Ludi
argues that the Bermuda formula drewheavily on the idea of theMinority Treaties that
had been established in the interwar period to protect national, ethnic and religious
minorities (Ludi 2012, 18f.). TheWest Germanpost-war reparation schemeadopted the
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those categorized as ‘asocial’ were deliberately excluded from this reparation
scheme as they were not considered victims of typical Nazi persecution. The
same applied to Roma and Sinti as the German Federal Court (BGH) ruled in
1956 that racial persecution under the Nazis did not begin until March 1943.
Deportations and arbitrary incarceration prior to that date were considered
as a means of criminal prevention, not as persecution (Feyen 2009, 330ff.).
By way of this exclusion, and in many other ways as well, the stigma that had
been inflicted on these groups of victims was reconfirmed and prolonged into
the era of democracy. For survivors, the transition to democracy did not coin-
cide with the end of stigmatization, exclusion and the experience of violence.
In many cases, personal, institutional or legal continuities stretched into the
age of the new republic: Experts called for a new sterilization law in order to
protect public health; the paragraph of the Criminal Code that banned male
homosexuality remained in place in its 1935 version until 1969; girls from so-
cially deprived backgrounds were confined to institutional ‘care’ for reasons
of their ‘sexual depravity’.
My aim in this book is to shed light on this continuity by means of a
threefold argument: First, Nazi selective sterilization policy, the persecution
of male homosexuals, and the persecution of people categorized as ‘asocial’
were driven by a biopolitical rationality aimed at improving the vital qualities
of the larger collective. They were firmly anchored in a biopolitical rationality
that values normality, health, functionality, productivity and fitness. Second,
this rationality did not dissolve in 1945. Third, the victims of selective steril-
ization policy, the persecution of male homosexuals, and the persecution of
‘asocials’ were denied entitlement to reparations and, for a long time, also an
apology and acknowledgement of the injustice they suffered—because and for
as long as the relevant policy actors in the post-war state and society shared
this biopolitical rationality. Thus, struggles over the biopolitics of the past
are simultaneously struggles over the power of biopolitical rationality in the
present, and the incidents referred to at the outset of this chapter show that
these struggles are not yet over.
Bermuda formula but included persecution for political reasons. In other words, West
German post-war reparations were crucially informed by the ethnic minority protec-
tion frame, and I would argue that it has remained the dominant frame in German
post-war reparations to the present time.
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1.6 Outline of the Book
The chapters in this book have been written at different points in time. They
should each be comprehensible as stand-alone units.The disadvantage of this
structure is, of course, that repetitions, discontinuities and even discrepan-
cies may occur. Thoughts, concepts, foci and perspectives may have shifted
over time, both in my thinking and in the literature.
This chapter was intended to introduce the three themes of this
book—biopolitics, temporality and historic justice—and explain how they
relate to one other. I have argued that biopolitics is a specifically modern
phenomenon characterized by a future-oriented logic of optimizing the
human life force on the level of the collective and that this logic implies the
differential valuation of human lives which, in the extreme, can involve the
elimination of those deemed less valuable.
Chapter 2 reviews a paradigmatic case of modern biopolitical logic: the
politics of eugenics in the twentieth century. It shows that eugenics is best un-
derstood as a modern political project encompassing knowledge production,
a broad repertoire of political mechanisms and technologies and engagement
of civil society actors such as professional associations, women’s organiza-
tions, charities and others. The eugenic project is a pinnacle of biopolitical
rationality in that it was directed at enhancing the vital qualities of the larger
collective through political technologies involving systems of differential val-
uation, exposure und vulnerability. The chapter refutes the common misun-
derstanding that eugenics was basically a project of the political Right based
on biologistic, sexist, and racist assumptions. In fact, historical research has
provided ample evidence that eugenic thought and practices emerged from
a broad range of political, cultural, and scientific orientations and existed in
many different variants. What they have in common is not an anti-modern,
‘reactionary’, pseudo-scientific attitude but rather a modern biopolitical ra-
tionality.
The ensuing Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are devoted to the question how the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany has come to terms—or not—with the injuries of
normality committed by the Nazi regime. Through three case studies—the
policy of selective sterilization, the persecution of male homosexuals, and the
persecution of ‘asocials’—I reconstruct when, how, with what result and on
which grounds victims’ claims to reparations and rehabilitation were denied
or approved. All three groups of victims belong to the wrongly named set of
‘forgotten victims’whowere excluded from entitlement to reparations accord-
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ing to the Federal Indemnification Act.They were only granted the right to file
for compensation when, in the 1980s, new hardship compensation funds were
established as a second track for compensating Nazi victims. These funds,
however, were designated to compensate for damages suffered due to the
war or similar circumstances, not for wrongdoing on the part of the state.
In addition, no official apology was issued and no official site of commemo-
ration established until well into the twenty-first century. I trace the struggles
for reparations and rehabilitation and the responses by relevant actors such
as policy-makers, courts and experts as well as the rationales given for these
exclusions. The focus of these chapters is on the question of what in these
crimes, if anything, state actors acknowledged as wrong. It becomes clear
that state actors did not grant rehabilitation and reparations because and for
as long as they were unwilling to condemn the political rationality that had
motivated these crimes in the past, a rationality according to which people
categorized as disabled, mentally ill, mentally retarded, work-shy or weak,
sick, deviant due to their homosexuality, or otherwise unproductive, useless
or worthless formed a threat or burden to society that the state was obliged to
fend off. In short, it was the endurance of a biopolitical rationality of enhanc-
ing the health, strength and productivity of the population through reducing
the number of the allegedly unhealthy, weak and unproductive that stood in
the way of historic justice. It was considered normal rather than wrong. Of
the three cases presented, we can see that the denial of wrongness persisted
the longest in the case of the persecution of ‘asocials’; it was not until 2020
that the Bundestag officially condemned this practice. Earlier in the century,
in 2004, it had officially declared that Nazi sterilization policy had been ut-
terly wrong, although upon close inspection, one can see that the verdict of
wrongness did not refer to selective sterilization policy per se but sterilization
policy as a stepping stone on the way to ‘euthanasia’ and the Holocaust. An
exceptional case of historic justice occurred in 2017, when the Bundestag re-
pealed the criminal convictions that had been issued for male homosexuality
after 1945 and also granted the right to reparations to those who had suffered
from them. In this case, the state not only condemned the wrongdoing of its
predecessor but also its own wrongs; moreover, in the same act, it formally
abandoned the biopolitical construction that male homosexuality is debilitat-
ing to state and society and must thus be curbed.
Chapters 6 and 7 examine the nexus of biopolitics, temporality and the
differential valuation of human life on a social–theoretical level. Chapter 6
discusses the overlaps and intersections but also the differences between Fou-
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cault’s analysis of biopolitics and Hannah Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism.
Both Arendt and Foucault, I argue, problematize the nexus of the assimila-
tion of politics to management and social engineering, the structure of pro-
cessual time, and modern politics’ and society’s preoccupation with ‘life’; both
draw attention to themore sinister implications of this nexus.While Foucault,
however, presents themore historicized analysis, Arendt offers an alternative,
non-biopolitical understanding of politics, life, and time which she captures
in the concept of natality. Chapter 7 explores the intersections and conver-
gences between Foucault’s conceptualization of biopolitics and Marx’s anal-
ysis of capitalism concerning the relationship between power, life and time
under conditions of modernity. I posit that both Marx and Foucault highlight
the productive dimension of power and that life, for both, is a key resource
for this historically specific type of power—in fact, it is the resource that can
simultaneously be exploited and increased. Finally, in both Marx and Fou-
cault, temporality is key: Capital and biopower/biopolitics share a temporal
structure characterized by an ongoing, unlimited process of ever-increasing
productivity. This process, they state, is directed at the future, but not at a
future of fulfilment of needs. Rather, it is a permanent, unlimited process of
optimizing and increasing the human forces of life, a process that cannot pos-
sibly come to a meaningful end. Again, we see that the quest for the constant
improvement of human beings is accompanied by the constant construction
of deficient life, life that does not meet the norms and standards of health and
fitness, of functionality and productivity. Rendering this nexus amenable to
critical reflection is the purpose of this book.

2 Biopolitics and Modernity:
Revisiting the Eugenics Project
For a long time, the notion of eugenics was firmly associated with the notions
of racism and biological determinism; eugenics was taken to be a reactionary,
pseudo-scientific ideology, typically emerging from an authoritarian, fascist
or totalitarian state. Hence, eugenics was located on one side of a binary ma-
trix, together with racism, biological determinism, pseudo-science, coercion,
control and authoritarianism as opposed to tolerance, sound science, free-
dom and democracy on the other. In this vein, Garland Allen, one of the first
historians of eugenics in the 1970s, lamented that British eugenics
became a reactionary programme for solving social problems through
biological technology. A direct heir of the Social Darwinist philosophy of the
late nineteenth century, twentieth century eugenics had a strongly racist
bias which explained all differences between people in hereditarian terms.
Eugenicists saw all racial and ethnic groups (what they persisted in calling
‘races’) in hierarchical terms, with the Anglo-Saxon on top and all other
groups ranging below in a scale of decreasing whiteness. (Allen 1976, 111)
With the emergence of the new genetics in the 1980s and 90s, the picture
of eugenics as a repressive, reactionary and racist ideology often served as a
background against which genetics compared quite favorably. While eugen-
ics, in this picture, put the emphasis on race, the new genetics served the
purpose of health; while eugenics was state-sponsored and operated through
force, genetic testing was a matter of individual freedom and self-determi-
nation. Eugenics was pseudo-science; genetics was sound science. As David
Gems of the Galton Library summarizes:
Among the numerous reasons for disapproving of 20th Century (sic) eugenics
programmes are the fact that they were typically not only authoritarian, but
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also based on an inadequate understanding of human genetics, particularly
before the Second World War. Then there was the special place of eugen-
ics in the deranged ideology of German National Socialism. Arguably, Nazi
atrocities justified in terms of eugenics (principally the Holocaust) are more
the consequence of the brutal, totalitarian and at times insane character
of Nazism, than the desire to promote human well-being through genetics.
These failings of eugenics are historically contingent and do not necessarily
follow from the idea of promoting human genetic well-being. (Gems 1999,
199)
Today’s genetic engineering, it has been argued, is entirely different from the
eugenics of former times, given that
[…] population eugenics involves commanding people to produce desired
genotypic or phenotypic traits. This sort of eugenics is not the same as al-
lowing an individual or couple voluntarily to choose a heritable trait in their
sperm, egg, embryo, or fetus, motivated by their view of what is good or de-
sirable. (Caplan, McGeen et al. 1999, 338)
Others hold that eugenics and the new genetics are not so different after all,
but that both should be approved since genetic technologies in combination
with reproductive medicine may serve to select against undesired qualities in
human offspring and enhance the quality of the nation, population, society
or human species (Lynn 2001). In this view, eugenics was not itself a problem;
only the Nazis’ abuse of it constituted one. Even if the new genetics does bring
about a return of eugenics, then, this is considered acceptable unless it is
coupled with a return of Nazism.
As part of a different endeavor, namely seeking to capture the distinctively
novel features of biopolitics in the 21st century, Nikolas Rose also contrasts
the old eugenics to the new genetics. Contemporary biopolitics, he argues,
is characterized by a molecularization of knowledge, a focus on optimizing
the healthy body, new somatic identities, an expanding bioeconomy, and new
forms of collectivity that he and Paul Rabinow have termed biosociality (Rose
2001; Rabinow and Rose 2006; Rose 2007). We need a new conceptual frame-
work, he argues, to capture the configuration of contemporary biopolitics in
its own right; classifying it as a new form of eugenics will not suffice. As true
as this may be, the contrast between old eugenics and new genetics is mis-
leading as it draws on a simplified and reduced understanding of historic
eugenics.
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Eugenics, Rose claims, “was a collective attempt imposed by a state to
improve the quality of the population, in a geopolitical context often seen
as a struggle between races. What we see today is something different.” (Rose
2006, 13) Politically, Rose argues, eugenics was sponsored and administered by
the state, whereas the new biopolitics is taking place in a variety of fields and
is promoted by a variety of non-state actors such as self-help groups, ethics
committees, professional associations, and not least individuals (Rose 2001).
Epistemologically, eugenics relied on the notion of genetic determinism and
biology as destiny, whereas contemporary biomedicine and genetics refute
the view of biology as destiny and, rather, regard life as something open to
modification and enhancement.
This chapter challenges the dichotomy between an old, reactionary, racist,
state-sponsored, biologically deterministic eugenics and a new, scientifically
sound, unideological, non-racist genetics serving the health and self-determi-
nation of the individual. It does so, however, less by questioning the genetics
component of the model and more by revisiting the historic eugenics project
and demonstrating that it was not necessarily reactionary, racist, determinis-
tic and state-sponsored. At least, these were not its most significant and dis-
tinctive features. It is true that eugenics was profoundly anti-egalitarian and
incompatible with notions of fundamental human rights and dignity. How-
ever, it was not confined to the reactionary, authoritarian or anti-democratic
end of the political spectrum. Eugenics was a multi-facetted, international,
politically diverse and essentially modern phenomenon of the early 20th cen-
tury (Engs 2005; Wecker 2009; Bashford and Levine 2010).
Although eugenics aligned itself with various political rationalities, its va-
rieties have some ideas and assumptions in common. The eugenics project
revolves around two basic claims, one theoretical and one practical: first, that
humans can and in fact must be classified on a scale of differential worth. In
the words of Harry Laughlin, one of the founding fathers of US eugenics:
Every science which deals with man in any way attempts to make its own
classification of mankind. […] Its [eugenics’] classification must be based
upon the ability of particular stocks to function as socially valuable units
and to reproduce themselves in proportion with their race values. (Laughlin
1925, 31)
Eugenics thus establishes a system of differential worth among humans based
on the presence or absence of certain qualities that are, assumedly, passed
down to future generations. Second, eugenics assumes that it is both neces-
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sary and possible to reduce the number of individuals of inferior quality to
the benefit of those of superior quality and thereby to improve the quality of
the larger social collective. To quote Laughlin again: “It is a big job to purge
the race, but it is one of the principal practical tasks of eugenics” (Laughlin
1925, 34).
Whether or not eugenics aligned itself with reactionary, authoritarian,
racist, biologist rationalities, it maintained these two assumptions. At its core
lies the distinction between the fit and the unfit, the useful and the useless, the
inferior and the superior, those who are an asset to society and those who are
a burden. Combinedwith the assumption that individuals pass these qualities
on to coming generations, this distinction constitutes a eugenicmatrix as part
of a larger biopolitical rationality demanding to reduce the numbers of the
unfit, the dysfunctional and the unproductive in order to improve the fitness,
functionality and performance of the social body at large. This biopolitical
rationality informed andmotivated a wide range of political, academic, social
and cultural efforts in the 20th century, whether these were termed eugenics,
racial hygiene, social reform, or called by another name.
2.1 A Modern Project
As is generally known, the term ‘eugenics’ was invented by the British an-
thropologist and statistician Francis Galton.The new academic discipline that
Galton intended to establish was a hybrid creation, a cross between science
and social engineering envisioned as useful to policy and planning. Most of
all, it was fundamentally oriented towards the future. Galtung thus chose the
name ‘eugenics’ to denote “the study of the agencies under social control that
may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either phys-
ically or mentally” (Galton 1907).
Thus, from the start, eugenics was a field where science and politics, facts
and values, practices of knowing and practices of intervening intersected and
co-constituted each other. It self-identified as an applied science rather than
as basic research.1 Hence, there was never such a thing as a purely scien-
tific, value-neutral, apolitical discipline of eugenics that eventually became
corrupted, that was politically misused or instrumentalized.
1 For a detailed study on this aspect in the German context, see Weingart, Kroll et al.
1996.
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Furthermore, it was far from being ‘reactionary’; its aimwas not to uphold
the given social order, let alone restore that of the past. It did not draw on tra-
dition, religion, customs or conventions but was decisively oriented towards
the future. As Galton saw it, eugenics “extends the function of philanthropy
to future generations” (Galton cited in Turda 2010a, 22).
Eugenics’ vision for the future, however, was not one of social equality.
Galton did not approve of the concept of equality:
I have no patiencewith the hypothesis occasionally expressed, and often im-
plied, especially in tales written to teach children to be good, that babies are
born pretty much alike […]. It is in themost unqualifiedmanner that I object
to pretensions of natural equality. (Galton cited in Reilly 1991, 3)
Galton’s opposition to the concept of equality did not, however, entail the be-
lief that biology was destiny. His goal was not to maintain the biological sta-
tus quo and stabilize existing inequalities. For Galton, eugenics was about
human improvement; the purpose of the new discipline was to accelerate the
evolution of mankind under conditions controlled by men. This required a
new ethics. In this respect, again, eugenics was far from being ‘conserva-
tive’. Implementing eugenic ideas required overcoming extant ethical norms,
conventions and traditions, which in fact formed an impediment to eugen-
ics. In Germany around 1900, prominent eugenicists explicitly promoted a
new, evolutionary, so-called generative ethics, an ethics that would further
the hereditary qualities of future generations and the evolution of mankind
(Weingart, Kroll et al. 1996, 141). In this vein, Wilhelm Schallmayer, a promi-
nent co-founder of eugenics in Germany who saw himself as a democrat and
socialist of sorts, explained that a generative ethics would include “moral obli-
gations in support of the race (that is, in support of the hereditary qualities of
future generations of our community)” (Schallmayer cited in Weingart, Kroll
et al. 1996, 141).
Thus, for eugenics, the past provided no moral orientation or authority
whatsoever; at best, it did not stand in the way. The most extreme version of
eugenic politics, Nazi eugenics, consequently took the most anti-conservative
stance with respect to ethics. As then-Minister for the Interior Wilhelm Frick
stated:
The scientific study of heredity (based on the progress of the last decade)
has enabled us clearly to recognise the rules of heredity and selection aswell
as their meaning for the nation and state. It gives us the right and the moral
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obligation to eliminate hereditary defectives from procreation. Nomisinter-
preted charity nor religious scruples, based on the dogmas of past centuries,
should prevent us from fulfilling this duty [...]. (Frick cited in Turda 2010a,
111)
From its inception in 19th century Britain to its eliminatory implementation
under the Nazi regime, eugenics took a decidedly modernist stance towards
the future. Eugenics can best be understood as a modernist politico-epis-
temic project encompassing ideas, visions, knowledges and policies promoted
by experts, policy-makers, professionals, practitioners, and an exceptionally
broad variety of civil society actors. What held the project together was the
common mission to improve the socio-biological basis of human life at the
collective level. The type of collective chosen for improvement could differ. It
could be the race, the Aryan race, society, humankind, or another group. In
all cases, though, eugenics sought to strengthen and improve some sort of
collective entity. That entity then became the object of deliberate efforts at
rational intervention. As such, eugenics can be considered the paradigmatic
case of biopolitical modernity (Braun and Gerhards 2019).
The future, however, was a creature of the present. One could not simply
wait for it; it required action—action in time. To refrain from intervention and
social engineering would be to open the gates to degeneration. In that sense,
eugenics epitomized modernity as German historian Reinhard Koselleck saw
it. For Koselleck, the idea that the future is open and amenable to deliberate
intervention, and that it in fact requires intervention, marks the threshold of
modernity (Koselleck 1989). Modernity, according to Koselleck, is character-
ized by the temporalization of history. Well into the 16th century, history was
a time of eschatological expectation, the time that remained before the sec-
ond coming of Christ, the Final Judgment and the end of time. Modern time,
in contrast, was open-ended and full of possibilities. The future came to be
amenable to human intervention, but at the same time it also became uncer-
tain. Planning it became both feasible and imperative. Until then, the present
had been a long stretch—nothing much would change in any case. Now, it
shrank to the point between past and future where decisions had to be taken.
At the same time, anticipating possible futures, establishing the likelihood
of future developments, deciding which were desirable and which not, push-
ing desirable developments and preventing undesirable ones became part of
the responsibilities and the remit of the state whose legitimacy no longer
originated in a Christian cosmology. From the perspective of eugenics, not
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only the economy, human morality, science and technology were amenable
to enhancement; human hereditary qualities were as well. It was first and
foremost, although not exclusively, the state that was now in charge of ac-
tion. Importantly, as Koselleck shows, the temporalization of history implies
the construction of collectivities such as ‘the nation’, ‘humanity’ or ‘the race’.
These imagined entities were assumed to remain the same through histori-
cal changes, thus bearing the marks of history and rendering it observable.2
What Michel Foucault (1980, 2003) called biopolitics is very similar. Biopol-
itics, for Foucault, is the form of politics that co-emerged with the modern
state and is directed at regulating and enhancing the composition and the
qualities of the population. Biopolitics is essentially future-oriented in that
it strives for future improvement; it is knowledge-based in that it relies on
statistics, correlations and prognoses (Braun and Gerhards 2019). On all of
these counts, eugenics can be considered the paradigmatic case of biopoli-
tics.
2.2 Eugenics and Social Reform
Hence, eugenics was not reactionary or conservative. Nor was it typically a
project of the political right. Historians of eugenics have provided ample ev-
idence that it had adherents among a broad range of political groupings, in-
cluding socialists, social democrats, anarchists, and feminists.
The view that eugenics was promoted by political conservatives, at least
originally, has been sustained by Daniel Kevles’ (1985) influential study on the
history of eugenic ideas in Britain and the US. Kevles makes a conceptual
distinction between mainline eugenics and reform eugenics. Mainline eu-
genics, he argues, came first and was eventually superseded by reform eu-
genics. Kevles refers to mainline eugenics as politically conservative, elitist,
rife with racist and anti-Semitic attitudes, scientifically reductionist and po-
litically in favor of compulsory measures. Reform eugenics, in contrast, was
developed by leading biologists who objected to mainline eugenics’ sexual re-
pressiveness, its class and race prejudices, and above all its false biology. By
the mid-1930s, mainline eugenics was in decline due to increasing criticism
from reform eugenicists. Thus, in this narrative, sound science overcomes
2 Koselleck coins the term “collective singular” (Kollektivsingular) here.
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bad science along with the latter’s problematic political attitudes. After 1945,
Kevles states, eugenics was discredited completely due to its Nazi legacy.
Several points have been raised against this account. First, while pre-
sented as the history of eugenics, it is actually a history of US and UK eu-
genics with some references to Germany. Furthermore, a number of scholars
have questioned Kevles’ periodization and shown that eugenic assumptions
endured among British, US and German biologists and geneticists long after
1945 (Weindling 1993; Weingart, Kroll et al. 1996, 631ff.; Mazumdar 2002; Dow-
biggin 2008).Third, Kevles studies eugenics mainly as a set of ideas, not poli-
cies and practices. Due to the focus on scientists and their views, he overlooks
the continuity of eugenics after 1945. Selective sterilization lawswere not abol-
ished in the US after the war; many in fact lasted into the 1950s and 60s (Reilly
1991). In the Scandinavian countries, selective sterilization laws endured into
the 1970s3. Furthermore, feminist scholars have pointed out that improving
the quality of the population continued to form a US policy objective after
1945, although the emphasis wasmore on the voluntary and pronatalist strate-
gies of encouraging the ‘fit’ to have more children (Kline 2001; Stern 2005;
Ziegler 2008).
Numerous studies have by now pointed out that eugenic values and aspi-
rations were by no means confined to the political right but were quite com-
mon on the left as well (Paul 1984; Schwartz 1995). Leading socialists and so-
cial reformers such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb (Leonard 2003), Margaret
Sangers (Franks 2005; Lamp 2006; Klausen and Bashford 2010), JohnMaynard
Keynes (Leonard 2005), Gunnar and Alva Myrdal (Spektorowski and Mizrachi
2004; Rabenschlag 2008; Kulawik 2009), and Karl Kautsky (Weingart et al.
1996, 108ff.) were proponents of the eugenics project. Conversely, many lead-
ing eugenicists such as the founder of social hygiene in Germany, Alfred Grot-
jahn (Weingart et al. 1996, 108ff.; Ferdinand 2009) and Swiss psychiatrist Au-
guste Forel (Gerodetti 2006b; Mottier 2008; Mottier and Gerodetti 2007) were
sympathetic to socialist ideas or ideas of social reform.4 Even among adher-
ents of the anarchist movement in France and Spain, which was committed to
the values of sexual reform and responsible reproductive self-determination,
3 On Scandinavian eugenics, see Broberg and Roll-Hansen 1996; Weindling 1999;Wein-
gart 1999; and Tydén 2010.
4 In Germany, however, as Weingart, Kroll and Bayertz (1996) note, the leftist faction of
the eugenic movement was marginal.
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many supported the idea of improving the race by preventing the unfit from
breeding (Cleminson 2000; Sonn 2005; Cleminson 2008).
2.3 Eugenics and the Question of Race
Another popular notion about eugenics is that it is essentially racist. It is
true that race is a pervasive topic in eugenics. Nevertheless, Marius Turda is
correct to contend: “Eugenics as such was not necessarily a racist movement:
indeed, arguing that eugenics was ‘racist’ tells us very little” (Turda 2010b, 63).
The relationships between eugenics and racism aremultifarious and com-
plex; whether eugenics can be characterized as racist depends first upon the
respective national, regional, or political variant of eugenics and second on
themeaning of the designation ‘racist’. Furthermore, I would inquire whether
eugenics is despicable only if and when it ascribes differential worth to people
according to the notion of race. Is it less or not at all problematic if worth is
ascribed along the lines of health, productivity or fitness?
The term ‘race’ never had a stable meaning. At the time when the eugen-
ics project emerged, it could refer to a broad variety of constructions of social
collectives (Geulen 2007). In the course of the 19th century, the term had in-
creasingly come under the authority of biology and anthropology and given
rise to scientific racism (Barkan 1992; Foucault 2003, 43ff.). Scholars of sci-
entific racism claimed that they could classify humans along certain innate
physical,mental, or behavioral characteristics; that they could identify a (vary-
ing) number of essentially different natural units among humanity that could
be ranked into systems of superiority and inferiority; and that race member-
ship caused complex social, cultural, and behavioral phenomena. Yet this was
but one use of the term. Concurrently, the word ‘race’ could, for instance, re-
fer to notions of tribal, family or class lineage (Conze and Sommer 1984). To
confuse things further, Galton and later eugenicists often spoke of the human
race as the entity that, in their view, was in danger of degeneration or need
of improvement. Galton argued that, in contrast to farm animals, the human
race had been sadly neglected by breeders:
The breeders of our domestic animals have discoveredmany rules by experi-
ence, and act upon them to a nicety. But we have not advanced, even to this
limited extent, in respect to the human race. […] If a twentieth part of the
cost and pains were spent in measures for the improvement of the human
38 Biopolitics and Historic Justice
race that is spent on the improvement of the breed of horses and cattle, what
a galaxy of genius might we not create! (Galton 1865)
Still in 1926, on occasion of an international eugenics congress in Paris, the
British Daily Telegraph titled:
Proposals for legislation which would do for the human race what natural
selection does for creatures lower in the scale of life are being discussed in
Paris at an international congress of eugenicists. (cited in Gerodetti 2006a,
224)
Both the meaning and the significance of race differed across national, re-
gional, and political strands of the eugenics project. Scientific racism was an
influential but not unanimously shared belief here; its influence in different
national settings varied. The same holds true for the relationship between
racism and eugenics at the political level. In the US, eugenic organizations
such as the American Breeders Association and the Galton Society were con-
cerned both about hereditary differences between races and about differen-
tial breeding of the fit and the unfit (Selden n.y.). In the early 1890s, concerns
about the alleged fecundity of the unfit publicly aligned with racist concerns
about dysgenic effects of immigration and interracial marriage and gave rise
to an advocacy coalition that successfully lobbied for immigration restrictions
and marriage laws on eugenic and racial grounds (Yamin 2008). Between 1875
and 1924, a number of US states had miscegenation laws in place that made
it illegal for a white person to marry someone defined as a Negro (Reilly 1991,
25; Lombardo 1996; Dorr 1999). Since the early 1900s, advocates of racist mar-
riage restrictions had received increasing support from protagonists of the
eugenics movement such as Charles Davenport and Harry Laughlin, who pro-
vided scientific rationales for their demands (Reilly and Shaw 1983; Micklos
and Carlson 2000; Lombardo n.y.). Interracial marriage, they argued, would
inevitably lead to degeneration and the decline of the superior, namely White
race. Eugenicists also supported the demand to further restrict existing mis-
cegenation laws and enact new ones. Eugenic efforts led inter alia to the pass-
ing of the Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924 (Reilly and Shaw 1983; Micklos
and Carlson 2000).
Similarly, eugenicists in the US identified the immigration of certain
racialized groups, in particular immigrants from Southern and Eastern
Europe, as one of the main causes of degeneration and lobbied for restrictive
immigration laws (Micklos and Carlson 2000; Hansen and King 2001). Their
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efforts were translated into the 1917 Immigration Restriction Law, which
restricted the immigration of undesirables such as
idiots, imbeciles, epileptics, alcoholics, poor, criminals, beggars, any person
suffering attacks of insanity, those with tuberculosis, and those who have
any form of dangerous contagious disease, aliens who have a physical dis-
ability that will restrict them from earning a living in the United States [...]
(Lombardo n.y.).
In addition, Laughlin’s and other eugenicists’ studies fed into the 1924
Johnson-Reed Act based on national quotas (Hansen and King 2001, 253).
US selective sterilization policies were also racialized in several ways.
Alexandra Stern has shown that in California (which had by far the most
extended and enduring sterilization policy in the US), although the wording
of the law was race- and ethnicity-neutral, implementation was not, and that
sterilization disproportionately affected foreign-born immigrants, African
Americans and Mexicans (Stern 2005, 1131).
Thus, in the US, the eugenic project was closely intertwined with poli-
cies that deliberately discriminated against racialized groups. Racism in this
sense was supported by eugenic rationales and inscribed into immigration
law,marriage restrictions and selective sterilization laws.These policies oper-
ated through negative provisions such as exclusion, restriction, violation and
prohibition of racialized groups. These laws and their implementation were
authored and controlled by those members of the unmarked group, namely
White, Anglo-SaxonUS nationals,who considered themselves hereditarily su-
perior.
Yet, these policies could also affect White US citizens who were deemed
“socially inadequate”, as Laughlin put it (Wilson 2002). “Socially inadequate”,
Lizzie Seal shows (Seal 2013), was a common label in US eugenic, psychiatric
and welfare discourses in the 1910s, 20s and 30s for the so-called dependent
poor, that is, those considered unable to sustain themselves economically and
meet the demands of capitalist society. The socially inadequate, for Laugh-
lin, included “feeble-minded, insane, epileptic, inebriate, criminalistic and
other degenerate persons” who were “maintained wholly or in part by public
expense” (Laughlin cited in Seal 2013, 147). ‘Feeble-minded’ and ‘socially inad-
equate’ operated as labels that linked ‘substandard whiteness’ and poverty to
notions of moral deficiency, signalling an urgent need for state intervention.
They specifically served as markers for ‘tainted whiteness’ (Stubblefield 2007)
or ‘substandard whiteness’ (Seal 2013, 154). “Whereas black people would have
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been regarded as automatically inferior, low quality whites needed to be iden-
tified from amongst the white population. ‘Degenerate’ whiteness mapped
onto poverty.” (Seal 2013, 154)
In Germany, relations between eugenics and race played out differently
and the term ‘race’ was allocated amore prominent role. In 1895, Alfred Ploetz,
a major founder of eugenics in Germany, deliberately coined the term racial
hygiene (Rassenhygiene) (Ploetz 1895) to denote a body of knowledge that else-
where would have figured under the label of eugenics. Ploetz distinguished
between two concepts of race: one that denoted themultiplicity ofmorpholog-
ically distinct groups within the human species (Systemrasse or Varietät) and
one that referred to the biological quality of entire populations (Vitalrasse).
The programme of racial hygiene, Ploetz maintained, should refer to the lat-
ter. For him, the purpose of racial hygiene was to prevent racial degeneration
and improve the hereditary quality of the population as a whole (Weingart,
Kroll et al. 1996, 91f.).The aim of Ploetz and some like-minded colleagues such
as Fritz Lenz was explicitly to improve the Nordic race in order to defend it
against a presumed Slavic threat (Weiss 1990). Others, such as the Association
for National Regeneration (Bund für Volksaufartung) favored the term ‘eugenics’
but interpreted it as a nonracist endeavor to fight national degeneration and
improve the hereditary fitness of the working classes (Weiss 1990, 35).5 An-
other famous eugenicist in Germany, Wilhelm Schallmayer, who considered
himself a socialist and a democrat, preferred the term Rassehygiene to that of
Rassenhygiene in order to dissociate it from older racial theories of Gobineauan
provenance (Weingart, Kroll et al. 1996, 93f.). The term Rassehygiene (without
n) indicated a single race instead of different races. As shown by Weingart,
Kroll and Bayertz (1996) show, however, the majority of German racial hygiene
scholars sympathized with the construction of a supposedly superior Nordic
race, Aryan race, German culture or other notion.
Yet what does this tell us about the relationship between eugenics and
racism in the German case? Studies that interrogate the relationship between
eugenics, racial hygiene, racism and Nazism point out connections, inter-
linkages, and collaborations as well as personal, discursive, and institutional
overlaps; tensions between these strands, though, also appear (Schmuhl 1992;
Weingart, Kroll et al. 1996; Wecker, Braunschweig et al. 2009). Before 1933, the
5 Yet, in 1931, the Bund für Volksaufartungmerged with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ras-
senhygiene (German Association for Racial Hygiene) to found the Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Rassenhygiene (Eugenik).
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eugenics project in Germany had not been the most advanced one interna-
tionally; racial hygiene was well established in the forms of professional asso-
ciations, academic positions and research institutions, but unlike its counter-
parts in the US and Scandinavia,German eugenics had not yet been translated
into policies.
However, key concepts of racial hygiene featured in the Nazi programme
as early as 1924, when Hitler incorporated entire passages of the so-called
Baur-Fischer-Lenz, the racial hygiene classic at the time, into Mein Kampf
(Weingart, Kroll et al. 1996, 372f.). Already at this point, the idea of eugenic
selection formed an integral element of Nazi programmatics, tightly linked
to racial purification, imperialist expansion and eliminatory anti-Semitism.
While racial hygiene scholars had not necessarily sympathized with Nazism
before 1933, they overwhelmingly embraced the Nazi seizure of power because
Hitler, as psychiatrist Ernst Rüdin declared in 1934, would now at last allow
them to translate their visions into reality (Weingart, Kroll et al. 1996, 390).
And indeed, within two years, the Nazi regime enacted a full series of laws
and measures directed at hereditary improvement and racial purification6.
One of the first of these was the Law for the Prevention of Offspring
with Hereditary Diseases of July 1933—which I will refer to as the Hered-
itary Health Act—which mandated the sterilization of persons deemed to
suffer from a hereditary disease, innate feeble-mindedness or alcoholism.
In November 1933, the regime also mandated the castration of sexual of-
fenders through enactment of the Law against Dangerous Habitual Crim-
inals. In June 1935, the Hereditary Health Act was revised to allow, among
other things, abortions for eugenic reasons and castration of male homosex-
uals. In September 1935, the Law for the Protection of German Blood and
Honor (Blutschutzgesetz) followed, which prohibited marriages and sexual re-
lations outside of marriages between Jews and citizens of ‘German or related
blood’. In October 1935, it was complemented by theMarital Health Act, which
banned marriages between persons deemed hereditarily valuable and those
deemed hereditarily unfit and required prospective spouses to produce amar-
riage certificate confirming that the marriage was hereditarily unproblem-
atic.
In contrast to the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor, the
Hereditary Health Act was not specifically directed against Jews and did not
discriminate between persons ‘of German blood’ and others.The wording was
6 For an overview, see Schmuhl 1992; Friedlander 1995; Bock 2004.
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race-neutral in the sense that it did not specifically target members of racial-
ized groups. Although Jews were among its victims (Bock 1986, 354), they did
not form the main target. On the contrary, Hitler’s attitude towards steril-
ization of Jews was, as he told Minister Frick in 1935, that “there is no reason
to improve alien races through applying sterilization” (Hitler cited in Bock
1986, 352). The fate that the Nazis planned for the Jews was elimination, not
sterilization. After 1945, the question of whether Nazi sterilization policy was
inherently racist would play a critical role for sterilization victims’ struggle
for reparations, since only those who had been persecuted “for racial, reli-
gious, or political reasons or because of the victim’s world view” were entitled
to reparations under the Federal Indemnification Act (BEG §1(1), see Chap. 3).
German historian Gisela Bock (1986), author of the first and still classic
study on Nazi sterilization policy, argues that Nazi sterilization policy was
indeed inherently racist. Bock offers a conceptual distinction between an-
thropological and hygienic racism. Both were based on notions of superi-
ority and inferiority, she argues, and were constructed largely in terms of
heredity and biology (Bock 1986, 356). They were not mutually exclusive but
intersecting and complementary elements of ‘racial upgrading’ (Aufartung).
Anthropological racism, Bock holds, was directed against other races, which
were per se constructed as inferior, whereas hygienic racism targeted the un-
fit across racialized groups. Importantly, however, the Nazi concept of ‘up-
grading’ did not consist simply of defending an existing, supposedly superior
group against a different, supposedly inferior group, but also of actively creat-
ing the supposedly superior group (Bock 1986, 327). This argument, stressing
the future-oriented, generative nature of Nazi racism is also made by Hannah
Arendt in order to delineate Nazi racism from other types of racism (Arendt
1968, 412). The Nazis saw the master race as a project rather than an existing
entity, and this project articulated strategies of selective pro-natalism with
strategies of selective anti-natalism, racial purification and genocide.
Hence, there can be no doubt that Nazi sterilization policy was directed at
‘racial upgrading’ and was in this sense essentially racist. Several open ques-
tions still remain, though, for instance: is the concept of hygienic racism also
applicable to non-Nazi variants of the eugenics project, that is, to eugenic
variants not directed at ‘racial upgrading’? Should hygienic racism be concep-
tualized as a unique phenomenon that cannot be separated from Nazism?
And if so, what is there to gain from framing classifications of fit and unfit,
socially adequate or inadequate, as racist beyond the scope of Nazi eugenics?
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2.4 Welfare Eugenics
Apart from Germany and the United States, the Scandinavian countries were
the 20th century’s most ‘eugenically developed’ countries, both in terms of
academic knowledge and actual policies7. When the State Institute for Race
Biology in Uppsala opened in 1922, it was the world’s first government in-
stitute of eugenic research (Rudling 2014, 42), and in the 1930s and 40s, at
the same time that they launched the Scandinavian social welfare state, Den-
mark, Sweden, and Norway all implemented selective sterilization acts that
included the possibility of both voluntary and compulsory sterilization. Lene
Koch emphasises that
[c]ompulsion was reserved for cases where social responsibility and readi-
ness to subject oneself to reproductive control could not be expected. This
was the case with groups of people considered ‘asocial’ or ‘antisocial’ such
as thementally retarded, psychopaths, tramps, and prostitutes. (Koch 2004,
320)
Historians of Scandinavian eugenics tend to agree that questions of race were
of rather marginal importance in these countries and that Scandinavian eu-
genics was not racist, although public discourse focused to some extent on
ethnic minorities deemed incapable of adjusting to modernization such as
Taters, Travelers and Lapps (Broberg and Tydén 1996; Haave 2000). Broberg
and Tydén point out that in the 1930s, the Taters were increasingly constructed
as a genetically inferior racial group whose behavior called for a more restric-
tive sterilization act. Somewhat ironically, the more restrictive 1941 Steriliza-
tion Act broadened the social indications for sterilization to include mental
illness, mental retardation and an “anti-social way of life” (Broberg and Ty-
dén 1996, 124ff.). This opened up the possibility of sterilizing members of the
Tater group without further need for scientific justification. From the 1940s
onward, the heredity frame in Swedish sterilization policy was increasingly
superseded by a socio-political one. However, the racialization of the ‘Tater
issue’ had been instrumental in bringing about the latter.
In Norway, racializing the so-called ‘Tater issue’ also played a role in the
formation of the national sterilization policy in the 1920s and 30s (Haave 2000;
7 Broberg and Roll-Hansen 1996; Runcis 1998; Weindling 1999; Haave 2000; Koch 2000;
2006; 2009; Spektorowski and Mizrachi 2004; Kulawik 2006; Spektorowski and Ireni-
Saban 2010.
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Braun, Herrmann et al. 2014). In official documents, this group was com-
monly described as ‘omstreifere’ (itinerants) and associated with crime, avoid-
ance of work, violence, sexual offences, drinking, and other socially undesir-
able behavior. The Itinerant Committee (løsgjengerkomiteen), appointed by the
government in 1927, divided the ‘omstreifere’ into two subgroups, ‘the hopeless’
and ‘the inferior’. While ‘the hopeless’ were to be detained, ‘the inferior’ were
to be sterilized (Itinerant Committee cited in Bastrup and Sivertsen 1996, 210).
Thus, the construction of the ‘Tater issue’ linked ethnicity, poverty and an al-
leged inability to be a productive and useful member of society. Sterilization
was considered a proper means to solve the problem. The Norwegian Ster-
ilization Act, however, also allowed for sterilizing persons without personal
consent if they were deemedmentally ill ormentally handicapped.These cases
required a justification on eugenic, criminal or social grounds (Haave 2001,
2). Again, biology was but one among several possible indications for steril-
ization. The Norwegian Sterilization Act was in force from 1934 to 1977, with
an interruption from 1942 to 1945, when the Nazi Hereditary Health Act was
installed. The 1934 act allowed for three categories of legal sterilizations: ster-
ilization of persons with full legal rights and upon application of the person
concerned (§3 (1)), sterilization of minors or persons deemed insane or men-
tally impaired upon application of the person with the consent of a guardian
(§3(2)); and sterilization of persons deemed mentally ill or mentally handi-
capped and incapable of providing personal consent upon application of a
guardian or corresponding authority (§3(4)). Under the 1934 act, 2,123 ster-
ilizations were reported under §3(2) or §3(4); of these, 922 were performed
under §3(4), that is, without personal consent (Haave 2001, 2f.).
In the 1990s, the former sterilization policy became the subject of an in-
tense public debate which, however, focused exclusively on the sterilization of
the Taters. Involuntary sterilization was framed in terms of racial and ethnic
discrimination only. Those who were involuntarily sterilized on the grounds
of their alleged feeble-mindedness or mental illness were not addressed at
all, as if involuntary sterilization constituted a problem only if and when per-
formed for reasons of race but not for reasons of a person’s abilities (Braun,
Herrmann et al. 2014). Public reflection did not extend to injuries and the
violation of those who were categorized as unproductive, unfit or incapable
of leading a useful life in society. Thus, reducing sterilization policy to racial
or ethnic discrimination obliterated the productivist and biopolitical dimen-
sions of selective sterilization.
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2.5 Eugenics and Feminism
Mainline eugenics, Daniel Kevles holds, was an anti-feminist affair domi-
nated by White male academics who considered it a woman’s most glorious
duty to marry, stay at home, and give birth to children (Kevles 1985, 88f.).
Many prominent American eugenicists opposed women’s suffrage and col-
lege education on the grounds that it would divert these valuable women
from fulfilling their procreative duty, thereby propelling the trend towards
degeneration. In Germany, around the turn of the century, this type of anti-
feminist selective pronatalism was also widespread and deeply intertwined
with the rise of racial hygiene (Allen 2000). To conclude that eugenics was an
anti-feminist project, however, would be misleading. Over the past decades,
a wealth of research on the relationship between feminism and eugenics has
produced a more nuanced picture8. It shows that women and women’s move-
ments have been actively involved with eugenic activities of different kinds,
although the nature, scope and motives of this involvement are a matter of
scholarly dispute. Further scholarship also shows the gendered nature of the
eugenics projects, that is, its constructions of femininity, masculinity, moth-
erhood, gender dimorphism, heterosexuality, and not least its gendered con-
struction of target groups (Stern 2010).
According to some analysts, the alliance between women’s movement ac-
tors and eugenics was a more strategic one. Late 19th and early 20th century
feminists, seeking to fend off anti-feminist accusations of eschewing the bur-
dens ofmotherhood, alignedwith eugenic arguments in order to benefit from
their scientific reputation (Pedersen 1993; Gordon 2002a). Other scholars ob-
ject to this view, arguing that certain women’s movement actors genuinely
believed in the eugenic ideal of improving the race or nation through limit-
ing the procreation of the unfit (Bland 1995; Ordover 2003). Ann Taylor Allen
goes even further and asserts that “eugenic theory was a basic and formative,
not an incidental, part of feminist positions on the vitally important themes
of motherhood, reproduction, and the state” (Allen 2000, 479). Allen shows
that British and German women’s movement leaders in the 1900s to 1930s,
8 For an overview see Klausen and Bashford (2010) and Stern (2010). For specific case
studies see Bucur (1994) for Romania, Gerodetti (2006) for Switzerland, Ladd-Taylor
(1997), Dorr (1999) and Kline (2001) for the U.S., Allen (2000) for Germany and the UK
and Allen (1988), Grossmann (1995), and Zimmermann (1988) for Germany.
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including those who employed eugenic arguments, fiercely opposed contem-
porary pronatalism and its aggressive misogyny. In any case, a number of
studies have pointed out that feminist affiliations with eugenics were heavily
textured by relations of race and class as well as standards of social adequacy
and fitness. Upon close inspection, feminist notions of reproductive rights
and self-determination were often tied to notions of reproductive responsi-
bility, which in turn were charged with notions of differential social worth or
social adequacy. In the US, birth control movement leader Margaret Sanger,
who founded the American Birth Control League in 1921, aligned her case for
birth control and free and voluntary motherhood to the eugenics project of
racial improvement (Sanger 2007). In Germany, the Association for the Pro-
tection of Mothers (Bund für Mutterschutz), a radical feminist organization for
social and sexual reform founded in 1905, struggled for women’s and chil-
dren’s social rights and women’s sexual and reproductive self-determination
and at the same time endorsed eugenic arguments and values (Grossmann
1995). Leading figures of the Bund für Mutterschutz, including Helene Stöcker
and Lily Braun, adopted eugenic language to some extent to bolster their
claims. Stöcker, in particular, called for women’s sexual and reproductive self-
determination but added that women must exercize it responsibly (Herlitz-
ius 1995; Allen 2000). Ideally, for Stöcker, enjoying the right to reproductive
self-determination would educate and enable women to make responsible re-
productive decisions, for instance, to abort a pregnancy if the child could be
expected to be mentally or physically weak (Herlitzius 1995, 350).9 Those not
able to do so, such as alcoholics, the mentally retarded or abnormal, should be
prevented from procreating, if necessary by means of legal restrictions (Zim-
mermann 1988). Hence, the meaning of self-determination within feminist
eugenics discourse was stratified along norms and standards of health, fit-
ness, and socially adequate behavior.
A similar biopolitical rationality characterizes the thought of Margaret
Sanger (Franks 2005; Klausen and Bashford 2010). Sanger advocated women’s
access to birth control, which she saw as absolutely necessary for racial better-
ment. Unlike many contemporary eugenicists, she did not adhere to biolog-
9 Teresa Kulawik (2009) comments: “Her vision therefore appears to have materialized
when, at the time when women in many countries of Europe and the Americas in
the 1970s achieved the right of self-determination over their bodies, they also were
handed the means for eugenic selection in the form of prenatal diagnostics, which
was invented at that time.”
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ical determinism but contended that poverty, mental retardation and racial
decay had social causes (McCann 1994, 99ff.)—not least among them overpop-
ulation. Sanger also objected to a widespread tendency at the time to blame
White middle-class women for racial degeneration because they refused to
have children. These nuances notwithstanding, Sanger articulated voluntari-
ness to responsibility, rights to duties, and some women’s individual freedom
to other women’s denigration:
Birth control itself, often denounced as a violation of natural law, is nothing
more or less than the facilitation of the process of weeding out the unfit, of
preventing the birth of defectives or of those who will become defectives.
So, in compliance with nature’s working plan, we must permit womanhood
its full development before we can expect of it efficient motherhood. If we
are to make racial progress, this development of womanhood must precede
motherhood in every individual woman. Then and then only can themother
cease to be an incubator and be amother indeed. Then only can she transmit
to her sons and daughters the qualities which make strong individuals and,
collectively, a strong race [...]. (Sanger 1920, 229)
On these presuppositions, Sanger endorsed immigration restrictions and se-
lective and compulsory sterilization for “the undeniably feeble-minded, in-
sane and syphilitic” (McCann 1994, 117). While this may seem a rather short
list of indications compared with that of mainstream eugenics at the time,
as Lisa McCann (1994) argues, it still makes clear that the value of individual
freedom and voluntariness for Sanger was stratified and contingent upon the
individual’s value in terms of racial improvement.
Concerning the translation of eugenic ideas into actual policies, research
has shown that the majority of those sterilized under selective sterilization
laws were women and girls—except in Nazi Germany, where the gender ratio
was about equal.10 However, gender norms intersected with norms and stan-
dards of health, fitness and social adequacy as well as poverty and class status.
In the Swiss canton of Vaud, for instance, which was the first political body in
Europe to pass a sterilization law, nine out of ten sterilizations in 1944 were
performed on women, most of these on young, unmarried women who lived
in poor conditions and were categorized as maladapted, socially deviant or
10 For Finland see Hietala (1996), for Norway Roll-Hansen (1996, for Denmark Hansen
(1996), for Switzerland Mottier and Gerodetti (2007), and for Nazi Germany Bock
(1986).
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of low intelligence (Mottier and Gerodetti 2007). Maija Runcis (1998) argues
that in Sweden, concerns about the number of mentally retarded and per-
sons leading an anti-social way of life focused primarily on women.11 More
specifically, the verdict of an ‘anti-social way of life’ often meant transgress-
ing sexual norms, which were more rigid for women than for men; as a result,
the verdict was more often imposed on women. Implementation, thus, was
gendered through gender-specific norms of sexual and social conformity. In
addition, the medical indication introduced into Swedish as well as Norwe-
gian sterilization legislation at some point applied to women only. In Swe-
den, a medical indication for sterilization was mainly advised in cases of so-
called ‘exhausted mothers’, a concept denoting lower-class women living in
impoverished living conditions and considered to be in danger of becoming
dysfunctional mothers or wives (Etzemüller 2000).
Nazi sterilization policy, in contrast, affected men and women in equal
measure; some 50 percent of those forcibly sterilized under the Law for the
Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring were men or boys. Gisela Bock
(1986, 372) argues that, on several grounds, the law was nonetheless gendered.
First, 90 percent of the estimated 5,000 individuals who died from steriliza-
tion were women (Bock 2004, 80). More problematic is Bock’s position that
involuntary childlessness affected women in a more devastating way than it
did men. Bock refers to data indicating that women protested more often
against the sterilization verdict than men and that many women purportedly
attempted to become pregnant before the intervention was performed (Bock
1986, 12, 371f., 384f.). However, it is difficult to discern what the equivalent
signs of suffering would have been for men, since they could not become vis-
ibly pregnant. Moreover, it is remains unclear that refraining from formal
protest would indicate an absence of suffering.
2.6 Biologist Determinism and Social Engineering
That eugenics was based on biologism is a truism in both public and academic
discourse. Eugenicists, according to the common narrative, were convinced
11 This was partly due to the fact that only women could be legally sterilized on the basis
of a medical indication; the number of sterilisations for medical reasons rose sharply
after the war. However, among those sterilized for being ‘mentally retarded’, women
were heavily overrepresented as well (Broberg and Tydén 1996).
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that all major pathologies that plagued modern society, such as criminality,
alcoholism, prostitution and poverty, were caused by genetically inherited de-
fects and these defects would proliferate because of the dysgenics’ increased
fecundity. Today, we know better, namely that modern science has largely re-
futed these biologist explanations as unfounded or wrong.
Again, this is not the full story. Presenting eugenics as a consequence
of biologism may account for many of its features, but it omits others. Nei-
ther eugenic scholarship nor eugenic policies necessarily referred to biologist
assumptions; selective interventions into reproduction could be articulated
within rationalities of biologist determinism as well as rationalities of social
reform and social engineering. In some cases, abandoning a biologist frame-
work actually allowed for an expansion of eugenic interventions.
A number of studies have drawn attention to the fact that a significant
share of scholarship did not subscribe to the Mendelian paradigm but fol-
lowed a Lamarckian line of thought. According to Lamarckism, living beings
could pass acquired characteristics on to their offspring. Thus, Lamarckians
did not believe in biological determinism as Mendelians did; for them, bi-
ological heredity was amenable to socio-political intervention in a more di-
rect sense. Lamarckism was popular among eugenicists in France (Schnei-
der 1990), Brazil (Stepan 1991), and Russia (Adams 1990) as well as Japan (Ot-
subo and Bartholomew 1998) and the Czech Republic (Simunek 2007). Both
Lamarckians and Mendelians were concerned with heredity. For Lamarck-
ians, however, social policy, health care and education were proper means to
improve the biological quality of present and future generations, since so-
cially acquired betterment would be passed down. Moreover, Lamarckians
were not necessarily opposed to compulsory measures to fight degeneration
(Adams 1990, 218). French Lamarckian eugenicists, for instance, believed that
the lower classes were biologically inferior because of poverty, not the reverse.
Yet, as Schneider points out, many strongly believed that the numbers of
the poor must be reduced, if necessary through more restrictive immigra-
tion laws, marriage restrictions, or compulsory sterilization (Schneider 1986,
86). Thus, the scientific case for selective anti-natalism was not always based
on biological determinism.
Eugenic policies, in particular sterilization policies, were also not entirely
founded on an exclusively biologist framework.The Swedish Sterilization Acts
of 1935 and 1941, for instance, included a eugenic and a social indication. The
social indication in the 1935 Act permitted sterilization without personal con-
sent in case of “mental illness, feeble-mindedness, or other mental defects”
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when the person concerned was declared legally incompetent and “incapable
of caring for children” (Broberg and Tydén 1996, 102f.). The 1941 Swedish Ster-
ilization Act actually broadened the social indication to include “an anti-so-
cial way of life” (Broberg and Tydén 1996, 108). The new clause arose from a
recommendation by the Commission on Population, which had proposed to
introduce a social indication in order to be able to sterilize persons whose ‘de-
ficiency’ was not hereditary (Broberg and Tydén 1996, 106). According to the
official statistics, between 1942 and 1975—when the law was repealed—some
20 to 100 sterilizations per year were performed in Sweden on the basis of
a social indication. However, the categories of eugenic, medical and social
grounds were never clearly defined, neither in theory nor in practice. What
did and what did not qualify as ‘hereditary’ was very much at the discretion
of those in power to decide. In this vein, a member of the Swedish National
Board of Health, which was the committee that made sterilization decisions,
explained in 1940 how the Board defined eugenic grounds:
[O]ur basis is the general statistical probability that a disease, abnormality,
or defect (epilepsy, feeble-mindedness, etc.) is hereditary or predominantly
hereditary, or, from a slightly different viewpoint, the probability that it will
appear in children or other relatives (the risk of morbidity). Thus, when a
case is to be decided (sterilization, abortion,marital capacity), the statistical
probability is decisive. That is to say, when the rate is sufficiently high, the
burden of proof rests upon the person whose claim it is that, for him or her,
the disease or quality…has an extrinsic cause so that his or her case is not to
be judged by the general statistical risk. (Swedish National Board of Health
cited in Broberg and Tydén 1996, 110f.)
The Board determined that assuming a ten percent risk of inheritance was
sufficient to establish a eugenic indication. In Norway, the 1934 Sterilization
Act permitted sterilization if there was a likelihood that a person would pass
a hereditary disease on to any children he or she might have or if the person
was deemed unfit to take care of a child (Roll-Hansen 1996, 172). Similarly, in
Finland, the 1935 Sterilization Act stipulated that individuals could be sub-
mitted to compulsory sterilization if they were diagnosed as idiots, imbeciles
or insane and there was a risk that they could transmit their disease to their
children; if it was probable that their children would not be cared for; or if
the individual had been proven guilty of a crime demonstrating an ‘unnatural
sexual drive’ (Hietala 1996, 232). The 1929 Danish Sterilization Act remained
relatively vague, stipulating that sterilization was permissible ‘…where sup-
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pression of reproduction must be regarded as being of great importance to
society’ (Hansen 1996). According to a review of the law in 1935, implemen-
tation was based on eugenic, social or individual considerations, with ‘social’
meaning that sterilization was in the interest of society, whereas ‘individ-
ual’ considerations meant, for instance, that the individual concerned had
the option of being released from institutional confinement should they con-
sent to undergo sterilization (Broberg and Roll-Hansen 1996, 38). Similarly,
a 1937 amendment to the Alberta (Canada) Sterilization Act sanctioned the
sterilization of persons “incapable of intelligent parenthood” (Grekul, Krahn
et al. 2004, 363). Hence, sterilization policies referred to biologistic concerns
as well as socio-political concerns about socially dysfunctional behavior or
ways of life.
Similarly, the Nazi Sterilization Act of 1933 allowed the coercive steriliza-
tion of alcoholics without categorizing alcoholism as hereditary. In addition,
the Act used the term ‘innate’ in lieu of ‘hereditary’ in connection to feeble-
mindedness so that it would encompass, for instance, people who had suf-
fered brain damage during birth.
In practice, the category of ‘mentally retarded’ or ‘feeble-minded’—a core
category in almost all sterilization laws—was sufficiently malleable and am-
biguous to allow for sterilization of those whose behavior, sexuality, or way of
life was deemed socially inadequate, undesirable or dysfunctional. In short,
selective sterilization laws, like other instruments of selective politics of re-
production, manifested and executed a biopolitical rationality that sought
to reduce the number of people who were perceived as a burden to society,
whether for reasons of their bodily or mental abilities or for their behavior or
way of life.
2.7 Eugenics, Progress and Productivism
Alberto Spektorowski and Elisabet Mizrachi show that, in the case of Swe-
den, eugenic policies grew out of a political mindset that combined humanist
Marxist ideas about social reform with a Fabian concept of industrial democ-
racy and an exclusionist concept of social welfare (Spektorowski andMizrachi
2004, 334). Sterilization, within this framework, was a mechanism of welfare
eugenics. “The basic idea of eugenic socialism”, Spektorowski and Mizrachi
argue,
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was to engineer a welfare community for ‘the fittest’ or a ‘welfare eugen-
ics’, built on parameters of ‘right-living’ destined to exclude those individu-
als defined as non-productive. In this sense this new scientific socialism was
built on concepts such as efficiency, productivism and social margins. (Spek-
torowski and Mizrachi 2004, 334)
Social rights, within this framework, were universal, but individual rights to
physical integrity and personal life were not; they weremade contingent upon
the individual’s conformance to standards of ‘right-living’ and productivity:
“Non-productive elements were denied not social welfare, but their right to
procreate” (Spektorowski and Mizrachi 2004, 334).
A similar argument is made by Thomas Leonhard (2005) concerning pro-
gressivist economics in the US. Although he does not use the term ‘produc-
tivism’, the political rationality that Leonhard interrogates displays signifi-
cant similarities to productivist welfarism as analyzed by Spektorowski and
Mizrachi. Leonard argues that eugenics was mainstream in the Progressive
Era. It was appealing to social conservatives as well as progressivists.The core
idea of Progressive Era eugenics, he argues,was “that the labor force should be
rid of unfit workers, whom they labelled ‘parasites,’ ‘the unemployable,’ ‘low-
wage races’ and the ‘industrial residuum.’ Removing the unfit, so the argu-
ment went, would uplift superior, deserving workers”. (Leonard 2005, 207f.)
What attracted progressive eugenicists, according to Leonhard, was a dis-
enchantment and a mounting impatience with the laissez-faire approach to
politics around the turn of the century.Overcoming the pathologies ofmoder-
nity, as progressives saw it, required the concerted effort of science, social
science expertise, and governance, applying the combined policy instruments
of social inquiry, social control, and expert management.
Thus, progressivist eugenics shared with Scandinavian welfare eugenics a
belief in biopolitical social engineering committed to values, norms and stan-
dards of productivity and social functionality. In fact, I would conclude, the
belief in a biopolitical type of social engineering geared at improving produc-
tiveness, conformity and social functionality in the population constitutes the
key characteristic shared by any variant of eugenics, whether feminist or anti-
feminist, left- or right-wing,more or less racialized, based on or independent
of biological determinism. Denouncing eugenics as sexist, racist, biologist or
reactionary merely obscures this distinctively modern productivist biopoliti-
cal rationality.
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2.8 Conclusion
The purpose of this review was not to explain the rise and fall of the eugenics
project—that would have required more comprehensive comparisons. To this
point, comparative analyses exist only in some cases, such as country compar-
isons (Adams 1990; Allen 2000; Hansen and King 2001). What should have be-
come clear, however, is that we cannot capture eugenics’ complexity by catego-
rizing it as reactionary, sexist, racist, biologistic. Eugenic ideas and practices
were promoted by a broad range of political actors, including social reform-
ers, women’s rights activists, socialists and progressives. Gender norms and
stereotypes strongly influenced the formation and implementation of eugenic
policies, but they did not operate separately from race, class, and norms of
social conformity, usefulness and productivity. Eugenic anxieties concerning
degeneration did intersect with constructions of inferior races and racialized
targeting, andmembers of racialized groups were disproportionately affected
by eugenic policies, but constructions of inferior races did not fully coincide
with categorizations of the defective, dysgenic, unfit or socially inadequate.
Members of the supposedly superior, unmarked race or ethnic group could
be targeted as well if deemed defective according to norms of conformity, fit-
ness, productivity or usefulness. Biological determinism was a prevalent, but
not an indispensable, feature of eugenic arguments and strategies.
Framing eugenics as a reactionary, repressive, racist, and biologist affair
misses not only the heterogeneity of eugenics projects and their multifold
strands and variations, but above all the biopolitical rationality they all shared,
namely the distinction between the fit and the unfit, the socially adequate and
the socially inadequate, the adapted and the maladapted, the functional and
the dysfunctional, the useful and the useless. At the core of eugenics lay the
belief that unfit, dysgenic, unproductive, deficient or socially inadequate per-
sons constituted a burden to society and that this burden must be reduced
through social engineering.While it is true that this logic was encoded in ab-
list categories such as feeblemindedness, mental illness, hereditary disease
and the like, it would be misleading to say that eugenic policies targeted ‘the
disabled’. Firstly, categories of disability and abledness are themselves the
product of categorizing, labelling, and marking practices; they are not given
entities. Second, categorizing people as disabled, feeble-minded, mentally ill
and the like cannot be separated from categorizing them as unfit, useless, dys-
functional and unproductive. Eugenic policies linked notions of race, gender,
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class and abledness to notions of adequacy, fitness, usefulness, productivity
and normality, and it is this linkage that made them popular and powerful.
Any effort to come to terms with eugenic policies in the past and address-
ing the injustices, encroachments and suffering they caused must therefore
confront this inherently modern biopolitical rationality. Reparation schemes
and government apologies may form important elements to confront it. They
may grant satisfaction to those whose rights, bodies and souls have been in-
jured, provide moral and legal rehabilitation and, ideally, a promise of non-
repetition. If, however, we as a society want to understand how and why these
injuries and infringements were possible in the first place, it is mandatory to
interrogate the productivist biopolitical rationality that informed and moti-
vated them.
3 Nazi Sterilization Policy, Second-Order
Injustice and the Struggle for Reparations
On 24 May 2007, the German Bundestag passed a declaration that ostracized
the Nazi Law on the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases of 14
July 1933. The declaration had been preceded by decades of struggle over an
entitlement to reparations for those who had been forcibly sterilized under
this law and over nullifying or ostracizing it. The terminological difference
matters, as explained below.
The law, the MPs declared, was an ”expression of the inhuman Nazi con-
ception of ’life unworthy of living’” (BT Drs. 16/3811 2006, 3) and the first step
on the way to the ”’euthanasia’ mass murder program” (BT Drs. 16/3811 2006,
4). It had provided a legal basis for forced sterilizations and therefore consti-
tuted Nazi injustice. Seventy-two years after the end of the Nazi regime, it
was the first time that a high-ranking German constitutional body declared
theNazi sterilization act itself, and not only theway it was applied, to be an in-
justice committed by the state. In 1988, the Bundestag had already proclaimed
the rulings under this law to be Nazi injustice. The verdict then, however, did
not apply to the law as such. This was now different:
The law itself is an expression of the Nazi ideology, which denies the invi-
olable dignity of every human being by subordinating the individual to the
racist delusion of 'purifying the body of the people' [Volkskörper] and, as a
final consequence, 'eradicating' it. Not only the violent measures based on
this law, but also the 'Hereditary Health Act' as such, which legalized these
violentmeasures, must therefore be regarded an expression of the inhuman
Nazi notion of 'life unworthy of living'. (BT Drs. 16/3811 2006, 3)
The Bundestag, the declaration went on, ”is doing so on the assumption that
by ostracizing the ‘Hereditary Health Act’ as such, it has removed any doubts
56 Biopolitics and Historic Justice
about its willingness to provide full satisfaction and rehabilitation to those
affected” (BT Drs. 16/3811 2006, 4).
For the victims, the declaration finally provided the official moral rehabil-
itation they had been awaiting for so long: Now ”they are no longer consid-
ered ’not worth of living’”, Margret Hamm,managing director of the Associa-
tion of Victims of “Euthanasia” and Forced Sterilization (Bund der „Euthanasie“-
Geschädigten und Zwangssterilisierten, BEZ) told us in a personal communica-
tion. However, the declaration did not entail recognition of those affected as
victims of Nazi persecution in the sense of the Federal Indemnification Act
(Bundesentschädigungsgesetz, BEG); thus, the persons concerned still were not
entitled to reparations under BEG until this point.
The faction of the Greens in Parliament (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) had sub-
mitted an alternative motion proposing not to ostracize but to annul the
Hereditary Health Act, thereby supporting the BEZ’s central demand to de-
clare the Act null and void (BT Drs. 16/1171). The majority in the Bundestag,
however, rejected this motion, arguing that the Act could no longer be an-
nulled as it had been automatically invalidated in 1949 for being incompatible
with the Basic Law. Yet, Margret Hamm explained, historically this was not
correct. The Act was never officially repealed. On the contrary, after 1945 and
even after 1949, it remained in effect in various ways as German administra-
tions, courts and governments continued to apply it. Courts and government
bodies used the Hereditary Health Act well after 1949 as a reference for de-
cisions on revision trials and reparation claims for persons who had been
forcibly sterilized, thereby actively confirming its validity. We have called this
practice, which reified the stigmatization of the victims, a second-order in-
justice (Braun and Herrmann 2015). In the following pages, we shall see that
the 2007 declaration failed to address this second-order injustice.
This chapter reviews the politics of coming to terms with Nazi steriliza-
tion policy—or failing to do so—in the Federal Republic. More precisely, it ex-
amines the politics of reparations for victims of Nazi sterilization policy and
reconstructs what was and was not subject to critical reflection in this pro-
cess. I use the term ‘politics of reparations’ to refer to the politics of coming
to terms with historic injustice in a broad sense, comprising acts of rehabil-
itation or redress, reparation schemes, public apologies and inquiries. This
may lead to the adoption of reparation policies or the rejection thereof, take
place in formal political arenas such as parliaments or courts or in the media
and other public spaces, and involve state as well as civil society actors. I take
a performatist approach to reparation policies here, understanding them as
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performative acts, as something that is being done—or not. From this per-
spective, the questions are: What is it that actors are actually doing when they
are crafting reparation policies? What distinctions are made, what bound-
aries drawn, what value judgements implied, what responsibility assumed
and what audience addressed? I draw on the approaches of Nicholas Tavuchis
(1991) and Aaron Lazare (2004), both ofwhomworkedwith the concept of apol-
ogy. According to their understandings, an apology is a performative act that
involves certain things being done, or in fact requires they be done, in order
to constitute a proper apology. These are: making a factual statement about
what happened, issuing a moral verdict, determining that wrongdoing has
taken place, accepting responsibility for it, and promising non-repetition. In-
sofar as rehabilitation and reparation policies are intended as acts of making
amends for an historic injustice—and not merely compensation for damage
caused by force majeure—they involve and require acts similar to those that
constitute proper apologies. Taking a performatist approach also allows us to
see that rehabilitation and reparation policies do not simply address matters
of the past but constitutively connect the past, the present and the future:
Actors engaging in reparation policies1 make factual statements about acts
in the past; they convey a moral judgement about these acts and determine
whether wrongdoing took place; they specify what was wrong about it; they
accept responsibility in the present, thereby referring to normative principles
or values that were violated; and they make a commitment to these norms
and principles and promise non-repetition. Thus, establishing what should
and should not qualify as a systemic injustice and which state actions in the
past should or should not constitute an entitlement to reparations involves
the confirmation of moral and legal standards for past, present and future.
Therefore, struggles over reparations are struggles not only about the past but
also about the present and the future as they inevitably imply the question of
what kind of society we want to be: What wrongdoing has taken place? Was it
so severe that it requires us to make amends? What normative principle has
been violated and how important is it to us? Are we willing to commit to it?
What kind of society are we now; in what way do we differ from the society
that allowed these things to happen in the first place? What kind of society
do we want to be in the future?
In this chapter, I interrogate the politics of coming to terms with Nazi
selective sterilization policy. A note on terminology is in order: I deliberately
1 In the following short for rehabilitation and reparation policies.
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avoid the terms ‘eugenic’ and ‘eugenics’ as well as the term ‘euthanasia’. Al-
though both acquired a more pejorative meaning after 1945, they were origi-
nally coined to denote something ostensibly positive: efforts to achieve a bet-
ter-quality population (see Chapter 2) in the case of eugenics and the ‘good
death’ in the case of euthanasia. Both terms are euphemistic and mislead-
ing. I refer instead to selective sterilization and selective sterilization pol-
icy. Selective sterilization means that certain persons or institutions claim
the competence to select other persons for sterilization on the grounds that,
for whatever reason, they consider these persons undesired in society. By se-
lecting the undesired for sterilization, those who claim competence seek to
reduce the number of the undesired by preventing them from having chil-
dren. Note that selective sterilization does not necessarily rest on biologistic
assumptions. Those who claim the authority to decide may also assume that
undesired features may be passed down to future generations through pro-
creation, education, or living conditions, as pointed out in Chapter 2.
To be sure, sterilization has not been the only practice to keep undesired
people from having and raising children; institutionalization and sexual seg-
regation, forced contraception, forced abortions, and forced removal of chil-
dren are others. Sterilization policy was arguably the most widespread but
by no means the only policy instrument for that purpose used by the Nazi
regime. Selective sterilization, as I see it, can be understood as a biopolitical
injury of normality. I use the concept of injuries of normality to denote hu-
man rights violations that refer to notions of normality in a threefold sense:
First, they enact social norms and standards of health, fitness, productivity, or
conformity, establish categories of differential social worth, and mark some
people as socially inadequate, abnormal, deviant or deficient and ultimately
being a burden or even a threat to society. Second, injuries of normality are
by no means confined to situations of war, civil war or other situations of
exceptional crisis. Rather, they occur also in states of normality—or what is
considered by the unmarked to be normality. Lastly, injuries of normality are
so ingrained and persistent because they are considered normal; as long as it
goes without saying that mentally handicapped persons are a burden to soci-
ety or that homosexual men endanger youth, it will be considered normal to
reduce their numbers and deny them full civil rights status.
Forced sterilization is an injury in that it is both a violation of the person’s
physical integrity and a stigma imposed on her, a value judgement stipulat-
ing that she and persons like her are undesired and should preferably not
exist at all. It is an injury of normality insofar as the value judgement refers
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to notions of normal vs. abnormal, deficient or deviant in relation to certain
social norms and standards. It constitutes, furthermore, a biopolitical injury
of normality that these norms and standards refer to notions of being a fit,
healthy, functioning, productive and thus useful part of the social body. If this
is accurate, then selective sterilization policies inevitably constitute biopolit-
ical injuries of normality. Nazi sterilization policy was a particularly large-
scale, systematic and violent case of selective sterilization policy, manifesting
and forcefully executing a type of biopolitical rationality. The question exam-
ined in this and the following two chapters is whether and to what extent this
underlying biopolitical rationality was subject to critical reflection in West
German reparation politics. I argue that the biopolitical rationality that drove
Nazi sterilization policy did not vanish in 1945. Moreover, it not only did not
vanish; it informed the politics of reparations for decades, manifesting in the
persistent failure to acknowledge victims’ claims to rehabilitation and repara-
tion. In 2007, the Bundestag finally managed to condemn the biopolitical logic
that had driven Nazi sterilization policy, but it failed to condemn or even re-
flect upon the enduring power of this logic in the Federal Republic.
In this chapter, I examine the politics of reparations for coercive steril-
ization under Nazi rule focusing on the question of what, if anything, was
considered wrong about this policy. I suggest that we can read the relevant
struggles as pertaining to the question of whether basic individual rights such
as the right to physical integrity, the right to found a family, and the right
to personal freedom apply universally, so that violating them on a system-
atic basis constitutes a severe historic injustice, or whether they apply only
to persons who meet certain norms and standards. From this angle, we can
see that for many decades systematic violations were not considered an un-
due infringement when directed against persons deemed mentally ill, men-
tally retarded, disabled or in some way abnormal or deficient. The 2007 dec-
laration condemned these violations under Nazi rule. However, it declared
Nazi sterilization policy despicable not because it categorized people as be-
ing biopolitically inferior but because it served the despicable racist goals of
the Nazi regime. It is thus unclear whether the Bundestag considers selective
sterilization to constitute a biopolitical injustice in any case, regardless of the
type of regime that performs it.
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3.1 The Hereditary Health Act and its Biopolitical Rationality
The Law for the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases (Gesetz zur
Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses, GzVeN)2, hereafter Hereditary Health Act,
came into effect on 1 January 1934. It allowed for sterilizing a person ‘if, ac-
cording to the experience of medical science, there is a high probability that
his offspringwill suffer from serious physical ormental defects of a hereditary
nature’ (GzVeN §1).
TheAct explicitlymentions “1. congenitalmental deficiency, 2. schizophre-
nia, 3. manic depression, 4. hereditary epilepsy, 5. hereditary St. Vitus’ Dance
(Huntington’s chorea), 6. Hereditary blindness, 7. hereditary deafness, 8. se-
rious hereditary physical deformity” (GzVeN §1).
In addition to hereditary conditions, alcoholism served as an indication
for sterilization. An amendment in 1935 also allowed for the termination of a
pregnancy, formally with the woman’s consent, if the woman was sentenced
to sterilization but already pregnant at the time (GzVeN §10a(1)). Further, the
amendment allowed males to be castrated, formally with their consent, to
”free them from a degenerate sexual drive” (GzVeN §14(2)). This was primarily
directed against homosexuals.
The decisions rested with the newly established Hereditary Health Courts
(Erbgesundheitsgerichte), consisting of a district court judge, a state physician,
and another physician trained in ‘hereditary health’ (Erbgesundheitslehre)
(GzVeN §6). Once a verdict was passed, the sterilization was required to be
carried out, even against the will of the person concerned, meaning that
the Act explicitly sanctioned the use of force. Notably, there was no mention
of race in the law. Sinti and Roma were disproportionally affected as they
were disproportionally categorized as ‘feeble-minded’ (Riechert 1995), but the
Act did not explicitly target ethno-racial groups. In fact, condemning Nazi
sterilization policy for being ‘biologistic’ or discriminating against members
of certain racial groups is a misconstrual. Even hereditariness was not strictly
a biological category. As Gisela Bock has shown, 95 percent of sterilization
verdicts referred to indistinct psychiatric categories. ‘Mental deficiency’,
schizophrenia, epilepsy and manic depression together accounted for nearly
two thirds of indications (Bock 1986, 302f.). None of these categories was
2 Available online at http://www.documentarchiv.de/ns/erbk-nws.html. For an En-
glish version see http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1521 (last ac-
cessed 10 April 2020).
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precise and well-defined, and the hereditariness of such conditions was
difficult if not impossible to establish. However, this was of no consequence.
Typically, sterilization candidates were identified by applying criteria of social
behavior, conformity and functionality as indicated by school or work perfor-
mance, sexual life, criminal record, receipt of welfare benefits, or records of
institutionalization (Bock 1986, 306f.). The overall purpose of the policy was
to improve the hereditary health (Erbgesundheit) and fitness (Erbtüchtigkeit) of
the people, as Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick explained in 1940. Since
Erbgesundheit was a “relative term”, the identification of sterilization candi-
dates was to take place by means of assessment of a person’s performance
(Leistungsfähigkeit), “taking into account the overall value to the community
in terms of skills, talents, etc. as well as the existence of hereditary defects”
(RMI quoted in Bock 1986, 236).
The Hereditary Health Act was certainly an instrument of biopolitical
racism—not necessarily in the sense of systematically targeting Jews, Roma
and Sinti, Poles or members of other racialized groups, but in the sense of
pursuing the overall Nazi goal of racial improvement (Aufartung). Nonethe-
less, not all forced sterilizations were carried out on a legal basis. Several
thousand Jews, Sinti, Roma, and Poles were sterilized in gruesome experi-
ments in the camps on the basis of executive orders (Friedlander 1995); several
hundred children of German women and Afro-French or African American
soldiers who had been stationed in the Rhineland after World War I also
suffered forced extra-legal sterilization (Pommerin 1979; Lauré al-Samarai
and Lennox 2004). Between 1934 and 1945, approximately 360,000 people
were legally sterilized under the Act (Bock 1986; Friedlander 1995); 5,000 to
6,000 women and 500 to 600 men died as a result (Bock 1986, 230ff.). The
exact numbers, however, remain unknown.
Forced sterilization is a bodily violation, but it also imposes a stigma on
a person, marking her as inferior and as a valueless member of the commu-
nity.3 It is a verdict on her “overall value to the community”, as Minister Frick
termed it. Bearing this mark entailed a series of further discriminations: peo-
ple lost their jobs, they were banned from marrying non-sterilized partners,
they were banned from adopting children, and they lost many other oppor-
tunities in life. Whether or not the person concerned suffered from health
repercussions due to the surgery, whether or not she wanted children—the
3 The letters and testimonies of survivors collected by StefanieWestermann (2010; 2017)
provide ample evidence of this.
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stigma and the resultant discriminations constituted a violation of her per-
sonal integrity and right to human dignity. Thus, the injustice committed is
not merely a question of the physical injury that may or may not be caused by
the surgery; it is inherent in the act of selective sterilization as such. Ascrib-
ing differential worth to people according to their presumed performance,
functionality and usefulness for the community and depriving those deemed
deficient of their dignity and status as full members of the community—that
is what Nazi sterilization policy did and what the Federal Republic failed to
acknowledge over the decades that followed.
3.2 No ‘Forgotten Victims’: Non-Reparation Policy after 1945
After 1945, theHereditaryHealth Courts were abolished; consequently, no new
sterilization verdicts could be passed under the Hereditary Health Act. How-
ever, the Act was not uniformly repealed. The Allied Control Council did not
include it in its list of legal acts that were permeated by Nazi ideology and
therefore to be invalidated (Control Council Law No. 1 1945). Only in the So-
viet occupational zone was it repealed (as a Nazi law by the Soviet military
administration in 1946). In the British occupational zone, by contrast, themil-
itary administration decided to maintain it, not least to enable the persons
concerned to have their cases reviewed in court (Tümmers 2009b). To do so,
claimants were required to demonstrate that in their case the sterilization was
unlawful because the Act had been improperly applied. They needed to con-
vince the court that, for instance, the earlier verdict was based on a faulty
diagnosis or on procedural errors. It was not uncommon for these trials to
consult the same documents and reports that had been used by the Heredity
Health Courts, and sometimes the same judges and experts were even in-
volved (Tümmers 2009b). If the courts established that the sterilization had
in fact been unlawful, the claimant could in principle apply for hardship com-
pensation or, in some cases, seek to have the sterilization reversed (Heben-
streit 1983).The legal basis of these proceedings, however, was always the Nazi
Hereditary Health Act. By implication, the just or unjust, rightful or wrongful
nature of the Act as such remained unquestioned; only its former applications
were at stake.Quite the reverse: the courtsmade the Act the reference for their
rulings and thereby performatively confirmed its enduring validity.
This practice continued after the Federal Republic was founded in 1949.
The Act was not repealed, and throughout the 1950s and 60s, the courts con-
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tinued to use it as a reference in revision trials. Until the 1980s, no federal
constitutional body ever declared the Act to be incompatible with the Basic
Law. On the contrary, the Higher Regional Court (OLG) of the city of Hamm
decided in 1954 that the Hereditary Health Act did not violate the rule of law
or natural law and that those affected therefore had no right to compensation
(OLG Hamm 1954).
In the same vein, jurist Ernst-Walther Hanack concluded in an expert
opinion on the ”Criminal Law Admission of Artificial Infertilization” of 1959
that the Nazi Hereditary Health Act did not contravene the Basic Law because
the provision of compulsory sterilization served not the purpose of discrim-
ination, disenfranchisement or humiliation, but rather the preservation of
public health. In fact, repudiating compulsory sterilization would contravene
the obligation to respect the rights of others (Harnack 1959, 87f.). Thus, he
argued, the Hereditary Health Act could not be considered invalid according
to Article 123 of the Basic Law because it did not conflict with the Basic Law.
The Article proscribes that “[l]aw in force before the Bundestag first convenes
shall remain in force insofar as it does not conflict with this Basic Law” (Art.
123(1) GG).
In the early years of the Federal Republic, this was by nomeans a minority
view. Medical, legal and other experts, many of whom had been involved in
racial hygiene and Nazi sterilization policy or even in the systematic killing
of people with disabilities or certain disorders, openly debated the need for
selective sterilization for reasons of public health or social welfare (Tümmers
2009a; 2011, 84ff., 162f.).The prevailing view among experts and policymakers
was that selective sterilization was a rational, if not necessary, state practice,
an appropriate policy instrument to achieve legitimate policy goals. Selective
sterilization, in other words, was considered a normal instrument of mod-
ern statecraft. Thus, the Hereditary Health Act was predominantly perceived
as a policy instrument for safeguarding the welfare of the German people,
not as Nazi injustice.4 According to this logic, individual ‘abuses’ of the Act
might have occurred, but the Act as such was not problematic. In this cli-
mate, the grievances of sterilization victims found no resonance in politics,
in the courts, or in civil society. Reparation and rehabilitation for those af-
fected were not on the political agenda.
4 For instance, Graf 1950, Nachtsheim 1950, Neukamp 1951. See also the minutes of the
Parliamentary Reparations Committee of April 13, 1961 (BT 3 1961).
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This did not change when the Federal Republic established a statutory en-
titlement to reparations for victims of Nazi persecution under the Federal
Indemnification Act (BEG) of 1953. The entitlement was subject to restrictive
territorial conditions; claimants were required to demonstrate that they had a
spatial relationship to Germany within a certain time period (Brunner, Frei et
al. 2009, 25). Among those who were in principle eligible on territorial terms,
only those persons who were recognized as victims of Nazi persecution were
granted the right to reparations. The BEG conclusively restricted this defini-
tion to those who had been persecuted for reasons of political opposition to
the Nazi regime or for reasons of race, political opinion, religion or ideology
(Weltanschauung) (BEG §1(1)). Thus, entitlement to reparations was not deter-
mined on the basis of what a person had suffered, nor was it contingent on
what one had done, on whether one had been a ‘fighter against fascism’, as
was the case in the GDR (Goschler 2005, 361ff., Ludi 2006). Rather, entitle-
ment to reparations was made contingent on whether a person belonged to
one of the groups listed by the BEG. Yet not all groups that suffered perse-
cution were listed. Why were some groups included and others not? From a
performatist perspective, the question to be asked would be: What is it that
the BEG does? The answer is: The BEG makes distinctions—distinctions ac-
cording to the motives of the persecution that took place. It distinguishes
between deserving and undeserving victims of Nazi persecution based on the
motives of the perpetrators. It sets out a number of ‘reasons’ for targeting,
tormenting, detaining, killing people that are so despicable that they consti-
tute a reason for making amends.These reasons included those of race, polit-
ical opinion, religion orWeltanschauung, but not those of sexual orientation,
abledness, health status, productivity or functionality.
Those who had been forcibly sterilized were not included, nor were ho-
mosexuals, ‘asocials’, ‘professional criminals’, deserters, forced laborers, or
those who were killed in psychiatric institutions (Evangelische Akademie Bad
Boll 1987, Goschler 2003; Reimesch 2003; Goschler 2005; 2009). This exclu-
sion, however,was by nomeans the result of thoughtlessness or forgetfulness.
Therefore, the concept of the forgotten Nazi victims that arose in the early
1980s is misleading. The discourse of forgotten victims addressed the per-
secution of those groups who were not included in reparation schemes and
had not yet been included in discourses on Aufarbeitung undWiedergutmachung,
such as Roma and Sinti, forced laborers, homosexual men and sterilization
victims. These men and women, however, had been not forgotten; they had,
rather, been deliberately excluded from the reparation scheme. State Secre-
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tary Alfred Hartmann at the Ministry of Finance stated this unmistakably in
1957:
The Act for the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases of 14 July
1933 is not a typical Nazi law, since similar laws also exist in democratically
governed countries—e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Finland and in some states of
the USA. The Federal Indemnification Act, however, grants compensation
benefits only to persons persecuted by the Nazi regime and, in a few excep-
tional cases, to injured parties who have suffered damage as a result of par-
ticularly serious violations of constitutional principles. (BT PLP 1957, 10876
(A))
The message to the persons concerned was clear: You are inferior, and the
state has the right to reduce the number of the inferior; thus, the state was
right to do this to you and you have no right to accuse it of wrongdoing.
Another argument to fend off reparation claims drew on the fact that the
Nazi sterilization law was based upon a draft sterilization law produced by
the Prussian State Health Council in 1932. This draft had been the result of
longstanding efforts by leading eugenicists and racial hygienists in Germany
to translate their ideas into policy programmes (Weingart, Kroll et al. 1996).
The purpose of the Prussian draft had been to reduce the procreation of the
hereditarily ill and ‘inferior’ (Bock 1986, 51f.); in that respect, it did not differ
from the subsequent Nazi law. The only difference was that the Hereditary
Health Act sanctioned the use of force (Bock 1986, 51).
The argument that selective sterilization was not a ‘typical Nazi injustice’
was thus not entirely wrong; indeed, the idea had not been invented by the
Nazis. Likewise, it is true that selective sterilization laws existed in Sweden,
Denmark, Finland and many US states. Today, we know that such laws ex-
isted in many more countries and, at some point, in most states of the USA
(see Chapter 2). In more conceptual language, we can say that selective ster-
ilization policies did not originate in Nazi ideology but in a biopolitical ra-
tionality that was deeply ingrained and operative in many modern states. By
reasoning that selective sterilization was not a typical Nazi injustice and there-
fore should not constitute entitlement to reparations, policy-makers effectively
classified selective sterilization as a normal instrument of modern statecraft.
They thereby simultaneously normalized and confirmed the biopolitical ra-
tionality that had originally informed and motivated these human rights in-
fringements and shielded them from problematization. In short, unlike the
oppression of racial or religious minorities or of political opponents (with the
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exception of communists), the biopolitical motive of improving the fitness of
the social body was normalized, rather than condemned, by excluding steril-
ization victims from reparation claims. The Federal Republic would not con-
demn persecution on biopolitical grounds as wrongdoing, let alone promise
non-repetition.
On the whole, in the 1950s and 60s, the view that selective sterilization
programmes were a normal, useful, rational, science-based instrument of
population policy prevailed. It was in this vein that the post-1945 debates
about a possible new sterilization law continued (Tümmers 2011, 84ff.). One
of the protagonists of these debates was hereditary pathologist Hans Nacht-
sheim. In the 1940s, Nachtsheim had been head of department for experi-
mental hereditary pathology at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropol-
ogy and performed, among other things, experiments on children with dis-
abilities whom he obtained from the killing institution Brandenburg-Görden
(Klee 2013, 427). He had also experimented with organs obtained from pris-
oners murdered in Auschwitz. After 1945, Nachtsheim continued to advocate
“The Need for Active Hereditary Health Care”, as he titled of one of his articles
(Nachtsheim 1952; 1964).
In this mindset, courts and bureaucracies regularly refuted reparation
claims on the grounds that selective sterilization was based on science rather
than political violence. The justifications with which reparation claims were
refuted thus resembled the justifications of Nazi sterilization policy. This is
exemplified by the experience of Hans Lieser, whom wemet in in 2010. Lieser
told us that he had suffered coerced sterilization in 1942 and applied for repa-
ration in the 1960s. In 1968, his application was dismissed by the district court
of the city of Trier on the following grounds:5
It is evident from the attached files that the proceedings were opened and
conducted against the plaintiff for the sole reason that, in the opinion of
theHereditaryHealth Court, the plaintiff suffered fromhereditary deafness.
Prior to its decision, theHereditaryHealthCourt obtained the expert opinion
of theDirector of theUniversity Ear, Nose and Throat Clinic in Frankfurt/Main
dated 4 February 1941, in which the expert concluded that the plaintiff was
suffering from sporadic recessive deafness, which was a hereditary disease
5 We visited Hans Lieser and his brother-in-law and fellow campaigner Valentin Hennig
on 14 May 2010 in Kordel near Trier and obtained express permission from them to
mention them both by name.
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in terms of the Law for the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Dis-
eases of 14 July 1933. It is obvious that this scientifically based expert opinion
alone led the Hereditary Health Court to order infertility treatment. More-
over, it follows from statutory regulation—hardship compensation pursuant
to §171, subsection 4, no. 1, BEG—that, as a rule, when sterilization was car-
ried out in theNational Socialist state, a violentmeasure according to §1, BEG
can only be assumed if the intervention was carried outwithout prior proce-
dure under the Hereditary Health Act. (Rationale quoted in Hennig 1999, 13,
emph. i.o.)
This was common procedure. The majority of such applications were rejected
”because the sterilizations were carried out on the basis of a procedure under
the Hereditary Health Act” (BT Drs. 10/6287 1986, 37). In other words, if the
injury was based on proper procedure, it by definition constituted no act of
violence. Hence, the justifications with which reparation claims were refuted
resembled the justifications of Nazi sterilization policy.
In 1965, the Parliamentary Committee on Reparations (Wiedergut-
machungsausschuss), established by the Bundestag in 1953, officially approved
this practice by declaring that the Hereditary Health Act had not been a law
of injustice (ein Unrechtsgesetz); accordingly, victims of coerced sterilization
were not to be entitled to reparations. The Committee based its statement on
an expert hearing that it had conducted in 1961 (BT 3 1961). Seven experts were
invited to this hearing, among them Professors Hans Nachtsheim, Werner
Villinger and Helmut Ehrhardt. Nachtsheim, as previously mentioned, had
used children with disabilities for his research (Klee 2013, 427); Ehrhardt
had provided expert reports for Hereditary Health Courts (Klee 2013, 127);
and Villinger had served as a judge on Hereditary Health Courts and was
also involved in the so-called T4 programme, that is, the institutional killing
programme, as a provider of medical reports (Klee 2013, 641). At the hearing,
Nachtsheim maintained that the Hereditary Health Act was not to be con-
flated with Nazi racial policy because it was ”an apolitical law intended to
protect the hereditary health of the German people” (BT 3 1961, 33). Ehrhardt
likewise underlined that the law ”in its core content is indeed in line with
the scientific convictions of the time, as well as those of today” (BT 3 1961,
25). Not all invited experts, however, were of this opinion. Ministerialrat Dr
Karl6, an administrative physician, argued that the very purpose of the Act,
6 The document does not give a first name here.
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”namely to achieve a ‘people’s body (Volkskörper) purified of biologically infe-
rior hereditary material’”, was immoral and that the sterilizations ordered
under it constituted ”a bodily injury emanating from a law of injustice”. The
state, he concluded, had the duty to compensate this injury by means of a
special reparation law (BT 3 1961, 48). The Reparations Committee, however,
agreed with Nachtsheim, Ehrhardt and Villinger and denied entitlement
to reparations for victims of Nazi sterilization. As late as 2008, the Federal
Ministry of Finance affirmed this conclusion and the method by which it was
obtained, stating in a letter to the Petitions Committee of the Bundestag that
all aspects of reparation law had been ”carefully examined by the Reparations
Committee after hearing leading experts in psychiatry” (BT Drs. 17/8729 2012,
7).
It was not until 1969 that essential parts of the Hereditary Health Act were
repealed.The remaining portions were repealed in the course of the 5th Crim-
inal Law Reform in 1974, not, however, for reasons of incompatibility with
the Basic Law. It was not until 1986 that a German court, the Kiel District
Court, found that the Heredity Health Act had been incompatible with the
Basic Law (Scheulen 2005, 5). The Federal Constitutional Court, however, was
never concerned with the issue and consequently never stated an incompati-
bility between the Hereditary Health Act and the Basic Law.
3.3 The 1980s: The Struggle Gains Momentum
In the 1980s, the situation changed. A new phase of coming to terms with
Nazi crimes began with a surge of research and commemorative activities.
In this context, crimes against the so-called ‘forgotten victims’ met with new
public interest, among them Nazi medical crimes.
One important event was the famous 1985 speech by then-President of
State Richard von Weizsäcker on the fortieth anniversary of the end of the
war, in which he not only called May 8th, 1945 the day of liberation but also
commemorated several groups of ‘forgotten victims’, among them the vic-
tims of forced sterilization and institutional killings. Moreover, a number of
civil society initiatives began to address the ‘forgotten victims’’ exclusion from
reparations and demanded a revision of the reparation scheme (Die Grünen
im Bundestag & Fraktion der Alternativen Liste Berlin 1986; Deutscher Bun-
destag 1987; Tümmers 2011, 272ff.). In 1986, Gisela Bock’s ground-breaking
book on coerced sterilization under Nazi rule was published (Bock 1986), and
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civil society groups formed that began to research individual psychiatric insti-
tutions’ involvement with the systematic killing of patients and persons with
disabilities.
The Association of Victims of “Euthanasia” and Forced Sterilization (BEZ)
played an important role in articulating these activities, as did the movement
for the reform of psychiatry and the Study Group for Research into Nazi ”Eu-
thanasia” and Forced Sterilization (Arbeitskreis zur Erforschung der nationalsozial-
istischen „Euthanasie“ und Zwangssterilisation). Among them, the BEZ was the
only organization founded by and for citizens affected by coerced sterilization
or institutional killing. Founded in 1987, it acted as a self-help group, an in-
terest group, and an initiative for commemoration and civic education (Braun
2017). Itsmain objectives were to achieve full moral and legal rehabilitation, to
have the Hereditary Health Act annulled by the German Bundestag, to achieve
recognition as victims of the Nazi regime, and to receive reparations under
the Federal Indemnification Act (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz, BEG). The over-
arching goal of these demands, however, was to overcome the stigma imposed
on those affected and to ensure that nothing of the sort would ever take place
again. In particular, the formal annulment of the Hereditary Health Act was
of great importance to the BEZ, asthey assumed that the act of annulment
(Nichtigkeitserklärung) would necessarily be followed by sterilization victims’
recognition as Nazi victims and consequently by their entitlement to repara-
tions under the BEG. For the BEZ, nothing short of reparation entitlements
under the BEG would rescind the status of ‘second-class’ victims allotted to
them. Only annulment of the Act and provision of full rights to reparations
could reverse the stigma. However, the efforts of the BEZ failed. To this day,
the victims of Nazi sterilization policy are entitled to no reparations under
the BEG.
3.4 Reparations as the Greater Injustice?
We can thus speak of an enduring politics of denial and non-recognition that
has never fully been reversed. It was bolstered by the core assumption that
selective sterilization policies as such were a relatively normal, rational and
science-based instrument of modern statecraft, even if the Nazi state might
have used it improperly. Hence, Nazi sterilization policy was in principle con-
sidered rational and lawful. In the 1980s, a new argument emerged to refute
reparation claims, referring this time not to science and the law but to nothing
70 Biopolitics and Historic Justice
less than justice. If one were to grant entitlement to reparations to persons
who were forcibly sterilized, as the argument went, one would in fact exacer-
bate existing injustices. Remarkably, this argument was first put forth by the
abovementioned Prof. Ehrhardt at the public hearing on “Making Amends
and Reparations for Nazi Injustice” organized by the Parliamentary Commit-
tee for the Interior in 1987 (Deutscher Bundestag 1987). The hearing marked
a milestone in West German politics of coming to terms with the Nazi past
insofar as it placed the so-called forgotten victims centre stage. For the first
time, in addition to academic and policy experts, persons who were person-
ally affected were invited as expert participants. Chairperson Klara Nowak
and member Fritz Niemand attended and gave testimony on behalf of the
BEZ. One of the academic experts invited was Prof. Helmut Ehrhardt, who
argued:
The last point of view concerns the actual victims of the Nazi regime. What
will they say if, for example, an anti-social drunkard who was wrongly ster-
ilized because of hereditary factors is now to be put on the same level as all
thosewho, as respectable citizens, were tortured in a concentration camp for
years simply because of their race, their faith or their political convictions?
A compensation scheme for those sterilized would in many cases amount
to a disavowal and a mockery of the genuine idea of reparation. (Deutscher
Bundestag 1987, 288)
One year later, the Federal Ministry of Finance confirmed this view in a letter
of reply to the BEZ, writing:
[...] the expert hearing conducted by the German Bundestag in 1987 made
it clear that revising the comprehensive laws on reparations and compen-
sation for war-induced losses would not lead to greater justice but, on the
contrary, to injustice in the relationship among the aggrieved parties.7
In the years that followed, the BEZ received a number of letters from the fed-
eral government reasoning, similarly, that improved compensation for ster-
ilization victims or surviving victims of ‘euthanasia’ would be tantamount to
an injustice to other Nazi victims (Braun 2017). For instance, in 1990, the Par-
liamentary Secretary of State at the Federal Ministry for Education and Re-
search, Manfred Carstensen, wrote:
7 Federal Ministry of Finance, letter to the BEZ of 27 July 1988, LAV NRW OWL, D107/73.
This and the following documents were retrieved from the BEZ archives.
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Additional improvements are not possible if the principle of equal treatment
is to be respected. They would lead to injustice towards the many severely
affected Nazi victims who have received or are still receiving statutory ben-
efits under the Federal Indemnification Act.8
Another letter from the Federal Chancellery, dated 2 February 1996, reiterates
the position of the Ministry of Finance almost verbatim. Revising the law on
reparations and compensation for war-induced losses, the letter says, ”[...]
would not lead to greater justice but, on the contrary, to injustice in the rela-
tions between the aggrieved parties.”9
Nevertheless, the struggle for reparations made some, albeit slow,
progress in the 1980s. In December 1980, the German government estab-
lished a Hardship Fund for Victims of Coerced Sterilization under the
General Act Regulating Compensation for War-Induced Losses of 1957. These
victims could then claim one-time compensation of 5,000 DM; as of 1988,
they could also apply for additional monthly payments under certain con-
ditions10. Hardship compensation under the Fund, however, did not imply
a recognition of wrongdoing. The purpose of the Fund was to compensate
for damage suffered due to the war, not due to an injustice. In accordance
with this purpose, claimants first needed to prove that they had in fact
suffered significant harm to their health as a result of sterilization surgery.
The health damage requirement was lifted in 1990. Until 2002, benefits were
granted only if claimants were in a situation of acute social distress. Although
several initiatives were launched in the 1980s and early 1990s for a new, more
inclusive reparation scheme (Braun 2017), none of them found a majority
in the Bundestag. According to the federal government, in February 2012, a
total of 13,816 persons who had been forcibly sterilized had received one-
time hardship compensation, and a total of 9,604 were receiving additional
monthly benefits (BT Drs. 17/8729 2012, 3f.).
8 Parliamentary State Secretary at the BMBF, Manfred Carsten, letter to the BEZ of 27
June 1990, LAV NRW OWL, D107/73.
9 Federal Chancellery, letter to the BEZ of 2 February 1996, LAV NRW OWL, D107/73.
10 The monthly payments amounted to 100 DM at first, from 1 January 2004 they were
raised to 100€, from 1 January 2006 to 120€, from 1 January 2011 to 291€ (BTDrs. 17/8729
2012, 3).
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3.5 Ostracization or Annulment
The members of the BEZ and those who supported them struggled not only
for reparations but also for moral and legal rehabilitation.The hardship com-
pensation as such included neither an acknowledgement of wrongdoing nor
a condemnation. Key to the struggle for rehabilitation became the question
of annulment.
In 1986 and 1987, the faction of the Greens introduced amotion in the Bun-
destag proposing that the Hereditary Health Act be annulled (BT Drs. 10/4750
1986; BT Drs. 11/143 1987). The Bundestag, it was posited, should declare that
the Act had been a Nazi law of injustice in that it categorized certain individ-
uals as inferior and socially undesirable. It was necessary to condemn the Act
because its very purpose, namely raising the hereditary quality of the German
people, was reprehensible. The Bundestag should therefore annul the Act and
all verdicts made under it.
The majority of the parliamentarians disagreed with this argument. In
1988, they adopted a declaration that condemned the rulings of the Hered-
itary Health Courts but not the Act as such (BT PLP 11/77). It took another
ten years to pass the NS Annulment Act of 1998 (NS-AufG), which effectively
cancelled the rulings. The main argument against annulling the Act was that
it had never been part of German law after 1949; it was incompatible with the
fundamental provisions of the Basic Law and had for this reason automat-
ically gone out of force when the Basic Law was established. Thus, it could
logically not be annulled, as argued for instance by then-Minister of Justice
Klaus Kinkel (FDP) in 1987 (Kinkel 1987; Incesu and Saathoff 1988).
This, however, wasmerely the personal opinion ofMinister Kinkel. In fact,
as we have seen, theHereditary Health Act was not ruled unconstitutional by a
competent constitutional body until the 1980s. On the contrary, it was actively
applied and thus constantly confirmed by the courts.
In the 1990s, the debate on annulling the Hereditary Health Act dimin-
ished. It was not revived until 2005, when a new initiative was launched,
mainly by former Minister of Justice and long-standing supporter of the
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BEZ Hans-Jochen Vogel (SPD)11 and the National Ethics Council (NER).12 The
Ethics Council called on the Bundestag to extend its former condemnation
of the sterilization verdicts to the Hereditary Health Act itself (Newsletter
Behindertenpolitik 2006, 5). This initiative prompted the two proposals men-
tioned at the outset of this chapter: the proposal by Bündnis 90/The Greens to
annul the Act (BT Drs. 16/1171 2006) and the proposal by the factions of the
governing parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, to ostracize it (BT Drs. 16/3811 2006).13
It was the firmhope of the BEZ that having the Act annulledwould provide
full moral and legal rehabilitation to the victims and consequently constitute
an entitlement to reparations under the BEG (Incesu and Saathoff 1988).How-
ever, the BEZ also wanted to draw attention to the injustices constituted by
the fact that the Hereditary Health Act had been continuously applied after
1949.The annulment proposal by B90/The Greens at least mentioned this fact.
The Bundestag, however, rejected the quest for an annulment on the grounds
that
[th]e Act had already ceased to be in force when the Basic Law entered into
force to the extent that it violated the Basic Law, pursuant to Article 123(1)
Basic Law. [...] The law thus no longer existed and can no longer be repealed.
(BT Drs. 16/5450 2007, 1)
Unfortunately, this was not correct. The Act was not repealed when the Ba-
sic Law entered into force; rather, the courts continually referred to it in the
course of review trials. No high-ranking court or constitutional body ever es-
tablished its incompatibility with the Basic Law. The Bundestag refused the
opportunity to confront this fact. It thus failed to address the countless bu-
reaucratic and governmental acts, court rulings, and expert opinions in the
1950s and 1960s that not only confirmed the Hereditary Health Act by apply-
ing it but often expressly vindicated it. The Bundestag failed to see that the
question of unconstitutionality had not been ignored but had rather been an-
swered in the negative. By accepting the argument that the Act had ceased to
11 Hans-Jochen Vogel was amember of theNational Ethics Council at the time and in this
position motivated the Council to issue a statement on the matter, as he told us in a
personal communication. Earlier, in 2004, the BEZ had turned to the Ethics Council to
request support in their struggle to annul the Hereditary Health Act.
12 An abridged version of the NER statement is printed in the Newsletter Behindertenpoli-
tik (2006).
13 The Left supported the call for annulment in a Question (Kleine Anfrage) submitted to
the government on the matter (BT Drs. 16/2307, 2006).
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exist in 1949, the majority denied the second-order injustice that had contin-
ued to take place until well after 1949 and failed to face the necessity for the
Federal Republic to acknowledge not only its predecessor’s wrongdoing but
its own. In turn, they also failed to address the continuity of biopolitical rea-
soning underlying these performative confirmations and open justifications.
3.6 Comprehensive Rehabilitation?
The 2007 declaration by the Bundestag clearly condemned the Nazi steriliza-
tion law. The declaration meets all the requirements for an official apology:
It names the wrong that has taken place, it names the major perpetrators,
namely physicians and heads of institutions, and it names the victims, rec-
ognizes their suffering and expresses sorrow and respect. Moreover, in sub-
stance if not in wording, it confronts the biopolitical rationality that moti-
vated these crimes, namely the delusional idea of ‘purifying the body of the
people’ (Volkskörper).The Bundestag thereby distanced itself clearly and beyond
doubt from the Nazi sterilization policy. It did not, however, condemn selec-
tive sterilization as such, and it did not confront the second-order injustices
that occurred in the Federal Republic or the enduring biopolitical rationality
that informed and motivated them. It treated Nazi sterilization policy as an
isolated case of exceptional evil, clearly delineated in space and time, obviat-
ing the need to confront origins, overlaps, parallels or continuities that would
go beyond these spatial and temporal demarcations. This is expressed quite
clearly in the rationale for the declaration:
Although eugenic ideas and eugenic sterilization laws were already
widespread internationally before 1933, the Law for the Prevention of
Offspring with Hereditary Diseases of 14 July 1933 (Hereditary Health Act)
marks a historical caesura. This caesura is characterized by the fact that the
allegedly ‘hereditarily ill’ persons were degraded to mere subjects of state
disposal by this law. (BT Drs. 16/3811 2006, 1)
It does not suffice to condemn only the applications of the Act, so the rationale
continues, given that the applications cannot be separated from the Act. The
reasoning as to why this cannot be done, however, deserves closer inspection:
A distinction between law and application requires a functioning separation
of powers. This prerequisite was not met in the totalitarian Nazi state. [...]
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Against the background of a totalitarian state practice, the legal orders and
the forced sterilizations carried out on the basis of these orders cannot be
separated from each other. (BT Drs. 16/3811 2006, 3)
Hence, only under the conditions of a totalitarian state was the Act itself de-
termined to deserve condemnation and not only its application.Would a pol-
icy of selectively sterilizing the undesired, the ‘useless’, the unproductive be
less despicable if pursued by a non-totalitarian state? Would it be acceptable
to violate someone’s bodily integrity, personal freedom, right to have and raise
children if that person were declared inferior? In the context of the Nazi state,
the declaration argues, the Hereditary Health Act was “the first step on the
way to the ‘euthanasia’ mass murder program” (BT Drs. 16/3811 2006, 3). It can
certainly be argued that this is correct insofar as we now know of significant
personal, practical and ideological continuities between the Nazi steriliza-
tion policy and the institutional killings (Friedlander 1995). Yet it is unclear
what the argument actually expresses: that selective sterilization necessarily
entails mass murder—which would be historically incorrect—or that forced
sterilization is unproblematic when it does not do so.
It is the merit of the Bundestag to have condemned Nazi sterilization pol-
icy for its—biopolitical—purpose of ’purifying the people’s body’ and to have
stated that the purpose as such contravenes respect for human dignity. Yet it
remains unclear whether, in the view of the Bundestag, the practice of selective
sterilization is to be condemned, whether it is wrong for any political regime
to assign a differential moral status to people according to their fitness, pro-
ductivity and usefulness to the community, tomake their rights to respect and
state protection contingent on this status. By confining the issue at stake to
the Nazi era, the Bundestag does several things at the same time: It acknowl-
edges severe wrongdoing on the part of the predecessor regime and names
perpetrators, victims, the wrong that occurred, the suffering it caused, and
the reason why it was wrong. However, it evaded the question of whether the
wrong—selective sterilization—is inherently wrong or only wrong under cer-
tain circumstances. In a certain sense, it thereby avoids making a promise of
non-repetition insofar as it does not condemn the use of selective sterilization
under conditions of a constitutional democracy. It further avoids addressing
the second-order injustices that took place after 1945 and exonerates the Fed-
eral Republic from confronting its own wrongdoing. In short, the Bundestag
failed to distance the Federal Republic explicitly and unambiguously from the
biopolitical rationality that motivated selective sterilization policy in the past,
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to state that this biopolitical rationality is incompatible with who we are as a
state and a society in the present, and to make a commitment to non-repeti-
tion in the future.
In hindsight, this wasmost probably the last word in the struggle for repa-
rations for forced sterilization. After 2007, the debate was discontinued; given
that very few of those concerned are still alive, it is unlikely to be reopened.
What remains open, however, is the question of whether biopolitical rational-
ity is considered compatible or incompatible with the kind of society we want
to be.
4 Justice at Last: The Persecution of
Homosexual Men and the Politics of Amends
On June 22, 2017, the German Bundestag passed the Act on the Criminal Reha-
bilitation of Persons Sentenced for Consensual Homosexual Acts after 8 May
1945 (StrRehaHomG), or Rehabilitation Act (BT PLP 18/240 2017). The Act re-
pealed convictions under Paragraphs 175 and 175a of the FRG Criminal Code
and Paragraph 151 of the GDRCriminal Code that were issued after 8May 1945
in what became the Federal Republic of Germany and the GermanDemocratic
Republic, respectively. It rehabilitated men who had been convicted by Ger-
man courts of consensual homosexual acts after the end of the Nazi regime1.
Furthermore, it granted a right to reparations in the amount of 3,000 Euros
per conviction plus 1,500 Euros per year or part thereof that those affected
spent in custody. Later, the right to reparations was also extended to men
who had been charged with homosexual acts but not convicted.
The Act was hailed by the government and the public alike as a major
move to end discrimination against homosexuals and provide justice for those
who had suffered from it in the past. The Federal Minister of Justice at the
time,HeikoMaas, called the convictions “iniquities of the constitutional state”
(Schandtaten des Rechtsstaates) (SZ 2017),maintaining: “From today’s viewpoint,
the former convictions are blatantly wrong. They deeply violate the human
dignity of every person convicted” (SZ 2017). The Federal Family Minister,
Manuela Schwesig, added that the Act was an “important signal for all ho-
mosexuals in Germany that discrimination and prejudice against them have
no place in our society today or in the future” (SZ 2017).
1 The Law did not suspend all convictions, however: It did not rehabilitate those men
who were sentenced for sexual interaction with boys under the age of 16. As the age of
consent between persons of different sexes in Germany is not 16 but 14, this was seen
as ongoing discrimination by some (BT PLP 18/240 2017, 24606 C).
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The Rehabilitation Act, I argue, is both exceptional and paradigmatic. It is
exceptional with regard to (West) German reparation policy in that it grants
official rehabilitation and reparations to persons harmed by state wrongdo-
ing after 1945. Thus, by enacting the Rehabilitation Act, the democratic state
acknowledged its own systematic wrongdoing—and not only that of its pre-
decessor, the Nazi state. Moreover, the democratic state acknowledged that
it had in fact continued Nazi policy for decades: The Federal Republic had
continued to apply a law dating back to 1935 and continued to persecute ho-
mosexuals, albeit in a mitigated form. By acknowledging this continuity, the
state departed from the binary classification system that had structuredWest
German reparation policies until then, namely the classification of reparation
claims into those that referred to ‘typical Nazi injustice’ and those that did not.
Within this system, the former counted as justified, the latter not; the former
constituted an entitlement to reparations, the latter at best the possibility to
apply for hardship compensation. The category of ‘typical Nazi injustice’ was
circumscribed in temporal and semantic terms: In temporal terms, it was con-
fined to the period of Nazi rule, demarcated by precise dates of beginning and
ending. In semantic terms, ‘typical Nazi injustice’ referred exclusively to acts
motivated by Nazi ideology. Conversely, this means that forms of repression,
infringements and persecution that were not exclusively committed by the
Nazi state, such as imprisoning homosexuals, by definition did not count as
typical Nazi injustice and thus did not constitute entitlement to reparations.
By definition, then, the post-war German state could not commit wrongs,
at least not of a kind that would constitute an entitlement to reparations.
The Nazi state was constructed as the state of exceptional evil, the post-war
(West) German state as the state of democratic normality, and both as mutu-
ally exclusive. The Rehabilitation Act breaks with that dichotomy, which is an
exceptional case in German reparation policy. There is no other case in which
the Federal Republic has acknowledged a continuation of Nazi practices and
granted reparations for it.
At the same time, the Act is paradigmatic insofar as it demonstrates the
performative power of reparation policies: As the statements by Maas and
Schwesig make clear, what is at stake is the moral, legal and political self-im-
age of German society: What kind of society do we want to be? What kind of
society do we not want to be any longer? What are our fundamental legal and
ethical principles? Like any reparation policy, the Rehabilitation Act articu-
lates past, present and future. By passing the Rehabilitation Act, the German
state declared that consensual sex is a basic individual right that is protected
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by the German constitution and that applies both to homosexual and hetero-
sexual activities. The state confirmed the principle of equality before the law
and consequentially condemned the criminalization of male homosexuality
as an act of severe and unconstitutional discrimination. Homosexuality, it
declared, is a matter of individual freedom. It does not pose a threat to the
social and political order; on the contrary, it is discriminating against homo-
sexuality that does so.
The path to that conclusion on the part of the state was, however, a long
one. To show how long, I will briefly recall the Nazi persecution of homosexu-
als and the continuation of that persecution in the Federal Republic, and then
reconstruct the struggle for reparations. I argue that the Nazi persecution of
male homosexuals was driven by a biopolitical rationality that long persisted
in the Federal Republic and that revolved around the idea that male homo-
sexuality posed a threat to the health, strength and performance (Leistungs-
fähigkeit) of the body politic and thus had to be eradicated. The state failed
to recognize the persecution of homosexuals for what it was—a severe and
systematic state offence—for as long as this biopolitical construction of ho-
mosexuality endured. The 2017 Rehabilitation Act has made it manifest that
this is no longer the case and that the biopolitical construction of certain peo-
ple as a threat to national health, strength and performance no longer applies
to homosexual men.
4.1 “Exterminating the Disease”:
The Nazi Persecution of Homosexual Men
When the Federal Republic came into being, it inherited inter alia Paragraphs
175 and 175a of the Criminal Code that had been enacted under Nazi rule in
1935. Before 1935, Paragraph 175 already penalized ‘unnatural fornication’ be-
tween males, but in 1935, the word ‘unnatural’ was removed so that men could
be convicted for each and every activity considered to go against a “general
sense of modesty and morality”, including for instance “lewd glances” (Reichs-
gerichtshof 1940 quoted in Rinscheid 2013, 254). In addition, a new Paragraph
175a was created specifically to penalize certain forms of homosexual activi-
ties, namely threatening aman into homosexual acts, homosexual acts within
a relationship of dependency such as a service or employment relationship,
and homosexual acts between men over and under the age of 21 years. These
provisions were the first in German history to introduce an age of consent for
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male homosexual acts that differed from that for heterosexual sex (Zinn 2018,
282). The homosexual acts specified in Paragraph 175a were punishable with
up to ten years in penitentiary. In October 1936, Himmler established the Re-
ich Central Office for Combating Homosexuality and Abortion (Reichszentrale
zur Bekämpfung der Homosexualität und der Abtreibung) as a central instrument
to detect and register homosexual men throughout the Reich. Upon the en-
actment of the revised Paragraph 175 and the establishment of the Office, the
number of prosecutions, convictions, raids and arrests increased sharply.
Between 1935 and 1945, ordinary courts alone launched nearly 100,000 in-
dictments according to Paragraphs 175 and 175a, and about half of the men
charged were convicted (Zur Nieden 2009, 289). Some 6,500 additional con-
victions were issued by special courts such asmartial courts (Grau 2014, 44). In
1940,moreover,Himmler decreed that the criminal police were to place all ho-
mosexual men who had seduced more than one partner in ‘preventive deten-
tion’ (Vorbeugehaft) after they had served their prison sentences (Bastian 2000,
58). Thousands were deported to concentration camps, and only a minority
survived (BT Drs. 14/2984 (neu) 2000, 1). According to historical research, the
death rate of homosexual men in the camps was about 60 percent (Zinn 2018,
319). Exact figures, however, are still lacking.
There is some dispute about the goals and the logic of this persecution2.
Talk of a ‘homocaust’ among gay movements in the 1980s suggested that it
aimed at a complete elimination of homosexuals, analogous to the attempt
to eliminate Jews. Though historical researchers today tend to agree that this
was not the case (Bastian 2000, 87ff.; Grau 2011, 145), leading Nazi functionar-
ies, above all Heinrich Himmler, did indeed call for the extermination of ho-
mosexual men. His goal was nothing short of „exterminating the parasites of
the people“ (die Ausmerzung der Volksschädlinge) and “removing the predisposed,
that is the centre of the epidemic, from the body of the people” (Himmler
quoted in Zinn 2018, 295). Yet only a small fraction of homosexual men were
in fact seized and detained (Bastian 2000, 88f.; Grau 2014; Zinn 2018, 304).The
actual policy was directed at eliminating homosexuality as a visible way of life
rather than eliminating each and every homosexual man. From 1934 onwards,
Himmlermade the issue a top priority. For him and other Nazi leaders, homo-
sexuality was abnormal, deviant and sick, and homosexuals were alien to the
ethnic community (Gemeinschaftsfremde), together with prostitutes, homeless
2 For a discussion about Nazi homophobia and racialisation of sexuality see Herzog
2005.
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people, vagrants and others labelled as ‘asocial’ or ‘work-shy’. However, rather
than simply being treated as a subcategory of ‘asocials’, male homosexuals
were constructed as a separate target group, persecuted by specifically de-
signed instruments of detection, registration and extermination. What con-
stituted his specificity?
One pervasive feature of Nazi homophobia was the preoccupation with
population policy (Pretzel 2002, 25; 34). In that vein, the official rationale for
revising Paragraph 175 in 1935 proclaimed: “The new state, which strives for
a nation that is strong in number and strength and morally healthy, must
vigorously confront all unnatural sexual activity.” (Quoted in BT Drs. 14/2984
(neu) 2000, 1) Himmler in particular was obsessed with population policy, as
indicated inter alia by his linking of the war against homosexuality with that
against abortion (Grau 2011, 40). In February 1937, Himmler gave a speech to
SS group leaders in Bad Tölz in which he laid out the grounds for eliminat-
ing homosexuality3 and declared that tolerating the existence of one to two
million homosexuals wouldmean ”that our people will be wrecked by this epi-
demic” because the lack of ”sexually able men will disrupt Germany’s gender
economy and become a disaster” (Himmler quoted in Zinn 2018, 291).
The preoccupation with population policy, however, does not explain why
only homosexual men were targeted. Female homosexuality was ostracized
as well (Eschebach and Ley 2012; Schoppmann 1997) and condemned as un-
natural and morally unhealthy. The clubs, journals and meeting points of les-
bian subculture were destroyed, but homosexual women were not systemat-
ically registered, charged, detained and murdered for same-sex activity. Fe-
male homosexuality was not constructed as a threat. Male homosexuality, in
contrast, was constructed as an epidemic that threatened to undermine both
the Volksgemeinschaft and the state. Unlike female homosexuals, male homo-
sexuals were ascribed a seductive power, particularly among youth, and it was
this power that made them so dangerous (Zur Nieden 2005). Accordingly, the
Nazis concluded, the state had to:
… combat same-sex fornication between men particularly forcefully, as ex-
perience has shown that it has a tendency to spread epidemically and that
it exerts a considerable influence on the entire thinking and feeling of the
3 According to the research of Alexander Zinn, this was Himmler’s most important
speech on this topic (Zinn 2018, 291).
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circles concerned. (Official rationale for the revised Paragraph 175 of 1935
quoted in BT Drs. 14/2984 (neu), 2000, 1)
Similarly, the SS newspaperThe Black Corps declared in 1937: ”Forty thousand
abnormals that could very well be eliminated from the ethnic community
(Volksgemeinschaft), are, if left free, capable of poisoning two million” (Das
Schwarze Korps quoted in Zinn 2018, 310).
Thus, male homosexuality was constructed as a contagious disease that,
unless vigorously fought against, would spread among the male population.
Notably, as Zinn points out, the Nazi state was heavily reliant on all-male or-
ganizations such as the SS, and these were imagined as being particularly vul-
nerable to the epidemic. Germany,Himmler insisted, was amen’s state, and it
was on the verge of self-destruction due to male homosexuality (Zur Nieden
2005). According to this imaginary, male homosexuality, equipped with its
seductive power, was creating secret communities within organizations, a
state within the state (Zinn 2018, 291f.; 295). Yet what was most disturbing
for Himmler was the idea of homosexual men as soft, weak, spineless, cow-
ardly, and mentally ill, tending to substitute an erotic principle for the prin-
ciple of achievement (Leistungsprinzip) (Zinn 2018, 292; 294): “Homosexuality
thus brings down every achievement (Leistung), every advancement (Aufbau)
within the state and destroys the foundations of the state.” (Himmler quoted
in Zinn 2018, 292)
The word ‘Leistung’ does not easily translate into English. It connotes not
only achievement but also merit and performance; thus, it may refer to re-
sults but also the activity of making an effort or to the capacity for achieving
results.The notion of Leistung, then, alludes to notions of efficiency, productiv-
ity, functionality, and strength and refers to results, activities and capabilities
at the same time. For Himmler and other Nazi leaders, male homosexuality
endangered the Leistungsprinzip, the basis of a strong, powerful, healthy state.
Himmler therefore demanded that homosexual members of the SS be de-
graded, expelled and imprisoned. After serving their sentences they should
be sent to concentration camps and “shot dead on the run” (Himmler quoted
in Zinn 2018, 292). Hence, male homosexuality was constructed as a sex-re-
lated biopolitical threat, a contagious disease that undermined both the state
and the Volksgemeinschaft and their health, strength and fitness. It was this
biopolitical imaginary that motivated the Nazi persecution of homosexuals.
As we shall see, it did not dissolve in 1945. Rather, it informed both the contin-
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ued policy of criminalizing male homosexuality and, indirectly, the exclusion
of homosexual Nazi victims from the post-war reparation scheme.
4.2 Normal Persecution: Paragraph 175 in the Federal Republic
Seventy years before the Rehabilitation Act was passed, in 1957, the Federal
Constitutional Court issued a ruling on thematter ofmale homosexuality.The
Court ruled that Paragraphs 175 and 175a of the Criminal Code did not violate
the constitutional principles of personal freedom and equal protection before
the law.Themain rationale for this conclusion was that male homosexual acts
violated moral law (das Sittengesetz) (BVerfGE 6 1957, 1).
The ruling rejected the constitutional complaint of two men, mentioned
as Günther R. and Oskar K., who had been convicted for homosexual acts
under Paragraphs 175 and 175a by the District Court of Hamburg in 1952.These
paragraphs, the claimants held, dated back to 1935; thus, they were Nazi law
and as such incompatible with the Basic Law, the West German Constitution.
Consequently, they argued, Paragraphs 175 and 175a should be abolished and
their convictions repealed. The Constitutional Court, however, refuted both
claims; it denied that Paragraph 175 was Nazi law on the grounds that the
1935 law, although enacted under Nazi rule, was not a typical Nazi law. Not
all laws dating back to the Nazi period were regarded as typical Nazi law.
Therefore, the judges concluded that upholding Paragraphs 175 and 175awould
not constitute a continuation of Nazi law and accordingly denied the twomen
legal rehabilitation.
Importantly, the Court did not engage with the fate of homosexuals under
Nazi rule; the judges made no effort whatsoever to establish the facts of the
persecution, let alone the logic behind it. Instead, they demonstrated at great
lengths that banning male homosexuality had a long tradition in German law
and that the Nazi ban was therefore merely one episode amongst others.They
cited the Old Testament, the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, Prussian law,
various other German state laws before 1871, and others in order to bolster the
claim that penalizing male homosexuality was perfectly normal for a political
entity. In this way, the Court ultimately normalized the criminalization of
male homosexuality, dissociated it from the Nazi past and categorized it as
an exercise of normal statecraft.
In addition, the Court pointed to the fact that Paragraphs 175 and 175a
were not listed in Control Council Law No.1.This law, established by the Allied
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Control Council in September 1945, expressly repealed a number of Nazis laws
and legal provisions for being “of a political or discriminatory nature upon
which the Nazi regime rested” (Control Council Law No. 1 1945). It did not
list Paragraphs 175 and 175a, Criminal Code, nor, for instance, the Law for
the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases, which had allowed for
forcible sterilizations. Thus, the Constitutional Court concluded, the Allied
Forces had not considered Paragraphs 175 and 175a to be specific to Nazi law.
Finally, the Court ruled, Paragraphs 175 and 175a were not invalidated by
the Basic Law. The Federal Republic was the legal successor of the Nazi state
and as such inherited the existing laws from the time prior to 1949—except
for those found incompatible with the Basic Law (BVerfGE 6 1957, 20). Neither
the Parliament nor the Constitutional Court found Paragraphs 175 and 175a to
be incompatible with the Basic Law, so they remained in force.
In terms of content, the claimants argued that treating male homosexu-
ality differently from female homosexuality violated the constitutional guar-
antee to equality before the law (Art. 3 GG). However, the Court denied this
claim as well. It referred to a range of expert testimonies frommedicine, psy-
chiatry, social work, the police, and forensics that unanimously confirmed
that male homosexuality was different from female homosexuality. The for-
mer, the testimonies agreed, was more intense, more aggressive, more vis-
ible, more promiscuous, more averse to marrying and having children, and
not least more contagious and hence more dangerous to society (BVerfGE 6
1957, 21ff.). Due to its contagious power, they reasoned, male homosexuality
was more widespread and more closely linked to venereal diseases, prosti-
tution and crime and thus more dangerous to society. Unless the state took
action to curb and control it, it would drain the life out of the population and
debilitate it in terms of size, strength, health, and moral condition. Young
people, as several of the invited experts claimed, were especially vulnerable
to homosexual seduction; therefore, the state was called upon to protect its
youth against this imminent threat.
Regarding the constitutional guarantee of personal freedom, the Court
simply stated that it only applied within the confines of the moral law (Sit-
tengesetz), whereas male homosexuality clearly violated the moral law (BVer-
fGE 6 1957, 30). In principle, then, the Court declared, personal freedom was
a basic right, and, also in principle, the right to unrestricted personal devel-
opment included one’s sexuality, but this did not apply to homosexual men.
Homosexual men were denied the right to personal freedom and equal treat-
ment.The norm, according to the implicit logic, only applied to ‘normals’, not
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to ‘abnormals’. The Court effectively stripped homosexual men of their basic
constitutional rights and, as a result, of social status, their livelihood, and
opportunities in life. In this sense, homosexual men in post-war Germany
were homini sacri (Agamben 1998): governed and subjugated through law but
deprived of legal status and protection. To bolster its reasoning, the Consti-
tutional Court quoted the draft Criminal Code of 1927:
The legislator should ask himself whether Paragraph 175, despite the hard-
ships towhich its applicationmay lead and its limited practicability, does not
constitute a barrier which may not be removed without harming the health
and purity of the life of our people (unseres Volkslebens). […] If this aberra-
tion continues to spread, it leads to the degeneration of the people and the
decline of its strength [...] (BVerfGE 6 1957, 30f.)
We see here that the construction of male, and only male, homosexuality as
a biopolitical threat did not originate in Nazi policy. The Nazis used it as a
rationale for mass murder, but the construction as such neither arose nor
ended with the Nazi regime.
The 1957 ruling set the tone for the following years, providing the main
reference for legal and political decisions on the issue. We find all of its key
elements reiterated in a draft criminal code presented by the Adenauer gov-
ernment in 1962. Eventually, the draft was rejected by the Bundestag, but it
merits study as it set out the key elements of the biopolitical logic that moti-
vated the preservation of Paragraph 175. It conceded that same-sex activity as
such did not violate any legal rights or interests (Rechtsgüter). Nonetheless, the
draft went on, the state was entitled to penalize behavior that was ethically
despicable and shameful, as was the case withmale homosexuality. After all, it
was inherently contagious and spread particularly among young people. Con-
sequently, homosexual communities would form and propagate within public
services and institutions such as the police or the army and corrupt these from
within (BT Drs. 4/650 1962, 377). Female homosexuality would not have this
rampant, community-building, institution-corrupting power (BT Drs. 4/650
1962, 378). Therefore, the government concluded:
More than in other areas of law, the legal system has the duty, vis-à-vis male
homosexuality, to use the morality-forming power of the penal law to build
a dam against the spread of a vicious activity which, if it were to take hold,
would pose a serious threat to the healthy and natural order of the life of the
people. (BT Drs. 4/650 1962, 377)
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After all, historical experience had shown: ”Where same-sex fornication has
spread and assumed huge proportions, the result has been the degeneration
of the people and the decay of its moral powers” (BT Drs. 4/650 1962, 377).
Paragraphs 175 and 175a did not exist only on paper; they were applied ex-
tensively. Criminal prosecution continued on a large scale: In the Federal Re-
public between 1945 and 1965, there were approximately 100,000 indictments
and more than 44,000 convictions under Paragraphs 175 and 175a—near the
number of criminal cases under Nazi rule (Zur Nieden 2009, 289). By way
of comparison, in the fifteen years of the Weimar Republic, ‘only’ 9,375 con-
victions had taken place (Burgi and Wolff 2016, 22). It is important to note
that not only a conviction, but even an indictment could be devastating. Peo-
ple could lose their jobs and their housing; they could be expelled from reli-
gious or other civil society associations. Self-help groups and sub-cultural or
political associations were not permitted, so homosexual men were severely
deprived of their civic and political rights (Burgi and Wolff 2016, 31).
Paragraphs 175 and 175a remained in place in the Federal Republic until
the general revision of the Criminal Code in 1969. In 1973, further revisions
reduced the list of sanctionable offences to sexual activities betweenmen over
and boys under eighteen years. The age of consent for heterosexual activities
was sixteen at that time. In a ruling of October 1973, the Constitutional Court
confirmed that this differential treatment was constitutional, citing the ruling
of 1957. Male homosexuality, it reiterated, was fundamentally different from
both lesbian and heterosexual sexuality, as several scientific experts had ver-
ified in 1957. Again, the main reason cited was that young men needed state
protection from homosexual seduction, which would otherwise spread and
damage their personal lives and development (Burgi and Wolff 2016, 31).
The GDR completely abolished Paragraphs 175 and 175a in 1968 and
thereby, as Günter Grau points out, was the first polity in German history to
decriminalize consensual sex between men (Grau 2011, 154). In the Federal
Republic, Paragraph 175 remained in force until 1994. It was abolished solely
in the context of German unification and the need to harmonize the two
German Criminal Codes (Grau 2011, 157).
Thus, the Federal Republic deliberately maintained the 1935 Nazi law and
deprived homosexual men of basic constitutional rights. Major state institu-
tions subscribed to the biopolitical construction that male homosexuality was
a contagious force that caused mental illness, weakness, venereal diseases,
prostitution, and crime and that threatened to undermine the strength and
fitness of state and society. In short, the institutions of the Federal Republic
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maintained the Nazi law because they shared the biopolitical rationality that
informed it.
It was due to this continuity in biopolitical rationality that homosexual
victims of Nazi persecution were excluded from post-war reparations, as I
will show in the following pages.
4.3 Banned from Reparations
After 1945, homosexual men were effectively excluded from reparations. To
understand how and why this happened, we need to understand the archi-
tecture of the West German reparation scheme and its inbuilt distinction be-
tween normal statecraft and exceptional evil.Within this framework, the type
of violations that I have termed injuries of normality, such as the persecution
of homosexuals, selective sterilization, and the persecution of ‘asocials’, would
qualify as normal statecraft, not as exceptional evil. As explained in Chapter
1, the concept of injuries of normality refers to systematic human rights vi-
olations and acts of degradation, stigmatization and persecution of persons
deemed not to conform with underlying standards of normality, health, fit-
ness, productivity or usefulness for the community. Injuries of normality fol-
low a biopolitical rationality of safeguarding and improving the fitness, func-
tionality and productivity of the collective body, a rationality which, as such,
was not limited to the Nazi regime. Nazi biopolitics was exceptionally mur-
derous, but the biopolitical rationality that informed systematic injuries of
normality was not utterly alien to German governments before or after 1945.
In fact, the way that West German courts and governments dealt with the
reparation claims of those affected by such injuries of normality demonstrates
that they shared the underlying rationality and considered it quite normal for
a state, for instance, to defend itself against the debilitating power of male
homosexuality. This underlying attitude is reflected in the architecture of the
West German reparation scheme.
There were, and still are, two possible ways for Nazi victims to achieve
compensation in the Federal Republic: via the Federal Indemnification Act
(Bundesentschädigungsgesetz, BEG) of 19534 and via the 1957 General Law on
4 The first reparation law on a federal level was the Federal Supplementary Law (Bun-
desergänzungsgesetz), passed on 18 September 1953. This law, however, proved insuffi-
cient andwas replacedby the Federal IndemnificationAct (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz,
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Consequences of the War (Allgemeines Kriegsfolgengesetz, AKG) with the Hard-
ship Funds established under it in the 1980s. Importantly, only the Federal In-
demnification Act grants entitlement to reparations for an injustice suffered,
subject to territorial restrictions5, whereas the AKG was meant to provide
compensation for a damage that occurred in the context of the war. The legis-
lators were well aware that the BEG did not grant the right to reparations to
all Nazi victims; this had never been their declared intention (Hockerts 2001).
Thus, a distinction had to be made between what should and what should
not constitute an entitlement to reparations. The legislators deliberately de-
cided to make reparations under BEG available only for typical Nazi injus-
tices, with only specific forms of Nazi persecution qualifying as typical Nazi
injustices. For this reason, the BEG conclusively defines who qualifies as a
victim of Nazi persecution, namely someone who was persecuted for reasons
of political opposition to the Nazi regime or for reasons of race, religion or
ideology (Weltanschauung) (BEG §1(1)). This definition excluded the victims of
forced sterilization, homosexuals, so-called ‘asocials’, so-called ‘professional
criminals’, deserters, forced laborers andmany others, regardless of what they
suffered. Even if they had suffered deportation, detention in a concentration
camp, injuries, mutilation or murder, these acts as such did not qualify as
Nazi persecution.The question for the BEG was not whether a persecution oc-
curred, but on what grounds. The critical distinction for the BEG was not the
severity of offenses but the subjective motive behind them (Giessler 1981, 9).
Put differently, the law-makers in the 1950s distinguished between legitimate
and illegitimate motives for persecution—a distinction which came down to
the question of whether they themselves could or could not accept them.
State measures to curb homosexuality, inheritable diseases or asocial be-
havior were not considered typical Nazi injustice (Hockerts 2001, 201). Accord-
ingly, the legal literature after 1945 explicitly justified their exclusion from
reparations under BEG. After all, it was argued, Paragraph 175 had not been
BEG), passed on 29 June 1956, which entered into force retroactively on 1 October 1953
(Federal Ministry of Finance 2019, 10).
5 The Law is based on the so-called territoriality principle, which requires that claimants
must have had a “spatial relationship” to the German Reich. This includes, roughly
speaking, German citizens and persons who lived in within the 1937 German borders.
It does not include persons who suffered from Nazi crimes elsewhere (Brunner, Frei,
and Goschler 2009, 25ff.).
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in place for reasons of race or political opposition but for reasons of expedi-
ency or security (Burgi and Wolff 2016, 33). The German government agreed.
As late as 1986, a report by the Federal Government to the Bundestag explained:
The penalization of homosexual activity in criminal proceedings conducted
in accordance with criminal law provisions is neither Nazi injustice nor in-
compatible with the rule of law. […] Therefore, convictions imposed in crim-
inal proceedings conducted in accordance with the law and executed in the
regular course of justice cannot be compensated as a deprivation of liberty.
(BT Drs. 10/6287 1986, 40)
The fact that consensual sexuality was persecuted did not constitute an in-
justice because it was motivated by acceptable reasons—reasons that policy-
makers and jurists of the Federal Republic could share.They, too, thought that
male homosexuality constituted a danger to youth, that it was contagious and
debilitating, causedmoral weakness, physical andmental illness, prostitution
and crime. In short, they shared the biopolitical construction of male homo-
sexuality as undermining the health and fitness of state and society.
After the BEG, the General Law on Consequences of theWar (AKG) formed
a second possible track to reparations. It was passed in November 1957 and
was intended to govern the claims of those who had been harmed by the Nazi
regime but were not eligible for reparations under the BEG.However, as Hans
Günter Hockerts states, the hurdles were high and the application deadlines
tight; as a result, until the establishment of new hardship funds in the 1980s,
the numbers of recipients from groups not mentioned in the BEG were close
to zero (Hockerts 2001, 201). Under the hardship funds established in the
1980s, claimants could receive a one-time allowance of 5,000 Deutschmarks
or, in particularly severe cases, monthly allowances. Yet, even then, the num-
ber of successful applications by homosexual men remained negligible. By 31
December 2018, a total of twenty applications had been submitted by persons
who had suffered persecution as homosexuals, and eight of these were ap-
proved (Federal Ministry of Finance 2019, 29). A total of five applications had
been submitted for monthly allowances; two were approved (Federal Ministry
of Finance 2019, 30).
To conclude, the distinction between those who were entitled to repara-
tions and those who were not ultimately rested on the new state’s attitude
towards the former’s motives for persecution. With respect to male homo-
sexuality, the political and legal elite of the Federal Republic predominantly
shared the Nazi assumption that male homosexuality was debilitating and
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contagious and thus a danger to state and society. For them, criminalizing
and controlling homosexuality was an entirely reasonable thing to do, even if
some measures, such as detaining people in concentration camps, may have
constituted an undue hardship in some cases. The construction that moti-
vated the penalization of male homosexuality was essentially the same as that
of the Nazi state; in this respect, the democratic state shared the Nazi state’s
motives, if not quite its methods.
4.4 Regret and Reluctance
After decades of struggle, Paragraph 175 was finally abolished in 1994. It was
not until then that the Federal Republic began to distance itself from the per-
secution of homosexuals and to acknowledge that it had been a severe case of
wrongdoing that required redress. After another four years, in 1998, the Bun-
destag passed the Law to Annul Unjust Sentences ImposedDuring theNational
Socialist Administration of Criminal Justice (NS Annulment Act; NS-AufG),
which rescinded all unjust NS criminal judgements without case-by-case re-
view. Yet the appendix to the law that specified which types of sentences were
defined as ‘unjust’ did not include Paragraphs 175 and 175a, meaning that con-
victions according to Paragraph 175 and 175a, whether before or after 1945,
were not annulled at that point.
Two years later, in December 2000, the Bundestag passed a unanimous
resolution that stipulated that the criminalization of consensual homosex-
ual activities after 1945 had been a violation of human dignity (BT PLP 14/140
2000). The Bundestag issued an apology:
The German Bundestag confirms its conviction that the honor of the homo-
sexual victims of the Nazi regime must be restored. The German Bundestag
regrets that theNational Socialist version of Paragraph 175 remained in force
without change in the criminal law of the Federal Republic of Germany until
1969. It apologizes for the continuing criminal prosecution of homosexual
citizens until 1969, whose human dignity, opportunity for personal develop-
ment, and quality of life were severely impaired by the threat of criminal
prosecution. (BT Drs. 14/2984 (neu) 2000, 2)
The decision, however, had no immediate consequences in terms of rehabili-
tation or reparations; the majority of MPs at the time were not ready to an-
nul the convictions issued by the Nazi courts, let alone those of the Federal
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Republic. One concern was that this might create a precedent for further re-
habilitation claims, as MdB Jörg van Essen (FDP) explained:
… after 1945, too, people suffered terribly with the consequences of a convic-
tion going far beyond what punishment should actually do, namely leading
to the destruction of all opportunities in life, to social ostracism. We have to
admit that, unfortunately, this has happened in a similar way in many other
areas too.We have had terribly dismaying sentences […] thatmake us clench
our hands over our heads. People were sent to prison for several months for
everyday crimes. There were incredibly harsh sentences in this area in par-
ticular, because much of the injustice that had been sown during the Third
Reich had an aftermath. That is why it is extremely difficult for us, from to-
day’s point of view, to judge the time after 1945 by saying: We declare this
to be wrong; if we started in one area but did not extend it to other areas,
we would not really achieve justice. I suspect that there are many areas in
which, from today’s point of view, we have to say that we cannot agree with
the judgments of that time. (BT PLP 14/140 2000, 13744 A-B)
At stake, then, was the temporal-substantive demarcation that had been
erected to separate the present from the past, the constitutional state from
the state of injustice, ordinary statecraft from extraordinary evil. The ma-
jority of Parliamentarians could not yet bring themselves to acknowledge
the permeability of that demarcation line and concede that numerous forms
of injustice had passed through it and continued to operate under the new
democratic regime.
The men who had suffered Nazi persecution as homosexuals would wait
two additional years until, in May 2002, the Bundestag finally passed the Act to
Amend the Law to Annul Unjust Sentences Imposed during the National So-
cialist Administration of Criminal Justice—against the votes of the CDU/CSU
and FDP (Burgi and Wolff 2016, 34). Through this act, those who had been
convicted under Paragraphs 175 and 175a by the Nazi state received rehabili-
tation—but not those convicted under the same law after 1945.
In the following years, the Greens and the Left in Parliament again
launched attempts to achieve rehabilitation and reparations for those con-
victed for consensual homosexual acts after 1945 (BT Drs. 16/11440 2008;
BT Drs. 16/10944). In 2009, their motions were rejected by the votes of the
CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP in the Bundestag. The CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP
were willing to annul the convictions passed by the Nazi courts but not those
passed by the courts of the Federal Republic, even though the Bundestag had
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stated in 2000 that the convictions before and after 1945 violated human
dignity. Obviously, the question was not whether a severe human rights
violation had been committed, but by whom.
The arguments against repealing the post-1945 convictions mainly re-
ferred to constitutional issues. In a constitutional state, opponents argued,
the parliament was not entitled to repeal the rulings of the courts, for this
would amount to breaching the separation of powers and the principle of
legal certainty (Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit and Integration und Frauen 2011,
41). The events of the following years, however, showed that where there is a
political will, there is also a constitutional way.
4.5 From Injuries of Normality to Sexual Exceptionalism
In 2011, the Berlin Senate held a conference offering an alternative view on
the constitutional issues related to rehabilitation of and reparations for men
convicted of homosexual activity after 1945. The Senate submitted reasoning
according to which annulling post-1945 convictions was indeed constitutional
(Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit and Integration und Frauen 2011). In 2015, the
Bundesrat passed a resolution calling upon the federal government to draft
a new law to rehabilitate the men convicted for consensual homosexual acts
after 1945 on the grounds that these convictions had violated human dignity
(BR Drs. 189/15 (Beschluss) 2015).
Instrumental in this respect was also the legal opinion ofMartin Burgi and
Daniel Wolff on behalf of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency on rehabil-
itation for post-1945 convictions and the issue of constitutionality (Burgi and
Wolff 2016). The opinion took constitutional concerns about legal certainty
and separation of powers seriously, but also clarified that a general annul-
ment would not violate either of them. The first of these concerns referred
to the point that, in a constitutional democracy, neither the government nor
parliament is permitted to interfere with the decisions of the judiciary. If the
parliament were to issue a blanket annulment of an entire set of court rulings,
this would amount to breaching the separation of powers and encroaching on
the principle of legal certainty. Burgi andWolff, however, countered that such
an encroachment could be justified in this case given that it would refer to an
exceptional matter. Firstly, they argued, the convictions at stake affected a
clearly demarcatable group of individuals, and secondly, they constituted an
exceptionally severe infringement of these individuals’ basic rights, namely
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“an intervention in the inviolable core domain of a person’s private life as cov-
ered by the fundamental right to free development of personality provided
for in Article 2(1) Basic Law, in conjunction with Article 1(1) Basic Law” (Burgi
and Wolff 2016, 10).
While there may have been other convictions after 1945 that referred to
offenses no longer criminalized today, such as procuring and adultery, issu-
ing a blanket rehabilitation of men convicted under Paragraphs 175 and 175a
would not set a precedent and would not entail a series of further claims to
rehabilitation, since the impact of these infringements differed: “The stigma-
tization and intense repression by and within society that was predominantly
and typically suffered by individuals convicted under Section 175 StGB is in
this regard unparalleled” (Burgi and Wolff 2016, 11).
Both the government and the parliament finally adopted this line of rea-
soning. In 2016, Federal Minister for Justice and Consumer Protection Heiko
Maas (SPD) announced that the government was preparing for the legal re-
habilitation and reparations for those convicted for consensual homosexual
acts after 1945 (BMJ 2016). On 22 June 2019, the Bundestag adopted the Reha-
bilitation Act unanimously.
Proponents of rehabilitation and reparations could draw support from the
European Court of Human Rights, which, beginning in 1981, had issued a se-
ries of rulings condemning the criminalization of consensual homosexuality
(Johnson 2013). The Court had greatly contributed to framing homosexuality
as a human rights issue, evoking particularly the right to a private life, free-
dom of expression and non-discrimination as laid out in the European Con-
vention for Human Rights.The new approach developed by the Court revolved
around the notion of sexuality as “an essentially private manifestation of the
human personality” (Johnson 2010). Sexuality, in these rulings, became an es-
sential and inalienable aspect of human life, inextricably linked to intimacy
and identity and as such valuable and worthy of state protection. Consensual
homosexuality was no longer a matter of morality or a danger to the state
but a matter of private life. The older, biopolitical notion of homosexuality
as undermining the strength of the state gave way to a liberal–expressivist
one in which homosexuality was seen as an individual lifestyle that allowed
for the expression of one’s own authentic personality. In the 2000s, this new
framework increasingly gained ground in German politics as well. Male ho-
mosexualitymoved from the biopolitical register of diseases to the psycho–le-
gal register of personhood and became a core element of gay men’s personal
identity, as Berlin Senator Dilek Kolat proclaimed: “Paragraph 175 threatened
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gay men at the core of their personalities, their sexual identities” (Senatsver-
waltung für Arbeit, Integration und Frauen 2011, 6).
The notion of homosexuality as a core element of one’s personality and
thus as protected by the right to personal freedom formed the basis for the
rationale for the Rehabilitation Act (BMJ 2016, 1). However, while the view that
homosexuality was a matter of private life and not criminal lawmay have pre-
vailed by then, it was still an exceptional step for the Bundestag to condemn its
own former law, annul its consequences and grant reparations on the grounds
that it had been unconstitutional. Therefore, as MdB Sabine Sütterlin-Waack
(CDU/CSU) correctly proclaimed in the Bundestag’s plenary debate, “Today we
are bringing to an end a unique and unprecedented legal–political process
with which we are also, in a sense, entering new constitutional territory” (BT
PLP 18/240 2017, 24606D).
Indeed, for the first time, the German Parliament had passed an act of
regret and redress for the continuation of a Nazi policy. In a gesture of excep-
tional self-critique, the state distanced itself not only from the wrongdoing of
its predecessor but from its own wrongdoing. It acknowledged that its own
democratic institutions had committed severe human rights violations that
differed only in degree from those of the Nazi state. It conceded that there
was only a gradual difference between the state of normality and the state of
exceptional evil. To this day, no other group of Nazi victims has received a
similar gesture.
One could say that, in the case of Paragraph 175, the continuity was most
palpable since here the same policy was continued; people were charged, con-
victed and imprisoned and their lives destroyed by means of the same law.
This is true, but the post-war German state also continued to operate work-
houses, maintained sterilization verdicts for decades, denied victims repa-
rations and rehabilitation, and justified these exclusions by citing medical
grounds, security reasons or reasons of expediency. The state could have ret-
rospectively distanced itself from these choices and did not. In the case of
the persecution of homosexuals, the state in fact broke with the original mo-
tives of persecution; in other cases, it did not. In 2017, the German state no
longer shared the biopolitical motive that had driven the criminalization of
male homosexuality for so long. This motive had become incompatible with
the political identity of the present state.The biopolitical construction of male
homosexuality as a threat to the health, strength and performance of state
and society was no longer evoked: it was dead. Instead, as in the rulings of
the European Court of Human Rights, homosexuality was framed as a matter
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of intimacy, private life and personal development. In that respect, accord-
ing to the dominant discourse, sexuality was a special, particular, exceptional
facet of human activity that was intimately connected to the core of one’s per-
sonality. It was exactly this idea of sexuality as a matter of privacy and of the
fundamental core of personal existence that allowed the government to annul
the convictions under Paragraphs 175 and 175a without setting a precedent for
possible further lawsuits.
Due to this articulation of sexuality, privacy and authentic subjectivity, it
was possible to set the case of homosexuality apart from any other potential
area of post-1945 state wrongdoing. As Paul Johnson (2010) has shown for the
European Court of Human Rights, reinterpreting homosexuality as a matter
of human rights was accompanied by, or even enabled by, the construction
of a “European homosexual subject” possessing “a true, authentic and con-
genital self” (Johnson 2010, 72). The same interpretational move allowed the
German government to resolve their concerns that blanket rehabilitation of
homosexuals might set in motion a series of further rehabilitation claims by
other groups. Attaching homosexuality to the inner, inviolable core of one’s
personality allowed the law-makers to demarcate these rehabilitation claims
from possible others and to constitute an acceptable exception to the general
rule of non-interference with the judiciary. What appears as a normalization
of same-sex activity on the one hand thus implies a kind of sexual exception-
alism on the other that makes sexuality an essentially private aspect of per-
sonal life.The new articulation of sexuality and privacy allowed for redrawing
the line between justified and unjustified reparation claims and shielding the
state against a possible avalanche of further reparation claims. In this vein,
MdB Sabine Sütterlin-Waack (CDU/CSU) explained that the state had indeed
continued to apply Nazi law in other instances as well, for example in the
cases of adultery and matchmaking, and that this had caused considerable
hardship, but that ”neither adultery nor matchmaking amount to a massive
intrusion into the core area of the personal right to design one’s own private
life” (BT PLP 18/240 2017, 24608A).
Homosexuality had thus been transformed from a political into a private
affair, from a danger to state and society to a valuable resource deserving
their protection. In 2017, it is a resource rather than a threat to society. Corre-
spondingly, the object of state protection is no longer the moral and physical
health of state and society but rather the healthy development of the indi-
vidual personality. On a more speculative note, one could add that personal
development has been promoted to a key resource for a state that increasingly
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relies on human capacities such as knowledge, creativity, and intelligence.The
new individualistic, personalized variant of male homosexuality is not a polit-
ical force that drains society and the state of their strength and productivity;
rather, it is itself a source of strength and productivity. Homosexual men are
no longer public enemies; they are no longer the others against whom ‘we’
have to defend our youth, our state and our society. Rather, the others are
now the other states that proclaim homosexuals the public enemy, as MdB
Gudrun Zollner (CDU/CSU) declared:
Butwe are also sending a signal as a society. Germany takes a stand—against
discrimination and against exclusion. We also want to send a positive signal
beyond our national borders to countries where homosexuality is still heav-
ily ostracized. (BT PLP 18/240 2017, 24612 C)
Thus, the Rehabilitation Act is a message to the world: Look: Germany is a
liberal, modern, democratic state; it draws strength from its citizens’ sexual
self-expression and personal growth.Homosexuality is no longer an epidemic
but a way of life, and one that is perfectly compatible with the moral, social
and political order of the present state.
4.6 Conclusion
Why have almost none of the victims of the Nazi persecution of homosexuals
received reparations while the post-1945 victims of Paragraph 175 have been
awarded them? Admittedly, this chapter cannot answer the questions of which
struggles were fought by whom and how between 1945 and 2017—or why some
of them were more successful than others. Here, I can only point out what it
was that changed.
Homosexual victims of Nazi persecution were excluded from the post-
war reparation scheme because the judicial and the political elite of the new,
democratic state shared the Nazis’ motives for that persecution. They may
not have adopted the full array of Nazi methods (although with Paragraph 175
theymaintained critical parts of thosemethods), but they shared the rationale
that had motivated the Nazi policy against homosexual men. This rationale
had not been invented by the Nazis but dates back at least to the time of the
Weimar Republic. The Nazis, principally Himmler, developed it into a pow-
erful biopolitical delusion, composed of the following assumptions: all same-
sex sexuality is unnatural and shameful, but male homosexuality is particu-
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larly vicious, debilitating and aggressive; it is like an epidemic that, unless
vigorously opposed, will spread and damage the people’s health and sense
of morality. It causes promiscuity, prostitution and crime and thereby dam-
ages society. Rather than an innate property, it is largely an acquired behavior
caused by seduction, imitation and habit. Young people, according to this as-
sumption, are particularly susceptible. In addition, homosexual men have the
tendency to establish clandestine same-sex communities within existing in-
stitutions, rendering the core institutions of the men’s state—the police and
the military—particularly vulnerable. Sooner or later, homosexual communi-
ties will undermine the existing institutions and, given the vicious and debil-
itating character of male homosexuality, drain the strength and performance
(Leistungsfähigkeit) of the state. Again, we see that Nazi biopolitics was not
necessarily biologistic; its murderous force was not dependent on a biologis-
tic epistemology.
This biopolitical construction did not dissolve in 1945. It was actively con-
firmed by the Constitutional Court in 1957 and by the Adenauer government in
1962 in its draft criminal code.The elites of the Federal Republic sustained the
Nazi law that had served to deport, detain, degrade and kill tens of thousands
of men because these elites continued to believe in the rationale that had mo-
tivated these atrocities. For the same reason, reparations to homosexual Nazi
victims were denied.TheWest German reparation scheme was founded upon
principles bound to contain the number of reparation claims in spatial, tem-
poral and substantial terms: the territoriality principle, the restriction to the
time between 1933 and 1945, and the definition of a victim of Nazi persecu-
tion as someone persecuted for reasons of political opposition, race, religion
or ideology. Every reparation scheme draws distinctions between what con-
stitutes a valid entitlement to reparations and what does not. In this case,
the distinction ultimately referred to the perpetrators’ motives; only those
atrocities and infringements based on typical Nazimotivations should consti-
tute an entitlement to reparations. Conversely, motives that reached beyond
the Nazi regime in temporal, politico-geographical and/or substantial terms,
such asmotives that dated back further in time,were found operative in other
countries as well, and/or were consistent with those of the ruling elites of the
present state, would be excluded by design. Motives shared by the past and
present elites included, for instance, the fight against communism and the
fight against biopolitical threats and burdens (such as mental illness, disabil-
ity, homelessness, and male homosexuality) that undermined the state’s and
society’s strength and productivity. Within the post-war reparation scheme,
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injuries of normality such as the persecution of ‘asocials’, of people catego-
rized as mentally ill or disabled, or of male homosexuals did not constitute
an entitlement to reparations because and insofar as the post-war elites in
politics and law effectively shared the Nazis’ motives for persecuting these
people. After 1945, they did not continue the camp system, they did not apply
the Nazi sterilization law to sterilize people, they did not kill people for being
mentally ill or homosexual, but in principle they shared the understanding
that these people posed a threat or a burden to society that needed to be cur-
tailed. Concerning homosexuality, the new state outright continued the Nazi
policy in crucial respects.
In this case, however, the state also performed the most clear-cut break to
datewith former policy by acknowledging that this very continuity had consti-
tuted a systematic human rights violation that required redress. What made
this break possible was the dissolution of the previous policy rationale: Male
homosexuality is no longer conceived as a biopolitical threat. It has moved
from the underworld of crime, clubs and clandestine communities into the
core of one’s personality, where it forms an essential element of personal de-
velopment, self-expression and growth; this shift represents valuesmost com-
patible with the contemporary, modern liberal state. The possibility, today, to
freely express one’s sexual identity, whether homosexual or not, is considered
a source of, rather than a threat to, productivity and performance, and it is
thus perfectly compatible with the social, moral and political values of the lib-
eral state. No corresponding act of self-criticism and acknowledgement has
occurred vis-à-vis ‘asocials’ or those who were forcibly sterilized. Concerning
the latter, the present state has never officially acknowledged or expressed
regret for the fact that it denied rehabilitation and reparation to victims for
many years on the grounds that it did not, or does not, condemn the perpe-
trators’ motives.
5 Marginal Justice: Coming to Terms
with the Persecution of the ‘Asocials’
Between 1933 and 1945, tens of thousands of men and women, boys and girls
were being stigmatized and persecuted as so-called ‘asocials’. Reliable num-
bers are still not available today (Hörath 2017, 11). In a speech in October 1943,
Heinrich Himmler boasted about the number of 70,000 ‘asocials’ and ‘profes-
sional criminals’ who had been detained in concentration camps until then
(Hörath 2017, 319; WD 2016, 15). According to the Stiftung Brandenburgische
Gedenkstätten, by 1945, more than 11,500 persons had been detained as ‘aso-
cials’ or ‘work-shy’ in the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen, of whom
2,600 died there, and about 9,173 detained in Dachau (WD 2016, 16). In addi-
tion, a letter by Secretary of State Monika Grütters recently gives the number
of 1,680 persons detained as ‘asocials’ in the concentration camp of Flossen-
bürg, of whom 204 died there, 250 persons in Bergen-Belsen, of whom at
least 38 died there, and at least 1,196 persons in Neuengamme, of whom at
least 230 did not survive the camp. As Anne Alex for the civil society initiative
Arbeitskreis Marginalisierte – gestern und heute points out, these figures, how-
ever, do not include all those detained in workhouses, work colonies, ‘beggar
camps’ (Bettlerlager), penitentiaries, youth camps or psychiatric institutions,
nor those imprisoned by the police or condemned to forced labor for being
or being deemed homeless, ‘work-shy’, a prostitute or a vagrant or otherwise
‘asocial’ (Alex 2015, 33; WD 2016, 15). How many of these people were killed in
these institutions we do not know. It is important to see, however, that there
was no clear-cut definition of being ‘asocial’ under Nazi rule and this cate-
gory overlapped with others. Among those detained for being ‘asocial’ were
many who were also marked as Gypsies, Jews, homosexuals, mentally ill or
handicapped. These Nazi victims had little in common except that they did
not live up to Nazi standards of being a productive, well-adjusted member of
the German Volksgemeinschaft (German ethnic community).
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In the Federal Republic of Germany, those persecuted as ‘asocials’ un-
der Nazi rule belong to the category of the so-called ‘forgotten victims’, a
term coined in the 1980s denoting those Nazi victims who were not enti-
tled to reparations under the 1953 Federal Indemnification Act (Bundesent-
schädigungsgesetz, BEG). The ‘forgotten victims’, however, had never been ‘for-
gotten’, but they had been consciously excluded from post-war reparation pol-
icy. For (West) German reparation policy, it was not decisive what someone
had suffered from the Nazi state but on what grounds. Persecution on the
grounds that someone did not conform to Nazi standards of health, fitness,
sexual way of life, productivity or usefulness does not count as typical Nazi
injustice. In this chapter, I will argue that the so-called ‘asocials’ still have a
particularly marginal status in historic justice policy in Germany today, even
compared with other groups of ‘forgotten victims’. Today, there are official
state-sponsored memorials for homosexuals, Sinti and Roma, and victims of
the ‘euthanasia’ programme in Berlin, and the Bundestag has formally con-
demned the Nazi sterilisation and ‘euthanasia’ programme as well as the per-
secution of homosexuals as Nazi injustice.The victims of the Nazi persecution
of the ‘asocials’, by contrast, have not received an official apology nor is there a
state-sponsored memorial or historical site to commemorate their suffering.
The chapter examines how official state policy in the Federal Republic has
addressed the Nazi persecution of the ‘asocials’ and how it has takenmeasures
of compensation and commemoration – or not. I argue that official German
politics has largely failed to identify and confront the distinctive features of
this type of persecution, namely that it targeted victims according to Nazi
standards of productivity, economic usefulness and social conformism. It can
thus be understood as a type of persecution based on a biopolitical rationality
of enhancing the life forces of the collective, in this case the Volksgemeinschaft
through promoting and fostering the orderly, useful and productive lives and
eliminating the useless, unproductive, or no more productive ones. In effect,
the Federal Republic has declared some motivations behind the Nazi crimes
to be incompatible with its own normative foundations – and others not.The
motivation of disciplining and reducing the number of those found unwilling
to live an orderly, useful, productive life was not among the incompatible ones,
it was not one that constituted a severe historic injustice and thus required
reparations.
This chapter takes the Bundestag to be a key site and a key actor in the
politics of historic justice in the Federal Republic of Germany, being the only
federal constitutional body directly elected by the people. It is not only the
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body that can adopt or reject legal reparation schemes or summarily inval-
idate Nazi court rulings, but it can also condemn Nazi crimes and issue an
official apology in the name of the people. Thus, the Bundestag has the power
to actually do historic justice – or not. Therefore, I will focus on its activities
concerning the persecution of the ‘asocials’.1
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I suggest a performatist per-
spective on historic justice, asking what policy-makers actually do when they
‘do justice’ to victims of state wrongdoing in the past, for instance in the form
of reparations schemes, apologies or commemoration practices. From this
perspective, I argue, policies of historic justice are performative acts that in-
evitably link past, present and future in specific ways. Second, I briefly refer
to the historical background to point out which infringements we are talking
about whenwe speak of the persecution of the ‘asocials’.The third section out-
lines the construction of the West German reparation scheme and explains in
which sense the ‘asocials’ have been excluded here. Fourth, I examine the ac-
tivities in and by the Bundestag of coming to terms with the persecution of the
‘asocials’, and the responses by the government pertaining to this. The chap-
ter concludes that historic justice to the victims of the Nazi persecution of the
‘asocials’ has remained marginal in German politics. There has been no offi-
cial act neither by the Bundestag nor by the Federal Government of specifying
what exactly had been wrong about the persecution of the ‘asocials’ and what
must, consequently, not happen again. Concerning this type of Nazi injustice,
the Federal Republic has not performed a clear-cut break with the past.
I will use the phrase ‘persecution of the asocials’ although it is problematic
on at least two counts. First, the term ‘persecution’ (Verfolgung) in German is
mostly used to denote acts of mass violence committed or condoned by the
state against religious, ethnic or political minorities. In this case, however,
there was no group, whether religious, ethnic or political. Second, the use of
the term ‘asocials’ means adopting the Nazi term. It refers to those prison-
ers in the camps marked by a black triangle; it is this triangle and the prac-
1 Sources are draft laws, parliamentary motions, parliamentary hearings, plenary de-
bates, questions to the government in writing or questions to be discussed at a plenary
session, government responses to these, and information provided to the Bundestag
by the government. The documents are accessible through the Bundestag’s electronic
archives at http://pdok.bundestag.de/. Interestingly, a search for ‘Asozialenverfolgung’
yielded no results, whereas a search for ‘Homosexuellenverfolgung’ yielded 28 results
(on 12 June 2017).
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tices that brought them there that together constitute the category of ‘aso-
cial’, nothing else. I will therefore use the phrase ‘persecution of the asocials’
as shorthand for the Nazi practices of stigmatizing, deporting or detaining
people in penitentiaries, workhouses or concentration camps and eventually
killing them on the grounds that they were categorized as homeless or work-
shy, vagrants, beggars or prostitutes, or otherwise not conforming to Nazi
standards of being a valuable member of the Volksgemeinschaft.
5.1 Model Germany?
The Federal Republic has often been lauded as the model case for ‘coming to
terms with the past’ (Wolfrum 2009). For Timothy Garton Ash, ‘past-beating’
has turned into a veritable industry since 1989 and Germany into its world-
wide leader (Garton Ash 2002, 32). Post-war Germany, it is often said, has
confronted its Nazi past in ways that could serve as a model for other coun-
tries that have also committed large-scale human rights violations in the past
(Buruma 1994; Cunningham 2004). In this vein, the German government has
long lauded itself for its exemplary reparation policy: “All in all, theWiedergut-
machung can be considered a unique historical achievement that has received
recognition from national and international organisations of Nazi victims,
too.” (BT Drs. 10/6287 1986, 11)
However, it is also true that German politics of Aufarbeitung undWiedergut-
machung have for a long time excludedmany groups of Nazi victims for whom
the term ‘forgotten victims’ came up in the early 1980s, referring to those who
had suffered from systematic Nazi persecution but were not entitled to repa-
rations under the BEG.This applies to coercive laborers, Roma and Sinti, ho-
mosexuals, those who had been coercively sterilized and those whowere killed
in the course of the so-called ‘euthanasia’ programme. The ‘asocials’ have re-
mained among the most ‘forgotten’ among the ‘forgotten victims’. While vic-
tims of ‘euthanasia’, coercive sterilisation and the persecution of homosexuals
have received an official apology from the German government by, there have
been no official acts of apology or commemoration for those who had been
stigmatized, deported, imprisoned, detained in workhouses or concentration
camps, or ultimately killed, for being allegedly work-shy, homeless, beggars,
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prostitutes or simply deemed ‘asocial’.2 In more recent years, initiatives of
commemorating these Nazi victims have mushroomed in Germany, but, ex-
cept for some isolated efforts by the faction of the Left in parliament, they all
originate in civil society, not in the Bundestag or other government bodies. In
short, this type of persecution still figures marginally within German politics
of the past and the logic that underlined it has scarcely been addressed by
official politics.
5.2 Doing Justice — or not.
The Performative Politics of Historic Justice
In German memory discourse, people who suffered from social rather than
racial or political persecution are often addressed by the sociological term
gesellschaftliche Randgruppen,marginal groups in English (e.g. Tümmers 2009).
However, the discourse of Randgruppen is problematic here since it implies
an ontological primacy of the target group; it implies that the existence of
these ‘groups’ precedes the practices of stigmatizing and persecution such as
rounding up, institutionalizing, detaining, imprisoning and killing.However,
it is actually through these practices that the target ‘group’ has been consti-
tuted in the first place. No such ‘group’ existed until state actors began to dis-
tinguish between normal and abnormal, appropriate and deviant, adjusted
and maladjusted, healthy and pathological, productive and unproductive, su-
perior and inferior, valuable and worthless categories of people. In the con-
text of reparation policies, the concept of Randgruppen obscures the question
when, how and by whom certain categories were constructed for purposes of
persecution and how these categories were still effective in reparation poli-
cies after 1945. I will not so much seek to explain why the ‘asocials’ have been
excluded from reparation and commemoration policies, but explicate what
this means. The focus is on what policy-makers do when they adopt or re-
ject policies of historic justice. By policies of historic justice, I mean policies
that self-critically address the nation’s own past. Policies of historic justice
in this sense may comprise political reparation programmes, official apolo-
gies, official commemoration days, state-sponsoredmemorials, commissions
2 The chapter is based on an article that had been written in 2017. See the addendum at
the end for an update in 2020.
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of inquiry or research programmes. Thus, policies of historic justice, as Reg-
ula Ludi (2005) states, inevitably make a set of performative distinctions: be-
tween legitimate claims for reparations and illegitimate ones, ‘deserving’ vic-
tims and ‘undeserving’ ones, condemnable abuse and justifiable acts of state
power, things to commemorate and things to forget. Building on this, I sug-
gest that policies of historic justice should be approached as performative
acts in the way that theorists of apology understand apologies as performa-
tive acts (Lazare 2004; Tavuchis 1991). In this perspective, certain elements are
required to make an apology: identifying the offence, the offended and the of-
fender, taking responsibility for the offence and acknowledging the suffering
it caused.Through offering an apology, offenders acknowledge that they have
violated a fundamental moral or legal norm or principle, or a previous social
contract with the offended. Thereby, the offender simultaneously confirms
the validity of these norms, principles, contracts or promises and explicitly or
implicitly promises not to violate them again. In the case of public apologies,
it is the state who takes responsibility for the offence. In this case, it is critical
that the person or body who speaks on behalf of the state is constitution-
ally entitled to do so. In a parliamentary democracy like the Federal Republic,
this would certainly be the parliament, elected by the people, or possibly the
chancellor, elected by the parliament.
In order to constitute proper acts of historic justice, policy measures such
as reparation schemes or commemoration days have to fulfil the same re-
quirements as public apologies, meaning they have to name the offence, the
offended and the offender. In common with public apologies, policies of his-
toric justice are performative acts through which actors make factual state-
ments about what happened, issue a moral verdict, determine that wrongdo-
ing has taken place, accept state responsibility for this wrongdoing, specify
what was wrong about it and which norms or principles had been violated,
confirm the enduring validity of these norms and principles and postulate
that they are fundamental for the present political order,make a commitment
to these norms and principles, offer means of making amends and promise
non-repetition. Conversely, when governments decide not to condemn a cer-
tain course of state activity in the past and not to acknowledge that severe
wrongdoing has taken place, they indirectly postulate that this course of ac-
tion is not at odds with the present political order. Hence, policies of historic
justice do not just struggle with ‘the past’ but at the same time they negotiate
fundamental legal norms and principles and the nation’s political imaginary
in the present. They do all this simultaneously, within the same performative
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act. Thus, there is no intrinsic logic nor any quality to past atrocities that de-
termines whether, when and to what extent governments take measures of
making amends – or not; since what counts as condemnable abuse and what
counts as a justifiable act of state power is a matter of moral and political
judgement and political contestation (Sandner 2001; Teitel 2000; Wahl 2012).
In a parliamentary democracy such as the Federal Republic, the parliament is
both a key site where these contestations take place and a key actor that par-
ticipates in them. Moreover, being entitled to make binding decisions about
the fundamental norms and principles of the polity, the parliament has the
highest authority to judge state actions in the past in light of present norms
and principles and to make binding commitments with respect to the future.
Parliamentary debates and decisions thus do not just reflect different views
and judgements existing out there, but actually perform and enact binding
judgements and commitments.
With regard to the persecution of the ‘asocials’ under Nazi rule, policies
of historic justice have largely been incomplete or abortive. The Federal Re-
public has failed to issue any declaration that names the offence, the offended
and the offenders and to take responsibility for the offences. Thus, it has not
distanced itself from the logic that underlay the persecution of the ‘asocials’;
it has not condemned state violence against people on the grounds that they
were being deemed work-shy, useless, homeless or otherwise maladjusted to
norms and standards of productivity and economic usefulness. It has not de-
clared such violations to be incompatible with its fundamentalmoral and legal
order.
5.3 The Nazi Persecution of the ‘Asocials’
Marginalization, discrimination and stigmatization of people for being
deemed ‘asocial’ did not start in 1933, nor did this come to a close in 1945.
Begging and vagrancy already constituted a criminal offence under the 1871
Imperial Criminal Code (Reichsstrafgesetzbuch, RStGB) and could be punished
with imprisonment of up to six weeks (§361 RStGB) or detention in a work-
house of up to two years (§362 RStGB) (Ayaß 1995, 44). However, the use of
workhouses had nearly come to a halt at the end of the Weimar Republic.
After 1933, the police made excessive use of §§361 and 362 RStGB and in
the fall of 1933, big raids against homeless people, beggars and vagrants were
already taking place and many thousands of people, according to Wolfgang
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Ayaß at least 10,000 people, were sent to workhouses or concentration camps
(Ayaß 1995, 23ff.; 41). Most of them were set free again after six weeks.The sit-
uation worsened with the ‘Law against Dangerous Habitual Criminals’, which
came into force in January 1934 and allowed for indefinite detention in a work-
house. To the present day, we have no reliable numbers about how many peo-
ple were held in workhouses, work camps or so-called Bewahrungsanstalten
between 1933 and 1945 (WD 2016, 15). From 1934 to the end of 1940, 7,956 per-
sons were sentenced to workhouse detainment on the basis of §42d of the
1934 law, according to official statistics (Ayaß 1988, 27).
Many inmates were imprisoned in workhouses for many years and many
were sent to concentration camps over the following years. Since 1934, many
municipalities also established coercive work camps (Lager der geschlossenen
Fürsorge or Arbeitszwanglager) in addition to workhouses (Ayaß 2005). Further-
more, inmates of workhouses or work camps were systematically targeted for
forced sterilization (Ayaß 1995, 47). In 1937, the Decree on Crime Prevention
of 14 December 1937 authorized the police to circumvent the courts and im-
prison so-called ‘asocials’ ‘preventively’ in a concentration camp. The decree
provided the pretext for major police roundups. It defined ‘asocials’ as per-
sons who ”without being a professional or habitual criminal endanger the
public through their asocial behavior” (Decree quoted in Ayaß 1995, 139; 1998,
document no. 50). In April 1938, executive guidelines for the decree declared:
“Asocial is he who demonstrates through his anti-social, however not criminal
behavior that he is not willing to adapt to the community.” (Ayaß 1998, 142ff.)
The guidelines listed beggars, vagrants, prostitutes, alcoholics, the home-
less, the work-shy, persons with a venereal disease or persons who did not
pay alimonies, although this list was not supposed to be exhaustive. Many
of the targeted were poor, but there was no ‘social group’ prior to the perse-
cution; the group was constituted by the label imposed on people, through
raids, imprisonment, detention, harassment and stigmatization, and even-
tually the black triangle attached to them in the camps. Based on the decree
on ‘crime prevention’, the Gestapo and Criminal Police arrested more than
10,000 mostly male persons in April and June 1938 and sent them to concen-
tration camps. The operation is nowadays known as Aktion ‘Arbeitsscheu Reich’.
It was mainly geared at adult males whose ability to work was exploited in
the camps, among them many Sinti, Roma and Jews.
Women were targeted as ‘asocials’ too. According to Christa Schikorra,
one in four who were deported to the women’s concentration camp Ravens-
brück between early 1939 and early 1940 were categorized as ‘asocial’ (Schiko-
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rra 2005). In total, approximately 120,000womenwere imprisoned in Ravens-
brück from 1939 to 1945, many for reasons of alleged prostitution, some for
adultery in wartime (Kriegsehebruch), some for petty crime, some after having
served a prison sentence for abortion. An estimated 25 percent of the women
detainees categorized as ‘asocials’ had previously been detained in residen-
tial care institutions for youth (Schikorra 2005, 110). Younger girls were also
imprisoned in a special concentration camp for girls and young women, the
Uckermark concentration camp. Between 1942 and 1945, some 1,200 girls and
young women between 14 and 21 years old and some boys were incarcerated
here, among them many girls classified as ‘hopeless cases’ by Nazi welfare
institutions. Girls could be classified as ‘asocial’ for all sorts of reasons, such
as running away from welfare institutions or ‘sexual depravation’ (sexuelle Ver-
wahrlosung), a term that could mean anything from having contact with Jews
or foreign workers to promiscuity or in any other way departing from sexual
norms of female behavior. Sexual depravation was a term uniquely used to
categorize women (Initiative Uckermark 2009, 5). Boys and young men who
had previously been detained in parallel institutions for male youth were sent
to the youth concentration camp Moringen. A decree issued by Himmler in
April 1944 declared that the purpose of the youth concentration camps was to:
…foster thosewhoare still capable of adapting to the community so that they
can fill in their place within the ethnic community (Volksgemeinschaft) and to
detain thosewho are not amenable to education until their final detainment
(in therapeutic institutions and institutions of care (Heil-undPflegeanstalten),
custody institutions, concentration camps), allowing for the use of their la-
bor. (Himmler quoted in Ayaß 1998, 30)
‘Healing and care institutions’ (Heil- und Pflegeanstalten) was of course code for
the institutions that systematically killed mentally ill or disabled people. The
persecution of those stigmatized as ‘asocials´ thus merges into the elimina-
tion of the mentally ill and disabled and we see once again the biopolitical
coupling of promoting productive lives and eliminating unproductive ones,
with both strategies being directed at enhancing the strength and fitness of
the collective body. We have to assume, says Martin Guse (2005), that one in
ten inmates of the Moringen youth concentration camp did not survive.
In the Federal Republic, begging, vagrancy and prostitution continued to
form a criminal offence until the major Criminal Code revision in the 1970s.
Even workhouses continued to exist into the late 1960s (Ayaß 1995, 210).While
people deemed to be ‘asocial’ were no longer sent to concentration camps, the
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institutions of the Federal Republic did not officially condemn these prac-
tices either. Claims for reparations were constantly rejected, even if someone
had been detained in a workhouse for many years or imprisoned in a con-
centration camp. Such acts did not constitute ‘typical Nazi injustice’ for the
authorities and the courts.
5.4 Meaningful Work and Orderly Life
In the early 1950s, the question of continuity and discontinuity came up in the
Bundestag when the faction of the Zentrum launched an effort to introduce a
new Custody Law (Bewahrungsgesetz) that was supposed to allow the detention
of ‘the mentally and morally weak’ in closed institutions. In June 1951, the
faction of the Catholic Zentrum party sub-mitted a proposal for a draft law to
the Bundestag (BT Drs. 1/2366 1951). It stipulated that the purpose of detention
(Bewahrung) was to protect the individual from deterioration (Verwahrlosung)
and get him or her accustomed to meaningful work and an orderly life (BT
Drs. 1/2366 1951, 1). The target group was constructed as individuals of full
age who are deteriorating or at risk of deteriorating owing to a pathological
or extreme mental or moral weakness or to a bluntness of moral sentiment
(BT Drs. 1/2366 1951, 2).The law would have allowed the institutionalization of
these people on either a temporary or permanent basis. During the pertaining
parliamentary debate, MdB Helene Wessel presented the rationale for such a
measure, namely that there were people who were mentally or emotionally
‘abnormal’ and therefore incapable of adjusting to society (BT PLP 1/163 1951,
6606B). True, Wessel conceded, the Nazi state had misused the restriction of
personal freedom, but in her opinion that did not disqualify the new Custody
Law (BT PLP 1/163 1951, 6606C). In other words, what the Nazi state had done
to those categorized as ‘asocial’ in her view did not constitute a state crime
but, in principle, an exercise of ordinary statecraft. Violating a person’s right
to personal freedom seemed acceptable when the person was incapable of
adjusting to ‘meaningful work and an orderly life’ in society, in short of being
a useful, productive member of the collective.
Others cautioned that the concept of deterioration was ill-defined and
thus prone to misuse (BT PLP 1/163 1951, 6610D) and that ‘we in Germany’ have
a special duty to prevent such misuse in order to overcome the ‘bad inheri-
tance’ of the past.The sharpest criticismwas brought forward by a Communist
MdB,MrsThiele, who referred to onemillion young people being unemployed
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at the time of the debate. Instead of enacting a law that would amount to
bringing back Schutzhaft (a euphemistic Nazi term for detaining people with-
out judicial decision or control), the state should take measures against mass
unemployment and social distress (BT PLP 1/163 1951, 6612A–D). The proposal
for a new custody law was eventually defeated in parliament. Yet, another in-
cident shows that the spirit behind it was still alive a few years later. In 1962,
when the Federal Social Benefits Act (Bundessozialhilfegesetz) was enacted, in-
cluded the so-called custody provisions (Bewahrungsregeln) that would allow
the authorities to institutionalize people in a workhouse “who, despite being
repeatedly ordered, persistently refuse to take up acceptable work” (quoted
in Stegemann 2013, 18). The provision, however, was eventually invalidated by
the Constitutional Court in 1967.
Both incidents show that the idea of denying personal rights and freedoms
to people for not complying with social standards of economic usefulness,
productivity and an ‘orderly life’ was not out of the question for the Federal
Republic.
5.5 Excluded Victims
There can be no dispute that the Nazi persecution of ‘asocials’ amounted to
massive, systematic and severe human rights violations committed by the
state. Yet, in commonwith the institutional killings, coercive sterilization and
the persecution of homosexuals, it did not meet the definition of Nazi per-
secution as stipulated by the 1953 Federal Indemnification Act. The Act estab-
lished a right to reparations for victims of Nazi persecution, subject to very
restrictive residency requirements. The Act defines who counts as a victim
of Nazi persecution, namely he or she who has been persecuted “for racial,
religious, and political reasons or because of the victim’s world view” (BEG
§1(1)). Thus, it stipulates that persecution for these reasons – but not oth-
ers – is a severe breach of fundamental moral norms and principles of the
Federal Republic.Thereby, it confirms that persecution for reasons of an indi-
vidual’s race, religion, political views or world view is incompatible with the
Republic’smoral, legal and political order.Conversely, the Act also defineswho
is not a deserving victim, namely he or she who has actively contributed to
bringing about the Nazi regime, or who after 1949 has “fought against the free
democratic constitution of the Basic Law” (BEG §6(1)2)).The latter was mostly
applied to Communists. Fighting Communists, as per the underlying ratio-
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nale, forms a legitimate exercise of statecraft, hence the present state cannot
condemn its predecessor for having done the same thing in the past. The In-
demnification Act singles out certain logics of state action which it considers
incompatible with the present political order, namely stigmatizing, violating
and killing people for being a member of a racial, religious or political group
(except for the Communists) or a group that shares a certain world view.
Thereby, the post-war reparation scheme effectively excluded the ‘asocials’
from reparations since they had not been persecuted for any of these rea-
sons – a fate they shared with other victims of what I termed the injuries of
normality. The post-war reparation scheme of the Federal Republic has been
constructed upon two basic assumptions. First, what is decisive is not what
someone had suffered and what the state had done, but for what reasons it
had done so. Second, it assumes that the state has the duty to respect and pro-
tect the rights of ethnic, racial, religious or political minority groups. Those
categorized as ‘asocial’, however, did not form a ‘minority’ group; people were
marked by the Gestapo, the police or the local authorities as presenting a bur-
den or a threat to the Volksgemeinschaft, not for belonging to a certain group.
These practices of marking and persecution reinforced, radicalized and exe-
cuted biopolitical norms and standards of conformity, usefulness and pro-
ductivity, thus establishing a system of differential valuation of human lives.
However, these norms and standards had not been created by the Nazis.They
formed part of an overarching biopolitical rationality that both predated and
outlasted the Nazi regime. The German reparation scheme, however, was re-
stricted to ‘typical Nazi injustice’ and thus excluded state wrongdoing that
cut across the temporal confines of the Nazi period. Thereby, by definition, it
ruled out the possibility of the Federal Republic continuing certain practices
of the Nazi state. Yet, this was the case insofar as stigmatization, detention
in workhouses and imprisonment for being homeless continued after 1945.
In the 1980s, many participants in civil society and in the Bundestag be-
gan to struggle for a reparation scheme that would go beyond the confines
of the Federal Indemnification Act. These struggles were supported by the
Greens and the Social Democrats, who formed the parliamentary opposition
in the Bundestag at the time. The Greens proposed a new law that would have
established entitlements to reparations for everyone who had person-ally suf-
fered from Nazi persecution in Germany or the territories occupied by Ger-
many between 1933 and 1945, proposing a broad concept of persecution based
on the infringements someone had suffered, not on the group that they be-
longed to (BT Drs. 11/141 1987). The Social Democrats in parliament preferred
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the model of a new foundation ‘Reparations for Nazi Injustice’, funded by
the government and supposed to compensate persons who had suffered from
Nazi crimes but had not received compensation so far (BT Drs. 11/223 1987).
Themajority in parliament, however, did not adopt these propositions but es-
tablished a new hardship fund in 1988 for Nazi victims who were not eligible
to reparations under BEG. The institution in charge for managing the hard-
ship fund became the Federal Ministry of Finance, not an independent body.
When the Bundestag, again, debated reparations for Nazi victims in June 1989,
oppositional MdBs complained that only 1.6 million Deutschmarks out of the
47.2million budgeted for that year had been spent (BT PLP 11/151 1989, 11340C).
The main problem, MdB Antje Vollmer from the Green Party remarked, was
“…that the responsibility was given to an authority whose very own interest is
saving money and whose representatives now sit on the government bench”
(BT PLP 11/151 1989, 11344B).
When the hardship fund was established, people who had been perse-
cuted as ‘asocials’ could theoretically apply for a one-off payment of 5,000
Deutschmarks. Few, however, tried and even fewer succeeded. In the period
to 31 December 2011, a total of 354 persons categorized as ‘asocial’, vagrants,
unwilling to work or work-shy by the Nazis had applied for hardship com-
pensation and only 222 were successful (BMF 2012, 33).
5.6 Forgotten ‘Forgotten Victims’?
When in the 1980s the new discourse about the ‘forgotten victims’ came up,
there was some reference to the persecution of the ‘asocials’. On the whole,
however, the topic remainedmarginal. Reviewing the history of this discourse
and the politics of historic justice through the lenses of the ‘asocials’ results
in drawing up a long list of omissions. Since the 1980s the Bundestag was con-
cerned with a series of initiatives to confront, commemorate, condemn and
compensate Nazi crimes and those against the ‘forgotten victims’ in particu-
lar. One can look at these discourses from a semantic and an interlocutionary
perspective, in terms of content or conversation. As regards content, we can
inquire, first, whether political speech acts – draft laws, proposals, questions
and inquiries sub-mitted to the government, governmental responses and re-
ports, parliamentary debates, hearings or speeches dealing with Aufarbeitung
und Wiedergutmachung – do mention this type of persecution at all. Second,
whether they do so in a more nominal way by just listing it or in a more
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substantial way by specifying offences, offended and offenders, and third,
whether and when we see initiatives addressing this particular type of perse-
cution. From an interlocutionary perspective, the major question is whether
policy-makers talked to people who had suffered from this type of persecution
or just talked about them, that is, whether these Nazi victims were treated as
active participants in political conversations or as passive beneficiaries of cer-
tain policies.
Let us begin with the latter. Survivors of the persecution of ‘asocials’ never
entered the politics of historic justice as participants, neither individually nor
collectively. When the Social Democrats in parliament submitted their initia-
tive for a new foundation for compensating Nazi injustice in 1987, they named
a number of victims’ organizations supposed to be represented on the board
of trustees.That foundation never came to be but it is worth noting that no as-
sociation representing the ‘asocial’ Nazi victimswasmentioned in this context
(BT Drs. 11/223 1987). In June 1987, the Parliamentary Committee on Internal
Affairs held an important public hearing onWiedergutmachung und Entschädi-
gung für nationalsozialistisches Unrecht in Bonn (Deutscher Bundestag 1987). It
was the first public hearing where victims of Nazi persecution, including ‘for-
gotten victims’, could tell their story to members of the Bundestag. Two years
later, when the Bundestag debated the allocation of resources for Nazi victims,
MdBs recalled that the hearing and the testimonies had left a lasting impres-
sion on them. It was, as Antje Vollmer said, “…as if many became aware for
the first time how many groups of Nazi victims were living without recogni-
tion and compensation in the Federal Republic and abroad.…There have been
tears at the hearing.” (BT PLP 11/151 1989, 11344A)
Among the participants were representatives of Sinti and Roma, people
who had been forcibly sterilized, surviving victims of the ‘euthanasia’ pro-
gramme, homosexuals and forced laborers – but no representatives of ‘aso-
cials’. Only one participant, the historian Wolfgang Ayaß, represented the
group. Arguably, there was no association of ‘asocial’ Nazi victims at that
time. At least no association publicly complained that they had not been in-
vited. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that those labelled ‘asocial’ by
the Nazis had no voice in the politics of historical justice. In terms of con-
tent, the ‘asocials’ were absent for a long time too. When President Richard
von Weizsäcker gave his celebrated speech on 8 May 1985 and, as first official
representative of the Federal Republic, commemorated the ‘forgotten victims’
such as homosexuals and those who had been coercively sterilized or killed
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in mental institutions, he did not mention the persecution of the ‘asocials’
(Bundespräsidialamt 1985).
In the following years, a number of parliamentary initiatives were
launched for a more comprehensive and inclusionary politics of Aufar-
beitung und Wiedergutmachung. During the 10th and 11th Bundestag, the Greens
launched a proposal for a draft law that would provide social benefits to all
victims of Nazi persecution (BT Drs. 10/4040 1985), the Social Democrats pro-
posed that the government submit a report on how to improve reparations for
Nazi victims (BT Drs. 10/4638 1986), the Greens again proposed a draft law for
adequate social benefits for all Nazi victims (BT Drs. 11/141 1987) in April 1987,
the Social Democrats proposed a draft law for a foundation ‘Reparations for
Nazi Injustice’ in May 1987 (BT Drs. 11/223 1987), the Committee on Internal
Affairs submitted a report on a new hardship fund for the ‘forgotten victims’
in 1987 (BT Drs. 11/1392 1987) and in 1987 the Social Democrats proposed
guidelines for allocating means to a more inclusive range of Nazi victims
(BT Drs. 11/1413 1987). Of these motions and reports, two mention a range
of ‘forgotten victim’ groups but not the ‘asocials’ (BT Drs. 10/4638 1986; BT
Drs. 11/223 1987), three mention the ‘asocials’ or ‘socially persecuted’ amongst
others, without, however, specifying the violations they had suffered (BT Drs.
10/4040 1985; BT Drs. 11/141 1987; BT Drs. 11/1413 1987) and the rest make no
mention of specific groups.
The Social Democrats in parliament used the term socially persecuted
(Sozialverfolgte), which at least hints at the specificity of this type of perse-
cution. They did not say, however, what this means, who was afflicted or who
the perpetrators were. More can be learned from the report provided by the
government on the request of the Bundestag on Wiedergutmachung and repa-
rations for Nazi injustice, and the situation of Roma and Sinti and related
groups. The report names some of the offences and the offended, namely:
persons who were taken to a concentration camp or another prison site for
reasons of ‘security’ without regular trial and without sentence or after hav-
ing served their prison sentence. Such measures were directed, for instance,
at poachers, sexual criminals, pimps, vagrants, drunks, work-shy, dangerous
criminals, so-called asocials, persons failing to pay alimonies, psychopaths,
mentally distorted, and prostitutes. Homosexuals were affected as well. (BT
Drs. 10/6287 1986, 39)
The report devotes a few lines on the logic that had underlined these infringe-
ments:
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Against this group of people so-called preventive measures were taken as
well during Nazi rule. These measures served to subject this group to regu-
lar work and at the same time to recruit workers who, due to the tense situa-
tion in the labor market, were in short supply. […]. In 1938, two actions were
taken against the so-called work-shy and those imprisoned in the course of
these actions were taken to the concentration camp Buchenwald. According
to the findings of the Institute for Contemporary History, however, we have
to assume that the majority of these prisoners were released in 1939 in the
context of an amnesty on the occasion of Hitler’s birthday. (BT Drs. 10/6287
1986, 41)3
Hence, what we learn from the government report is that the Nazi state vio-
lated these persons’ right to the due process of law. We learn little about the
logic that drove these infringements other than, apparently, it having to do
with a labor shortage at the time and the strategy of the state to recruit addi-
tional labor. In short, the report suggests, theNazi state acted out of economic
rationality. It does not become clear whether the government condemns this
course of action, and if so, on what grounds.
The Greens in parliament discerned a different logic at work. In 1995, they
launched an initiative to establish a new foundation for reparations for Nazi
crimes (Entschädigung für NS-Unrecht) supposed to grant reparations to all vic-
tims of Nazi persecution, not just those listed by the Federal Indemnification
Act:
The purpose of the foundation is that all persons who had been subject to
Nazi persecution get acknowledged as victims of National Socialism and in
principle received continuous material benefits as compensation. Nazi per-
secution is eachmeasure of Nazi injustice against the life, body, health, free-
dom, professionalism or property. (BT Drs. 13/1193 1989, 1)
The key criteria to delineate legitimate from illegitimate reparation claims
were supposed to be the acts of injustice as such, not the grounds on which
they had been inflicted upon people. The proposal would have radically re-
organized the West German reparation scheme. In the proposal, the Greens
named as prospective beneficiaries inter alia “persons who on the grounds of
3 Wolfgang Ayaß, however, the leading scholar on the persecution of the ‘asocials’ in
Germany, argues that there is no evidence that most of the detainees were set free
upon Hitler’s 50th birthday (Ayaß 1988, 22).
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their way of living or living situation were treated as being parasitic to the
community, according to Nazi ideology (e.g. ‘gripers’, ‘work-shy’, ‘homeless’)
and harmed as such.” (BT Drs. 13/1193 1989, 2)
Albeit briefly, the proposal thus addresses the specificity of this type of
persecution and to some extent identifies a specific logic behind it, namely
the logic of persecuting people for a way of life that, whether freely chosen or
not, does not conform to Nazi ideology. Yet the Greens were a small minor-
ity faction in the Bundestag without a realistic chance of getting the proposal
approved. Later, when they formed a coalition government with the Social
Democrats in 1995–2005 and thus had a parliamentary majority, neither of
them came back to their former proposals.
It was not until 2008 – the year of the Aktion’s 70th ‘anniversary’ and also
the year of the financial crisis –when the Left inquired about commemorating
the Aktion ‘Arbeitsscheu Reich’ of 1938 that a parliamentary action addressed the
persecution of the ‘asocials’ separately, as a stand-alone topic. The Question
explicitly linked the events of 1938 to the situation in 2008 and vice versa:
“Since people who have been marked as ‘asocial’ are increasingly exposed to
aggressive acts this type of anti-human hostility should have a place within
the politics of reminding and commemoration.” (BT Drs. 16/9405 2008, 2)
The list of questions submitted here refers inter alia to the number of
‘asocials’ sterilized, imprisoned, impaired, sentenced to death, executed, de-
tained and/or killed in prisons, penitentiaries, concentration camps or med-
ical institutions. It further inquired about the government’s plans to obtain
such data, about the amount of reparations paid so far, plans to examine the
role of ministries, authorities and other parts of government in these viola-
tions (Aufarbeitung), and further plans, projects and activities to commemo-
rate these crimes. Albeit briefly, the inquiry names the offence, the offended
and the offender, namely the Sturmabteilung and the police. This was the first
parliamentary or governmental action to do so.
The government’s response mostly states that the government had no in-
formation concerning numbers of victims or offences, no intentions to ob-
tain them, and no plans or intentions as regards commemoration. The only
concrete data provided were data on hardship compensation payments. Ac-
cording to these, 163 ‘asocials’, 17 persons who had refused work (Arbeitsver-
weigerer), 24 work-shy and one vagrant had received a one-off payment of
€2556.46 up to that date (BT Drs. 16/9887 2008).
In 2010, the Left in parliament again submitted a question in writing to
the government, inquiring about the site of the former concentration camp
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Uckermark for girls and young women categorized as ‘asocial’. Most of them,
the question holds, were detained because their behavior did not conform to
the norms of Nazi society:
Changing the place of residence, periods without proof of employment, re-
fusing service in the Bund Deutscher Mädel [League of German Girls], or ac-
quaintances withmenwhowere stigmatized or discriminated against could
lead to accusations of ‘hanging around’ or ‘sexual depravation’ and detain-
ment in a concentration camp. (BT Drs. 17/1493 2010, 1)
The question also names the ordeals and injustices the inmates suffered such
as malnutrition and coercive labor for the company Siemens. When the Left
inquired whether the government had any plans to develop a commemora-
tion site devoted to this group of Nazi victims, the government responded
that the authority in charge was not the Federal Government but the State
of Brandenburg. On the question which memorials or commemoration sites
existed that were particularly devoted to those who had been stigmatized and
persecuted as ‘asocials’, the government responded: “On the federal level, no
memorial sites or sites of commemoration are known that are particularly
dedicated to the group of people Nazi victims persecuted as ‘asocials’.” (BT
Drs. 17/1721 2010, 4)
These two interventions by the Left in parliament remained isolated over
the following years. In sum, over the past decades, the German government
has acknowledged for a fact that thousands or tens of thousands of men and
women, girls and boys had been deprived of their freedom, health, dignity
and/or life because the way they lived did not conform to Nazi norms of pro-
ductivity or being adjusted to society.The government did not deny the factual
truth of these violations. Nor did it deny that the state had been responsible.
However, it did not view these violations as typical Nazi injustice and accord-
ingly did not grant reparations under the Federal Indemnification Act. Nor
did any German government or the Bundestag ever issue an official apology
for these violations. Neither did the Federal Government ever set up a com-
mission of inquiry into these aspects of the Nazi past, nor sponsor any spe-
cific commemoration practices such as developing and sustaining a memo-
rial site. The Federal Republic never officially specified what, if anything, had
been wrong about stigmatizing, detaining and persecuting people as ‘aso-
cials’.There is no official declaration that names offence, offended and offend-
ers. In the absence of such a declaration, the Federal Republic has not drawn a
line between the past and the present, it has not identified or condemned the
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logic that under-lined this type of persecution, it has not specified the moral
or legal norms and principles that had been violated, and consequently it has
not committed itself to these norms and principles in the present and has not
promised non-repetition.
5.7 Commemoration Beyond the State
In recent years, an impressive number of civil society initiatives have strug-
gled to commemorate the persecution of the ‘asocials’. Today, many sites of
former violence such as the site of the former youth concentration camps
Uckermark and Moringen, as well as the site of a former workhouse called
Rummelsburg (Irmer 2013; Irmer, Reischl et al. n.y.) in Berlin-Lichtenberg,
have been turned into memorials by local civil society groups. They organize
conferences, talks and workshops, discover and preserve memorial sites, and
provide information and analyses in form of articles, books and websites.
Through placing the persecution of the ‘asocials’ in the context of the eco-
nomic crisis, social inequality, marginalization and exclusion, they articulate
commemoration and social critique. They draw a continuum between past
and present and problematize the injustices of the latter in light of the former.
A very active group is the Arbeitskreis Marginalisierte – gestern und heute, a name
that deliberately articulates the past with the present. In addition, in German
the name signifies both ‘working group on marginalized people’ and ‘working
group of marginalized people’; hence, it addresses the marginalized both as
subject matter and as active participants. The group makes it very clear that
it seeks to expose and condemn the continuity of social marginalization be-
fore, during and after the Nazi era and this continuity, in their view, is at least
partly due to capitalism. It is the marginalizing effects of capitalism that they
seek to bring to the fore – a project not particularly supported by the govern-
ment.Nevertheless, if the government were looking for interlocutors to talk to
about commemorating the persecution of ‘asocials’, it could find them here.
These activists self-identify as people affected by socialmarginalization,many
of them know first-hand what it means to be poor, unemployed or homeless,
and thus vulnerable to stigmatization, criminalization or violence, many of
them have become experts on the persecution of ‘asocials’ under Nazi rule,
and they have made it their cause to prevent similar things from happening
again.
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5.8 Conclusion
Tens of thousands of men and women, boys and girls were stigmatized, de-
ported, detained in penitentiaries,workhouses or concentration camps.Many
were eventually killed on the grounds that the way they lived did not conform
to Nazi norms and standards of being a productive, valuable, useful, well-
adjusted member of the Volksgemeinschaft. Like other ‘forgotten victims’ of
Nazi crimes, they are still excluded from reparations under the Federal In-
demnification Act since their suffering does not count as Nazi persecution
in the sense of the law. Only a few hundred have received a small amount
of hardship compensation payment. Unlike many other groups of ‘forgotten
victims’, those categorized and persecuted as ‘asocials’ have not received an
official apology, nor is there a state-sponsored memorial, museum, founda-
tion or historical site to commemorate their suffering. In their case, there has
been no declaration by the Bundestag or the Federal Government that names
offence, offended and offender. Despite the fact that the infringements, the
violence and the degradation they suffered have been acknowledged as a fact
and mentioned as one type of persecution amongst others since the 1980s,
until 2008 no parliamentary or governmental action referred to this type of
persecution in particular.Those two initiatives in the Bundestag that finally did
so, remainedmarginal themselves. From a pragmatist perspective, thismeans
that the Federal Republic has failed to specify what exactly was wrong about
these infringements, whether, why and in what way this was an abuse of state
power and not the exercise of statecraft. In failing to do so, the Federal Re-
public has failed to distance itself from the biopolitical and productivist logic
that underlay the persecution of the ‘asocials’. The Federal Republic has con-
demned state violence against people on the grounds that they were homosex-
ual, disabled or mentally ill, but not on the grounds that they were homeless,
unemployed, poor or deemed to be work-shy, useless, or just mal-adjusted to
norms and standards of productivity and economic usefulness. The state has
avoided clarifying which ways of treating the socially marginalized are ac-
ceptable and which are not, thereby avoiding making a commitment on how
to treat the socially marginalized. The state, therefore, has not declared vio-
lations on these grounds to be incompatible with its fundamental moral and
legal order. In turn, this says something not only about the past but also about
the present.
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5.9 Addendum
On February 13, 2020, at the beginning of the Corona crisis and largely unno-
ticed by the general public, themajority of the Bundestag adopted a declaration
on the acknowledgement of ‘Asocials’ and ‘Habitual Criminals’ as victims of
Nazi persecution. All MPs voted in favor of the declaration, except those from
the right-wing extremist party Alternative for Germanywho voted against.With
this declaration, the Bundestag responded to the petition “Acknowledgement
of ‘Asocials’ and ’Habitual Criminals’ as Nazi Victims” that had been launched
in April 2018. It received broad support from a number of parliamentarians,
artists, scholars, and other figures from public life and was signed by over
21,000 people. It states that the Nazis persecuted, stigmatized, incarcerated
and murdered homeless persons, beggars, alcoholics and migrant workers
and “carried out a kind of socio-biological prevention of violence among those
with criminal records” by detaining them in concentration camps after serv-
ing a prison sentence, on the assumption of the existence of criminal genes
(BT Drs. 19/14342 2020, 2; 3). The fate of these victims, the Bundestag declared,
has not yet been commemorated and this needed to change: “No one was
rightly imprisoned, tortured or murdered in a concentration camp”. (BT Drs.
19/14342 2020, 3)

6 Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault
on Biopolitics, Time and Totalitarianism
Although Hannah Arendt never used the term ‘biopolitics’, she has developed
some of the most critical insights into the primacy of life in modern society
and the reduction of people to mere living things in 20th-century totalitari-
anism. These insights, I will argue, essentially refer to a structure of tempo-
rality which I will term processual temporality, that runs from the beginnings
of modernity through 20th century totalitarianism up to post-war capitalist
mass society. I will show that Arendt’s examination of modern temporality to
large degrees overlaps withMichel Foucault’s diagnosis ofmodern biopolitics.
Unlike Foucault, however, Arendt also offers a starting point for developing a
different, non-biopolitical conception of politics, based on a non-processual
form of temporality: the temporality of the interval.
Recent work in philosophy and the social sciences has highlighted a num-
ber of intersections and affinities between Foucault and Arendt, although they
never referred to one another (Allen 2002; Gordon 2002b). Both reject an es-
sentialist conception of human nature and a teleological conception of his-
tory, be it of Hegelian or Marxist provenance, and both share a commitment,
although spelled out differently, to a type of inquiry that combines philosoph-
ical and historical perspectives. It would not be too far-fetched to say that not
only Foucault but also Arendt reconstructed the ‘history of the present’, to use
Foucault’s term. Both investigate the ideational dimension of history without
reducing it to a traditional history of ideas. While in Foucault it is the body
that is of particular importance to his history of the present, in Arendt it is the
category of experience. It has also been noted that both Arendt and Foucault
move beyond a Weberian notion of power (Allen 2002; Gordon 2002b), both
stressing the relational and performative, and, as I would add, the genera-
tive character of power. However, one must not take the analogy too far be-
cause, as Richard Dana Villa (1992) remarks, when Foucault and Arendt speak
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about power, they speak about different things. While the Foucauldian con-
cept of power in a specifically crypto-normative way denotes a ubiquitous,
pervasive, and somewhat dark and troubling force, power in Arendt (1970)
emanates from concerted political action. Power, in Arendt, is the public and
visible manifestation of human action’s ‘weak’ messianic potency, making its
appearance in a specifically messianic structure of temporality: the interval.
It was Giorgio Agamben, who most influentially highlighted the aspect
of biopolitics in Arendt and Foucault, bringing together the Foucauldian con-
cept of biopolitics with Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism. In hisHomo Sacer,
Agamben (1998), who makes detailed reference to Arendt’s analysis of how
totalitarianism reduces persons to mere specimens, deplores the fact that
Arendt did not explicitly draw a connection between her analysis of mod-
ern society in The Human Condition (1958) and her analysis of totalitarianism
in Origins (1968).He concludes that Originswas altogether without a biopolit-
ical perspective (Agamben 1998) whereas Foucault, he holds, has never dealt
with 20th-century totalitarianism. Both statements are only partly correct.
Foucault, in the last part ofTheHistory of Sexuality (1980) and in his lectures at
the Collège de France in 1976 (Foucault 2003), albeit briefly, did refer to total-
itarianism, and these passages, as Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg (1998)
have shown, are perfectly in line with his other works. As far as Arendt is
concerned, it is correct that in Origins she does not refer to the terms ‘life’ or
‘biopolitics’ and does not explicitly explain the relation between The Human
Condition andOrigins. However, inTheHuman Condition, she intensively exam-
ines the notion of life in connection with the emergence of the social and
the decline of politics in occidental history up to the 20th century. Strangely
enough, Agamben makes little or no use of these thoughts. In this chapter,
I will not undertake a detailed discussion of Agamben’s political theory but
rather continue the project of bringing Arendt and Foucault together on the
issue of biopolitics. Although the term ‘biopolitics’ does not appear in Arendt, I
will argue that in her work we can find a rich and in-depth analysis of the spe-
cific features that constitute modern biopolitics, so that we can read Arendt
as a theorist of biopolitics avant la lèttre. So far, this aspect in Arendt’s work
seems to have been widely overlooked. An exception is André Duarte (2005)
who argues that readingOrigins andTheHumanCondition as analyses of biopo-
litical violence, even though biopolitics is not an Arendtian category, enables
us to find themissing link between these twoworks and to understand the lin-
gering continuity between capitalist market society and totalitarian violence
in our contemporary world. Duarte suggests that we live in a world in which
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there is a constant danger that the Arendtian animal laborans gets converted
into the Agambian homo sacer.My own reading of Arendt widely corresponds
to this thesis, but I will discuss in more detail the overlaps and intersections
between Foucault’s conception of biopolitics and Arendt’s analysis of totali-
tarianism.These intersections, I argue, concern the analysis of certain critical
features of the modern project that culminate and converge in totalitarian-
ism: the zoefication of humans, a technocratic understanding of politics, and,
not least, modern processual temporality. The issue of temporality, as I will
show, is of particular significance in Arendt’s political thought. Furthermore,
I will focus on Arendt’s specific contribution to a theory of biopolitics and
modernity and point out the additional insights she can offer. Those consist,
in my view, first in opening up an additional dimension of understanding in
regard to biopolitics, one that refers to a debatable but also inspiring exis-
tentialist, if not theological, layer in her thought. Second, and linked to this
dimension, with her concept of natality, she presents an alternative way of
conceiving temporality, politics, and life that has the potential to take us be-
yond the spell of biopolitics.
6.1 Life and Labor
Both Arendt and Foucault belong to those thinkers who draw our attention
to the dark sides of the modern project. What Jeffrey Isaac said about Arendt
is equally true for Foucault: both are puzzled by the irony “that the modern
age, which proclaims the value of life above all else, is also the age of genocidal
mass murder” (Isaac 1996, 65).That is, both Arendt and Foucault ask the ques-
tion of how the atrocities of 20th-century totalitarianism were rooted in the
soil of modernity and how to unearth these roots. Whereas Arendt provides
an in-depth study on the functioning principles of totalitarian rule and the
nexus between shaping, regulating, and enhancing the Volkskörper and classi-
fying and killing people marked as ‘life not worth living’, Foucault’s works, as
Milchman and Rosenberg (1998) point out, rather shed light on the formative
stages of this nexus. Milchman and Rosenberg argue that the idea of ‘life not
worth living’ can be seen as one possible, though not necessary, outcome of
the practices of classifying and categorizing in terms of health–disease, nor-
mal–pathological, fit–unfit, which Foucault traced back to the emergence of
modern medicine, psychiatry, biology and the carceral society. In the follow-
ing, I will highlight some further aspects in Foucault’s and Arendt’s work that
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illuminate the threads running from the formation of the modern project to
the extermination camps. To avoid misunderstandings, this is not to say that
Nazism was the inevitable, necessary outcome of anything. It is only to say
that Nazism was able to build on ideational and practical elements that were
and are still key to modernity and that it is worthwhile studying these ele-
ments in order to be aware of the possibility that they might again grow into
a real nightmare.
The first aspect I want to highlight is the observation of what might be
termed the political zoefication of humans.1 Looking at the formative stage
of the modern state, Foucault observes that it was accompanied or even char-
acterized by the move through which humans as living beings became the
subject and target of political rule:
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the
ultimate domination was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it
would be able to exercise over themwould have to be applied at the level of
life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that
gave power its access event to the body” (Foucault 1980, 142f.).
The life at stake here is not so much the life people live, the life story, the
biography, but rather the zoe-aspect of their existence. Public policy and the
welfare state through the late 18th and 19th centuries, Foucault argues, co-
emerged with practices, institutions, and new bodies of knowledge, designed
to take care of the physical aspects of human life such as fertility, health,
disease, longevity, or morbidity, in order to enhance the productivity of the
population as well as its loyalty to the state (Foucault 1988). Foucault makes it
clear that the shift towards the population was a decisive precondition for the
emergence of the economy as a separate sphere which he links to the govern-
mentalization of the state (Foucault 2000a, 220), that is, the understanding
of politics as government in the sense of management.
This analysis partly overlaps with Arendt’s indictment inTheHumanCondi-
tion that modern society is being based on labor rather than on work or politi-
cal action. Labor, in her terminology,means the type of activity that serves the
necessities of life and the ongoing circle of consumption and reproduction.
1 Agamben (1998) has pointed out that the Greeks had no single word for life but the
two terms bios and zoe. Unlike the contemporary use of the prefix bio in terms such as
biology or biopolitics, bios denoted the life one was living whereas zoe comprised the
physical aspects of being an animal, a living thing.
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The purpose of labor is not really to produce lasting works but to maintain
the life processes of the individual, society, and the species. The Arendtian
categories of labor, work, and action are certainly problematic, as Bronislaw
Szerszynski (2005) argues, particularly when understood as universal, neatly
separable features of human existence or as an account of the social evolu-
tion. Still, I think, if we do not share Arendt’s “phenomenological essential-
ism” (Benhabib 1996, 123ff.) but rather understand labor, work and action as
a typology of action within modern society, these concepts may be useful to un-
derstand some of its basic features.
From this perspective, Arendt’s delineation of the role of labor as com-
pared with work and action clearly draws from Marx’s analysis of capitalist
accumulation (Braun 2001); human activity merely serves as a means to feed
the ongoing dynamic of a process that Marx has analyzed as the process of
capitalist accumulation. Any act of work tends to get transformed into an act
of labor insofar as it is neither performed for its own sake nor for the sake
of creating a lasting product but merely as a means to maintain the dynamic
of the economy. Arendt speaks of “repetition and the endlessness of the pro-
cess itself” and of a “specifically modern acceleration”, which has transformed
work into labor (Arendt 1958, 125). It is not least in this sense that life in mod-
ern society has become the highest good; however, it is not the life of human
individuals but rather the ‘life’ of society, the ongoing dynamic of the eco-
nomic process, which ranks as the supreme good.
Thus, while Foucault stresses that life is a resource which gets mobilized,
Arendt points out that life is constantly (re)produced. Both state that individ-
ual life functions as a force that feeds into the dynamic of a larger process,
be it as a resource or as a product, and that the newly emerging sphere of
the social is not least characterized by the constant consumption of life in or-
der to maintain the dynamic of this process. They both make the diagnosis,
similar to the Marxian analysis of capitalist society, that the rise of the social
implies a certain degradation of individual lives to mere means of sustain-
ing and feeding the economy. Thus, to a certain extent, we can say that the
political zoefication of humans is inherent in modern society from the very
beginning.
The totalitarian systems of the 20th century have taken the political zoefi-
cation of humans to the extreme in reducing certain groups of people to the
status of being mere life. They did so through stripping these people of their
civil rights, social positions and political status. The concentration camps,
Arendt says, demonstrated “that human beings can be transformed into spec-
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imens of the human animal” (Arendt 1968, 455). She also makes clear, that the
practice of stripping people of their legal and political status was not invented
by the Nazis. It had already occurred in the aftermath of the First World War,
when hundreds of thousands of people became refugees, homeless or state-
less due to expatriation, flight, or expulsion. These people, Arendt says, be-
longed “to the human race in much the same way as animals belong to a spe-
cific animal species” (Arendt 1968, 302); they were reduced to a status similar
to that of an animal; it did not matter what they thought or did but only what
they were (Arendt 1981). While it was the Nazi state that declared whole cat-
egories of people to be ‘life not worth living’ and accordingly destroyed their
lives, the Stalinist Soviet Union also, as both Arendt and Foucault remark, clas-
sified political adversaries in biological terms, as mentally ill (Foucault 2003)
or “dying classes or parasitic races” (Arendt 1996, 938).2
6.2 Total Management
The political zoefication of humans is closely linked to another thread which,
according to both Arendt and Foucault, runs through modern politics and
society up to totalitarianism: the conception of politics as administration,
namely the administration of life. Foucault (2003) shows that the emergence
of biopolitics comes with a shift from understanding politics basically as the
continuation of war to an understanding of politics as administrating, regu-
lating, calculating, and managing the life of the population. Within this new
paradigm the population was seen as a resource that can be mobilized in or-
der to strengthen the state. Administrating and managing this resource was
dependent on knowledge and gave rise to population statistics, population
science, hygiene, public health, or eugenics. These bodies of knowledge were,
as Foucault points out, intrinsically based on a logic of classifying, qualifying,
categorizing, and ranking. Biopolitics in Foucault, as Larry Reynolds (2005)
notes, actually means bio-administration. Foucault thus diagnoses a specif-
ically technocratic understanding of politics in modernity: politics is mainly
the set of technologies required to achieve certain ends such as the increase
2 I refer to the German version here since the German version of Origins, which has not
so much been translated but rather rewritten by Arendt herself, is much sharper and
stronger compared to the earlier English version. Whenever I refer to the German ver-
sion, it is for this reason.
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of the welfare and productivity of the population and the relative strength of
the state as compared to other states.
Arendt, too, views modern politics mainly as administrating or managing
the necessities of life.The 19th and 20th centuries, according to her, have devel-
oped an understanding of politics that equates politics with government and
sees it as a sort of housekeeping. Whereas Foucault takes a non-normative
view, simply stating the substitution of one unappealing understanding of
politics for another, Arendt takes a decisively normative perspective, mourn-
ing the loss of the public sphere and referring to an emphatic idea of politics
as an activity that forms an end in itself.
Again, we find that a general feature of modernity culminates in totali-
tarianism. Under totalitarian rule, there is no room for politics in the sense
of expressing and debating different viewpoints and opinions and for acting
in concert as opposed to exercizing command and obedience. In short, there
is no space for political action as an end in itself. The sites where the utmost
destruction of the ability for political action altogether took place were the
camps. Hence, we find that both Arendt and Foucault see totalitarianism as
the extreme case of a system that has turned politics into a knowledge-based
administration of life.
In totalitarianism, according to Arendt, this knowledge-based adminis-
tration of life takes on a new dimension: she depicts the system of the camps
in terms of experiments and laboratories, that is, in terms of techno-scientific
knowledge production. Totalitarianism, here, is seen as a gigantic experiment
on human subjects, the camps being the laboratories where new technologies
of turning humans intomere life are developed and tested: “The concentration
and extermination camps of totalitarian regimes serve as the laboratories in
which the fundamental belief of totalitarianism that everything is possible is
being verified” (Arendt 1968, 437).
6.3 Politics, Life and Modern Temporality
The last observation about the relation between modernity and totalitarian-
ism in Foucault and Arendt concerns the processual structure of time. It is
here that Arendt can offer some crucial insights into the nature of totalitari-
anism and the modern link between politics and life.Therefore, in the follow-
ing, I will reconstruct her argumentation in more detail.
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Again, Foucault makes us aware of a specifically new modern feature of
power and politics which, as Arendt’s analysis makes clear, fully and fatally
takes shape in totalitarianism. He points out that the new modern form of
power which refers to ‘man-as-a-living-being (Foucault 2003, 242) does not
really target individuals as living beings. It does not primarily operate through
exercizing direct control over the body or through intervening in individual
lives. Instead, it targets collective phenomena such as the birth rate, or the
average life expectancy. While on the individual level these phenomena seem
ungovernable, they are not necessarily so when taken as collective phenom-
ena. This, however, implies another characteristic new feature of biopolitics,
namely that it targets processes, temporal phenomena, phenomena which
occur over a period of time, which have to be studied over a certain period of
time: they are serial phenomena. The phenomena addressed by biopolitics
are, essentially, aleatory events that occur within a population that exists
over a period of time (Foucault 2003, 246, emph. added).
Biopolitics is essentially about “taking control of life and the biological pro-
cesses ofman-as-species” (Foucault 2003, 247, emph. added); it “is a technology
in which bodies are replaced by general biological processes” (Foucault 2003,
249). In other words, the processes Foucault is talking about do not take place
within an individual’s life time. On the contrary, they pass through individual
life. The individual’s birth and death do not delimitate but on the contrary
mediate and facilitate the activities of modern governing. Hence, the life that
biopolitics targets has a supra-individual dimension, not just in a numeric
but also in a temporal sense (Gerodetti 2005). Modern politics, as Foucault
depicts it, consists of a set of government technologies which act upon a tar-
get, the biological processes in the population, within which individual life is
just a transitory moment.
We will rediscover this relation between politics and life and its specific
temporal structure in a radicalized form in Arendt’s analysis of totalitarian-
ism. To her, it forms a key to understanding the specific nature of totalitar-
ianism. Understanding, here, means to recognize the principle that sets this
form of government in motion (Arendt 2005). However, it is also more:
Insofar as totalitarian movements have sprung up in the non-totalitarian
world (crystallizing elements found in that world, since totalitarian govern-
ments have not been imported from the moon), the process of understand-
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ing is clearly, and perhaps primarily, also a process of self-understanding
(Arendt 2005, 310).
Trying to understand totalitarianism, for her, includes asking the question of
how it could have an appeal to people and she examines this question both in
herworks on totalitarianism and inTheHumanCondition.However, she does so
not on a political sociology plane but on a speculative, if not theological, plane,
seeking to understand the rule of processual temporality as an answer to the
questions of death, finitude, and loneliness. It is at this point that Arendt and
Foucault definitely part; Foucault would not concede that it made sense to
deal with questions of that kind. He deliberately restricts himself to the study
of when and how certain questions emerged and evolved. However, such self-
restriction comes at a cost: Within these limits it is neither possible to ask the
question of appeal, which certainly limits the range of understanding what
was going on, nor is it possible to develop better, non-destructive answers or
to distinguish between bad,worse, and better answers at all.Therefore, I think
it is worthwhile to take a closer look at Arendt’s analysis of the configuration of
politics, life, and temporality that characterizes the nature of totalitarianism
and links it to the modern predicament. Against this backdrop we can then
reconstruct Arendt’s concept of natality as a guidepost to break away from
this still dangerous configuration.
At the core of totalitarianism, both as a form of government and as a
type of ideology, Arendt argues, lies the idea that all human action is subordi-
nated to laws of nature or laws of history. In retrospect, she sees one such line
leading from Darwin to Nazi racism, another from Marx to Stalinism. What
both have in common is the idea “that a superior process of movement has
seized both nature and history” (Arendt 1996, 952). Totalitarianism, according
to Arendt, is largely about executing the laws of nature or history. What does
this mean? It essentially implies a disastrously distorted, preposterous re-
lation between continuity and change, intransience and transience, timeless-
ness and time.Here, Arendt in fact starts from some basic assumptions about
human needs, and about the kind of relation between intransience and tran-
sience that would be more appropriate to humans. Her assumption is that,
due to their capacity for freedom and spontaneity, human actions and their
results unavoidably have a moment of unpredictability, instability, and tran-
sience to them. That is, transience is built into the human condition—which
is a problem that men inevitably have to deal with. Positive law and politi-
cal institutions, to Arendt, form something like an appropriate compensatory
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answer to this problem. They are able to provide continuity and stability in
order to balance the essential instability and changeability of human action.
Positive laws are depicted in terms of boundaries or a “framework of stability”
(Arendt 2005, 341), which confines but also permits and protects the exercise
of freedom. As such, positive law hedges what she calls a “common world, the
reality of some transcending continuity” (Arendt 2005, 342).
Two other salient concepts in this context are home and homelessness.
Arendt goes so far as to assume that “human beings need the constant trans-
formation of chaotic and accidental conditions into a man-made pattern of
relative consistency” (Arendt 1968, 352). The transformation of class society
into mass society and the related process of atomization, in her view, have
eroded such a common world and left the masses in a condition of “essen-
tial homelessness” (Arendt 1968, 352). She even speaks of a “social and spiritual
homelessness” (Arendt 1968, 352, emph. added), which underlines that she is
arguing on a highly speculative plane here.
The totalitarian response to this spiritual homelessness was to twist
around the relation between continuity and change so that under totalitarian
rule it is human action which is made static (Arendt 2005, 342), whereas
all laws are turned into laws of movement. Terror, the main instrument of
totalitarian rule, stabilizes or freezes men (Arendt 1968, 342) through shutting
down the spaces where freedom and spontaneity could be exercized, whereas
the laws of nature or history undermine and ultimately destroy the conditions
of stability and a common world. At first glance, the laws of nature or history,
in contrast to positive, man-made law, seem to be characterized by their
unchanging, permanent quality, their timeless presence, as Arendt puts it.
At the same time, however, the laws of nature or history display an inherent
dynamic linked to the political zoefication of humans. We can reconstruct
Arendt’s argument through discerning three ways in which the laws of nature
or history form laws of movement: first, they allegedly determine the course
and movement of history, much as natural laws determine the course of the
planets. Second, totalitarian movements make them their highest-ranking
source of authority, so they become the laws of these movements. Third, the
totalitarian movement as such can only proceed if it avoids the establishment
of any stable institutional order. In order to maintain its existence, it has to
preserve its form as a political movement even after having taken seizure of
the state. Arendt insists that totalitarianism is far from forming a monolithic
or hierarchical state structure but is rather characterized by its shapelessness
(Arendt 1968, 395). Through mechanisms such as the confusing co-existence
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of party and state offices, real and façade power centres, overlapping and
competing jurisdictions, and not least the constant shifting of the centre of
power, it avoids the establishment of stability. Keep in mind, Arendt insists,
that the goal of a totalitarian movement is not simply to retain power within
the territorial boundaries of a state but to conquer the world and to create
a new mankind. The latter in particular can be seen as a dynamic goal.
Whereas world conquest could theoretically be achieved—the surface of the
earth is limited—this is not the case with creating the master race or the ‘new
man’; these are endless projects requiring an ongoing process of purge and
elimination. It is here that the different dimensions of the laws of movement
converge with one another and with the political zoefication of humans: the
project of creating the new human species through the execution of supra-
human laws of movement, thereby avoiding stabilization and preserving
the political movement as such, according to Arendt, forms the essence of
totalitarianism.
6.4 Improving Life
Creating the new mankind, or the new human race or species, through exe-
cuting the laws of nature or history displays and implies the general features
that Foucault ascribes to biopolitics: It targets collective and serial, temporal
phenomena. Put differently, it operates on the level of the species and employs
the sequence of generations, thereby transgressing, utilizing, and mobilizing
individual life. Further, when Foucault highlights evolutionism as a general
paradigm that emerged in the 19th century he comes very close to Arendt’s
analysis of processual thought:
Basically, evolutionism, understood in the broad sense—or in other words,
not so much Darwin’s theory itself as a set, a bundle, of notions (such as:
the hierarchy of species that grow from a common evolutionary tree, the
struggle for existence among species, the selection that eliminates the less
fit)—naturally becamewithin a few years during the nineteenth century not
simply a way of transcribing a political discourse into biological terms, and
not simply a way of dressing up a political discourse in scientific clothing,
but a real way of thinking about the relations between colonization, the ne-
cessity for wars, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness,
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the history of societieswith their different classes, and so on. (Foucault 2003,
256f.)
Evolutionism, according to Foucault, forms an important link between clas-
sical biopolitics and what he calls the evolutionary racism developed by Stal-
inism and Nazism. Thus, Foucault, too, points at the specifically processual
structure of modern temporality, which links the biopolitical dimension of
the modern project to the totalitarian project.3 Totalitarianism prolongs and
radicalizes the features of biopolitics highlighted in Foucault to the point that
it uses the elimination of humans as a means of productively consuming in-
dividual life in the production process of the new species life. The only func-
tions individuals can have vis-à-vis the laws of movement are to execute them
and/or to become “walking embodiments of these laws” (Arendt 2005, 340),
which is by no means mutually exclusive. Executing them means actively ap-
plying the standards according to which certain individuals or groups do or
do not allow for the unfolding dynamic of the laws of movements. Embodying
them means being classified according to these standards. Laws or processes
which function through transgressing and productively consuming individual
lives are not served through compliance but through providing thematerial in
which they realize themselves. This material can be of higher or lower quality
and the political zoefication of humans is the outcome of a mechanism that
judges the existence of individuals or groups according to the question of
whether they present suitable or unsuitable material to realize and promote
the project of enhancing the human race. Within this logic, being deemed a
‘dying’ or a ‘decadent class’ functions much the same way as being deemed
‘unfit to live’, whether the classification refers to physical qualities or not.
Compared with 19th-century processual thought, the totalitarianism as
depicted in Arendt thus adds, or at least dramatically increases, the element
of acceleration. The totalitarian project is not only about scientifically under-
standing the laws of movement but about actively promoting the process of
their unfolding. Here, execution is at the same time acceleration. Its instru-
ment is terror, which makes terror the borderline case of a technocratic, in-
strumentalist understanding of politics. Hence, Arendt seems to say, proces-
sual thought had a certain appeal to themasses in their spiritual homelessness
3 For an overview on the respective notions of temporality in the different stages of the
work of Foucault see Michon (2002), for a systematic discussion of the relationship
between different regimes of time and forms of power in Foucault see Portschy (2019).
6 Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault on Biopolitics, Time and Totalitarianism 133
because it enabled them to participate in a permanent, intransient, timeless
presence.The alleged intransience or permanence of these laws, however, was
a fatal error because in fact their operating principle was mobilization, dy-
namization, acceleration.What processual temporality really did was destroy
the chance of establishing some sort of this-worldly stability, continuity, or
common home. In the end, the
supra-gigantic forces whose movements race through humanity, dragging
every individual willy-nilly with them—either riding atop their triumphant
car or crushed under its wheels—may be various and complicated: still, it
is surprising to see how, for all practical political purposes, these ideologies
always result in the same ‘law’ of elimination of individuals for the sake of
the process or progress of the species. From the elimination of harmful or su-
perfluous individuals, the result of natural or historical movement rises like
the phoenix from its own ashes; but unlike the fabulous bird, this mankind
which is the end and at the same time the embodiment of the movement of
either History or Nature requires permanent sacrifices, the permanent elim-
ination of hostile or parasitic or unhealthy classes or races in order to enter
upon its bloody eternity. (Arendt 2005, 341)
The kind of eternity the totalitarian movement has to offer is a deadly eter-
nity, the permanence it produces is the “tranquility of the cemetery” (Arendt
2005, 348). Hence, the totalitarian project is based on a specifically processual
structure of temporality in which endlessness has taken a double meaning:
first, the processes determined by the laws of nature or history and executed
through terror cannot come to an end because their goal, the production of
a new human species, can never be completed. Second, each individual and
each human activity merely counts as a means to promote the process and
not as an end in itself. These processes have a direction, but no end(s). To
Arendt, this structure is expressed concisely by the maxim of the SS: “No task
exists for its own sake” (Arendt 1968, 409).This attitude, she says, destroys “all
genuine interest in specific jobs and produces a mentality which sees every
conceivable action as an instrument for something entirely different” (Arendt
1968, 409).
Here, however, we also see that processual temporality is not confined
to the totalitarian project, although it is within the totalitarian project that
it assumes its most deadly power. Rather, the relation cited earlier between
actions and ends bears considerable resemblance to Marx’s analysis of the
relation between exchange value and utility value under capitalist conditions,
134 Biopolitics and Historic Justice
in which human productivity is essentially transformed into a mere means to
advance the process of accumulation. Indeed, Arendt’s later work on modern
society can, arguably, be read as a study on the functioning of processual
temporality before and after totalitarianism. InTheHuman Condition, as I will
point out in the following, Arendt both makes an endeavor to understand the
development of processual temporality and to present an alternative model,
the temporality of the interval, the former crystallizing in the priority of life,
the latter in the concept of natality.
6.5 Living in the Interval
InTheHumanCondition, Arendt explores the rise of ‘life’ to be the supreme good
in occidental culture; she shows how the changing notion of ‘life’ is related
to a pertinent transformation of temporality and how these transformations
form responses to certain fundamental, traumatic historic experiences. The
polis, in her view, had offered its citizens a kind of “worldly immortality” in
that it formed the institutional framework for the possibility of remembrance
(Arendt 1958, 314). Life was conceived of as a life story that can be passed down
over generations and remembrance constitutes a response to human mor-
tality. This response required a body politic though with a functioning con-
text of narration and remembrance. The decline of the polis therefore meant
a traumatic experience and the cultural response to that experience was the
invention of a new form of temporality, namely eternity, which came with a
revaluation of the vita contemplativa in relation to political action. This shift,
however, came at the price of devaluating the only human capacity that is able
to create a common world before death.
Similarly, Arendt understands Christianity and its idea of the immortal
soul as a response to the decline of the Roman Empire. However, this shift
meant a further devaluation of political action and the political realm insofar
as the immortality of the soul did not rely on a functioning body politic. On
the contrary, in order to save one’s soul and attain immortality, whatmattered
was to turn away fromworldly political life. For this reason, Arendt argues, the
price for this new form of immortality was alienation from the interpersonal
world.
The beginning of the modern age and the development of modern sci-
ence mark a further upheaval in that science implied a model of investigation
that devalued contemplation as a path to truth so that contemplation lost
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the status of being the most highly regarded form of life. For a short time,
Arendt says, work took the place of contemplation and homo faber the place
of the philosopher. However, to the extent that religion lost its capacity to
determine the appropriate ends of work it lost its significance and was su-
perseded by processual thought, be it evolutionism, historical materialism,
life philosophy, or the belief in progress, as a new notion of temporality. This
notion of temporality in turn, she argues, is modelled on the biological life
process, or on a biologistical understanding of life. In terms of bios and zoe, it
would be modelled on zoe, referring to the idea of an entity that, in analogy
to the species, sustains itself through the coming and going of individuals.
The species in that sense is beyond life and death and so is the assumed en-
tity that underlies processual thought, be it termed nature, history, society,
or progress.
However, we could also say that Arendt understands processual thought
as a response to the ‘spiritual homelessness’ that has accompanied the inhab-
itants of the western world from the turn to metaphysics in ancient Greece
to post-war capitalism. To model thought on the life process—zoe—therefore
means a specifically immanentist endeavor of constructing immortality.Note,
however, that Arendt does not consider the quest for immortality to be an es-
sential feature of ‘human nature’. In her interpretation, the quest for immor-
tality is not a cause but rather an outcome of or a response to another human
need, which she does assume to be essential: the need to find a home in the
world, to be respected as a member of this worldly community.
Incidentally, according to Arendt, the capitalist economy of the 20th cen-
tury is in no way based onwork but on labor in that every human activity is di-
rected at the maintenance of the economic dynamic. Again, we find, “no task
exists for its own sake”; no activity forms an end in itself, anything and any ac-
tivity merely serves to feed the automatically proceeding dynamic. From this
perspective, we still live under the rule of processual temporality. It certainly
does not take as murderous a shape as it has taken in Nazism and Stalinism
insofar as it is not directed at the production of one new single mankind and
does not use terror as its main instrument. However, to the extent that hu-
man activities are qualified and treated as mere means to feed an automatic,
relentlessly proceeding paramount process, whether it is named progress or
globalization, we are still under the spell of processual thought. In post-war
society, Arendt says, one form the rule of supra-human processes takes is the
inexorable progress of science and technology “compelling us to do whatever
we can, regardless of consequences” (Arendt 1970, 86), not least in the realm
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of biotechnology which, in Arendt’s view, is apparently driven by the desire to
escape the human condition of natality and mortality.
6.6 Beyond Biopolitics: Zur Welt Kommen
Hence,we note that Arendt and Foucault help us discern certain critical, inter-
related elements of the modern project that fatally culminated and converged
in the totalitarian projects of the 20th century, but did not disappear with
them. As such features we have identified the political zoefication of humans,
a technocratic understanding of politics, and processual temporality. Biopoli-
tics can be understood as the combination of these elements. As long as these
elements are to be found in contemporary thought, science, technology, soci-
ety, or politics, it is advisable to watch out for their impact and their possible
convergence. Arendt, in my view, goes a little further than Foucault in that she
decidedly outlines an alternative, non-biopolitical understanding of politics,
life and temporality captured by the concept of natality. The idea of natality
is meant to present a different and better response to the existential human
need to find a home in the world.This response would differ from the various
predominant responses we can find in occidental history which all focused
on overcoming mortality. Up to now, the history of occidental thought has
been preoccupied by mortality (Arendt 1958). Metaphysics, Christianity, and
processual thought, in this perspective, do respond to the need of finding a
home in the world and to the experience of this need being frustrated. Meta-
physics and Christianity responded in developing a specific temporal form:
eternity, a sphere of permanence and intransience beyond the interpersonal
world and superior to it. In processual thought, however, eternity moves from
transcendence into the immanence of nature or history and in this move gets
dynamized so that what remains from eternity is just the constancy of the
process. Processuality is the new temporal form emerging in the 19th century.
Hence, to Arendt, both eternity and processuality form temporal structures
that respond to the problem of homelessness in the world, a problem caused
by the nature of human action itself, but they respond in a way which rather
makes things worse as they devaluate and undermine those human faculties
through which humans are able to create a home in this world. To focus on
natality instead of mortality would mean to acknowledge that the only rem-
edy to the volatility of human action and its results is human action itself,
complemented by the capacity to promise and to forgive. While human ac-
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tion produces results that are volatile and unstable, action is also the capacity
to begin anew, to create a new political community in concert with others.
Arendt concludes Origins with the warning that totalitarianism will stay with
us as an ever-present potentiality but also with the more optimistic outlook
that the end of totalitarianism at the same time implies the promise of a new
beginning: “Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme
capacity of man, politically, it is identical with man’s freedom” (Arendt 1968,
479).
Although the concept of beginning, initium, is taken from Augustine,
Arendt gives it a distinctive turn in linking it to the factum of birth: “This be-
ginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man” (Arendt 1968,
479). In The Human Condition, she develops this idea further by coining the
concept of natality to capture the linkage between beginning, freedom, and
action. Being born—zur Welt kommen in German—is not just a physiological
event at the beginning of life, although it is that too, but in the case of humans
it also means entering the world which is already inhabited by others. For
Arendt, it is the beginning of a being that is capable of beginning. Action
can be understood as a kind of second birth, through which a person, again,
enters the world of interactions and common projects. Unlike many other
metaphors of a second birth this one does not devaluate the first birth. The
second birth is not the antithesis of the first but its confirmation; it means
accepting the gift of spontaneity and freedom man has received already at
and through birth. While birth forms the beginning of physiological life that
has to be sustained through labor and work, action is the essence of political
life. Physiological life thus provides time for the good life; action fills zoe with
bios. It is important to note though that political life, in Arendt, is no idyll,
no paradise that had been lost and could be regained; the idea of embracing
natality is not meant to lead us back to an alleged state of static timelessness.
There is no denying that human action can cause mistakes and that political
institutions are volatile, which is why we need promising and forgiving.
With the help of forgiveness one cannot undo mistakes caused by human
action but one can prevent them from determining the future. By means of
making and keeping promises human beings can bring consistency and com-
mitment into their affairs without relinquishing their freedom. Focusing on
natality, instead of mortality,means appreciating these human capacities and
sustaining the institutional framework that allows them to be exercized. To
focus on natality also means to break away from eternity and processuality
and to introduce a new temporal form instead: the interval. Thus, it is not
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least a revision of our understanding of time that the concept of natality is
aiming at, as Julia Kristeva (2001) has remarked.4 Human life, then, is not
understood as a transitory stage to eternity or as a means to feed the dy-
namic of an ongoing process nor as a timeless idyll but as “the time interval
between birth and death” (Arendt 1958, 97). As such it has a beginning and an
end, it is limited, and it provides time for the good life, which in turn can be
remembered as a life story.
To focus on natality would thus mean putting an end to processual tem-
porality and replacing it with the time of the interval. It is here where we
can locate what Susannah Young-ah Gottlieb has called Arendt’s weak or in-
conspicuous messianism (Gottlieb 2003, 160). Arendt frequently refers to the
figure of Jesus, particularly when she wants to emphasize the significance of
action and forgiveness. Jesus, she holds, was far from preaching the superior-
ity of contemplation over action: “The only activity Jesus of Nazareth recom-
mends in his preachings is action, and the only human capacity he stresses is
the capacity ‘to perform miracles’” (Arendt 1958, 318).
Hence, it is not necessarily Jesuswho hasmessianic qualities but rather Je-
sus demonstrates the messianic, potentially redeeming powers of action and
forgiveness. To Arendt, these amount to the human faculty to perform mira-
cles. In many passages of the New Testament, she tells us,
miracles are clearly not supernatural events but onlywhat allmiracles, those
performed by men no less than those performed by a divine agent, always
must be, namely, interruptions of some natural series of events, of some au-
tomatic process, in whose context they constitute the wholly unexpected
(Arendt 1968/1993, 168).
Thismiraculous power of human action has amessianic quality to it as it ends
one time and opens up another; it disrupts the time of the process and opens
up the time of the interval. It brings the current time to a close insofar as it
stops the racing of time towards the future and breaks open a time span in
the present, a time between limits.
The element of messianism and the thought of redemption are alien to
Foucault and it is with regard to this messianic perspective that Arendt’s and
4 However, I do not share Kristeva’s (2001) view that Arendt pursues a vehement defence
of life in The Human Condition. Kristeva does not sort out the different meanings of the
term life in this book.
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Foucault’s conceptions of temporality fundamentally diverge. Foucault’s con-
siderations about time do not refer to the messianic idea of an end of time,
whereas Arendt’s conception of human action as amessianic power that man-
ifests itself in the public sphere bears strong affinities to what Gershom Sc-
holem identifies as the messianic idea in Judaism:
Judaism, in all of its forms andmanifestations, has alwaysmaintained a con-
cept of redemption as an event which takes place publicly, on the stage of
history and within the community. It is an occurrence which takes place in
the visible world and which cannot be conceived apart from such a visible
appearance (Scholem 1971, 1).
Arendt, as well as Foucault, strictly rejects the strong messianic idea that the
world could be saved once and for all, which she, as well as Foucault, consid-
ers extremely dangerous. Nevertheless, she does convey a messianic message,
only that the messianic powers, the human faculties of action and forgiving,
are themselves temporal; they operate within time, their results are unstable
and all they can do is open up time for a new beginning in this world. Hence,
messianic time in Arendt has the structure of the interval, redemption means
freedom, the exercise of which in Arendt is synonymous with power, and such
power takes place, quite as Scholem put it, publicly, in the community.
To Foucault, in contrast, freedom means the capacity to think differently
and to conceive of ourselves differently, different from the requirements of
subjectification, of becoming an autonomous subject through confessing and
truth telling and thereby producing knowledge required for the biopolitical
management of the living. The liberty Foucault finally leaves us with consists
of thought practices and self practices; liberty to Foucault is “an attitude, an
ethos, a philosophical life” (Foucault 1997, 319), “a permanent critique of our
historical era” (Foucault 1997, 312), a “critical ontology of ourselves”, it is “work
carried out by ourselves upon ourselves” (Foucault 1997, 316). It is a liberty
that remains preoccupied with the self, if not confined within the limits of
the vita contemplativa. Foucault’s way of interrogating history and exposing
allegedly universal, necessary, rational or emancipatory features ofmodernity
as being not only historical but also inherently ambiguous provides us with a
tremendously helpful prerequisite to analyze the logic of modern biopolitics.
It is hard to see, however, how this self-centred, philosophical conception of
liberty could point at an alternative conception of politics, one that enables
us not only to analyze but also to overcome biopolitics.
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The concept of natality, I have argued, takes us a step further, offering an
alternative understanding of politics, life, and temporality. Human life here
is understood not as a moment in an endlessly racing process whose laws
are to be executed on the individual, nor as a manageable entity but as the
time span between birth and death. Time is not the medium for the execution
of supra-human processes but the interval that provides the chance to per-
form activities for their own sake. Politics, finally, would be understood not as
the management of populations or the acceleration of economic or scientific
progress5 but as acting in concert together with others, and the purpose of
politics would not be to enhance the quality of some collective entity, to create
a better species or to maintain the dynamics of the economy, but to make the
world a home.
5 Arendt’s critique of the idea of progress and processual thought clearly draws from
Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Concept of History (1968). The affinities and differences
between Arendt’s and Benjamin’s conception of temporality would, however, require
another study. For exploring the use of Benjamin for a critical analysis of biopolitics
see Wehling 2019.
7 Increasing the Forces of Life: Biopolitics,
Capitalism and Time in Marx and Foucault
It is no longer the worker who employs the means of production, but the
means of production which employ the worker. Instead of being consumed
by him as material elements of his productive activity, they consume him
as the ferment necessary to their own life-process, and the life-process of
capital consists solely in its own motion as self-valorizing value.
(Marx 1990, 425)
Since the classical age the West has undergone a profound transformation
of these mechanisms of power. ‘Deduction’ has tended to be no longer the
major form of power but merely one element among others, working to in-
cite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it:
a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them,
rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or de-
stroying them.
(Foucault 1980, 136)
7.1 Missing the Link: Biopolitics and Capitalism
At the beginning of the 21st century, the biofication of terms finally entered
the field of economics. Compounds such as biotechnology, biomedicine,
bioethics, biolaw and, to a lesser degree, biopolitics, had already taken off in
the 1980s and 90s, whereas notions of bioeconomy, biovalue, and biocapital
did not proliferate until the early 2000s. Like the term biopolitics, they are
being used in very disparate ways, seeking either to promote or to critique the
subject they are referring to.Those who use them in a critical way customarily
refer in one way or other to the concepts of biopolitics and biopower as coined
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by Michel Foucault.1 Even within this tradition, however, the relationship
between biopower and biopolitics on one hand and (bio-)value, (bio-)capital
and (bio-)capitalism on the other is still relatively unclear. As Ute Tellmann
(2017, 69) rightly notes, the nexus between liberal economics and biopolitics
is often assumed but seldom explored. This holds all the more true for the
relation between biopolitics and capitalism. Although there is much mention
of biopolitics and liberalism, biopolitics and liberal governmentality, biopol-
itics and biovalue, or biopolitics and biocapital in the literature, the focus is
rarely on the relationship between biopolitics and capitalism. The concept
of capitalism almost never figures in this literature, and when it does, it
tends to be equated either with liberalism or with a particular segment of
the economy that makes use of the biosciences and biotechnology. We can
thus distinguish two main approaches to relating issues of biopolitics and
capitalism in the Foucauldian tradition, which I will term the ‘technology-
centred approach’ and the ‘government-centred approach’.
7.2 Biopolitics as Biotechnology
I borrow here the concept of a technology-centred approach from LarsThorup
Larsen (2007), denoting a line of work on the relationship between biopolitics
and economics that focuses not somuch on government but on bioscience and
biotechnology.The concepts of bioeconomy, biovalue, bioproperty and biocap-
ital here denote either a particular sector or era, or both, of 20th/21st-century
economics, namely one capitalizing on the potential of life processes, from
the molecular level to the human body, based on advances in technoscientific
1 Unfortunately, Foucault himself never clarified the relationship between the two con-
cepts. Sometimes, he seems to use them synonymously; then again, biopolitics ap-
pears to denote a subset of ways through which biopower is exercised. The confusion
is further exacerbated by the popularity of the term ‘biopolitics’ since about the turn of
themillenniumandby the fact that Foucauldian and non-Foucauldian uses often inter-
mingle in the literature. While biopolitics is the more widespread term, biopower, in
Foucault, is arguably the more fundamental one. As a counterpart to sovereign power,
biopower denotes a new, epochal formof power that pervades different strata, spheres
and dimensions ofmodern society. Since this is actually the theoretical level this chap-
ter is aiming at, biopower would thus in many cases be the more appropriate term.
Since, however, biopolitics is the more common one in the literature, I will for prag-
matic reasons generally use that term here.
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knowledge production (Helmreich 2008). The focus here is on studying the
political economy of the biotech industry, including the disentanglement and
valorization of biological objects or processes and the development of individ-
ual business models and investment strategies. On the general level, one can
add to these the formation of markets, research and development strategies,
economic discourses, and visions and imaginaries—as well as, importantly,
the transformation of economic structures in interaction with biomedical and
biotechnological knowledge production (Cooper 2008; Rose 2007; Sunder Ra-
jan 2006; Waldby 2008; 2009; Waldby and Cooper 2010). The concepts of cap-
ital and capitalism come into play when and insofar as the valorization of
bodies, life processes, biosciences and biotechnologies are analyzed as situ-
ated within a capitalist economy governed by capitalist principles of compe-
tition and profit-seeking and, though it is more rarely addressed in the liter-
ature, exploitation. For technology-centred approaches, biopolitics concerns
the ways in which life processes are made accessible, mobilized and enrolled
in order to utilize their vital potential (Waldby and Cooper 2008, 68). Contem-
porary biopolitics, in this sense, tends to coincide with biotechnology-based
ways of valorizing vitality. Thus, technology-centred approaches have drawn
attention to the intricate ways in which bioscientific knowledge production,
biotechnology, and bioeconomic valorization strategies mutually shape and
reinforce each other in late capitalism, accompanied and to some extent re-
inforced by the generation of new forms of the individual and collective iden-
tities, social relations, networks and communities that Rabinow (1996) dubbed
‘biosocialities’.2 Yet biopolitics and capitalism come into view only in conjunc-
tion with biotechnology or biomedicine; the focus is on industries, markets
and business strategies organized around biotechnology or biomedicine, that
is, on industries, markets and the quest to harness the potential of life pro-
cesses in the body, body parts or body materials through recent advances in
genetics, biochemistry or reproductive medicine.Thus, in the last instance, it
is the advent of reproductive medicine and the new genetics that marks the
emergence of biocapital. While this strand of research has greatly advanced
our understanding of the interpenetration between knowledge production in
the life sciences, the formation of new markets and industries, state policies
2 For an overview on the discussion concerning the relation between the biosciences,
biosociality and the economy, see Gibbon and Novas 2007; for a critique of implicitly
techno-determinist assumptions underlying the concept of biosociality see Gerhards
2020, 57.
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and institutional arrangements as well as identity and community formation
(Gibbon and Novas 2007, 13), it highlights only a particular segment of biopol-
itics and capitalism and does not discuss the relationship between the two on
a conceptual level. A problem arises when biopolitics is conceptually reduced
to political or economic activities organized around biotechnology. Despite
assertions to the contrary, this stance bears an implicit tendency towards
technological determinism if and when it takes late-20th century advances in
genetics, biotechnology and reproductive medicine to be the origin and the
driving force behind contemporary biopolitics and its interpenetration with
the economy. Such a stance also leaves open two questions: whether and how
these advances themselves may be shaped and driven by a logic of biopolitics
and how this relates to the logic of capitalism. Relatedly, a technology-centred
conception of biopolitics tends to overlook or play down biopolitical strategies
not necessarily organized around the life sciences but operating through var-
ious forms of social, employment, family or immigration policies, through
urban planning, social work, birth control campaigns and the like on state,
sub-state and global levels, thus ignoring much of what Foucault termed the
biopolitics of the population. While Nikolas Rose in 2007 still assumed, at
least for late modern liberalism, that state-led interventions on the level of
the population were a matter of the past and that biopolitics had become in-
dividualized and molecularized, the return of the camps, the selective closing
of borders, the rehabilitation of population policy (Schultz 2019) and openly
eugenic discourses (Wehling 2010; 2019) leave no doubt that this is no longer
true—if it ever was. A technology-centred concept of biopolitics falls short
of capturing these persistent yet ever-changing practices, discourses and so-
cial technologies of selectively managing the size, structure and qualities of
human groups and populations.
7.3 Biopolitics as Self-Government
Government-centred approaches, by contrast, do not focus on matters of sci-
ence and technology but rather on the relationship between biopolitics, lib-
eralism and technologies of government. Liberalism in this literature, is ba-
sically conceived as a political rationality operating through ideas, technolo-
gies and mechanisms of governing at a distance (Dean 2002; Larsen 2007;
Lemke, Krasmann et al. 2000; Tellmann 2017). It enrols individuals, families,
neighbourhoods and other collectivities in programmes of self-government
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and self-improvement, particularly with regard to health, fitness, sexuality,
procreation and other aspects of bodily life. It thereby shifts responsibility
for public health, wellbeing and security from the state to individuals, fam-
ilies, groups, neighbourhoods or other collectivities. Biopolitics, in this con-
text, comes as a set of mechanisms for promoting self-government and self-
improvement, or, as its inverse, a set of mechanisms for disciplining those
deemed incapable thereof. Thus, biopolitics and liberalism ultimately con-
verge on the terrain of disciplining and responsibilizing individuals. Biopol-
itics, in short, operates as an instrument of (neo-)liberal government. From
this perspective, however, it remains somewhat unclear what, if anything, is
the added value of concepts such as biopower and biopolitics. If biopower and
biopolitics basically denote technologies of discipline and responsibilization,
then why not retain these concepts? What, in short, is the ‘bio’ in biopolitics,
and why does it matter?
More recently, Ute Tellmann has suggested approaching this question on
a more systematic level. The Foucauldian tradition, Tellmann holds, tends to
assume that the biopolitics of the population coincideswith a liberal economic
governmentality, thus establishing a metonymic nexus between population,
biopolitics and economic government that is, however, never submitted to
closer theoretical examination (Tellmann 2011, 61). She suggests investigating
this nexus by taking a closer look at the work of Thomas R. Malthus. Going
back to Malthus, she argues, allows us to reconstruct the missing link be-
tween biopolitics and liberal economics that is constituted by the connection
between population and scarcity (Tellmann 2017). The notion of scarcity, she
holds, assumes a key position in modern economy, defining its boundaries
both in terms of economic discourse and in terms of a separate sphere in so-
ciety. After all, it is reference to the problem of scarcity that sets the economic
sphere apart from the sphere of politics (Tellmann 2017, 204). Starting from
Malthus, according to Tellmann, we can reconstruct the biopolitical origins
of modern economics founded on the inherently racist and colonialist dis-
tinction of civilized human life and savage life. The key to understanding this
nexus, she argues, is the third element in the connection: time. While sav-
age life is caught up in a timeless present, unable to think ahead, consuming
and procreating excessively through times of abundance without providing
for the future, civilized life breaks the cycle of abundance and scarcity, re-
sists the temptations of excessive consumption and procreation, and allows
for economic progress to take place. Thus, in Malthus, savage life and its lack
of futurity are responsible for scarcity and misery among the whole of the
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population. Thus, for Tellmann, the missing theoretical link between biopol-
itics and capitalism is to be found in the nexus between scarcity and futurity
and this notion of the population. Biopolitics basically denotes the difference
between savage and civilized life, coincidingwith a difference between a time-
less present on one hand and the quest for a better future on the other. It thus
alsomarks a corresponding historical leap. In that sense, biopolitics coincides
with the birth of modern liberal economy; it disciplines uncontrolled needs
and desires for the sake of eventual fulfilment in the future, thus substituting
immediacy for futurity. By doing so, biopolitics constitutively implies a hi-
erarchy of human life, a value differential between savage, present-oriented
and civilized, future-oriented life.
Tellmann draws attention to two important features of biopolitics to
which I will return later: the relationships among the modern market
economy, biopolitics and future-oriented temporality, as well as the value
differential ascribed to different forms of human life. However, concerning
the issue of biopolitics and capitalism, a few questions remain open. In par-
ticular, the focus here is on the relation between biopolitics and liberalism,
not biopolitics and capitalism; Tellmann does not use the term capitalism.
The meaning of liberalism, however, remains somewhat vague, oscillating
between liberal political rationality, market economy and classical political
economic discourse. Unlike the concept of capitalism, it does not denote a
particular form of society with a particular mode of production and particular
forms of social relations. Further, Malthus does not have much to say about
biopolitics after a modern liberal economy has been established. Is biopolitics
still taking place? Has savage life been replaced by civilized life once and
for all, so that the biopolitical makes only a single appearance in history?
Or does savage life, rather, form a subterraneous layer of human life that
continues to threaten the liberal order? In that case, the role of biopolitics in
liberalism would be that of a permanent force of repression. Both assump-
tions—biopolitics as a singular event and biopolitics as a permanent force of
repression—lack, I would argue, the peculiar, distinctively modern features
of biopolitics and its relation to capitalism. While I agree with Tellmann
that both biopolitics and capitalism are inherently future-oriented, I would
object that the future toward which they are oriented is not one in which
needs are met and scarcity is overcome. Concerning the connection between
capitalism and biopolitics, I posit that there is more to learn from Marx than
from Malthus: namely that what drives the dynamics of capitalism is not the
problem of scarcity but the logic of accumulation.
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In sum, government-centred approaches tend to reduce capitalism to lib-
eralism while technology-centred approaches tend to reduce biopolitics to
biotechnology. None addresses the relationship between biopolitics and capi-
talismmore specifically or on both a theoretical and conceptual level. In order
to do so, I suggest a return to Foucault and Marx and their respective concep-
tualizations of biopolitics and capitalism. I argue that, notwithstanding the
obvious differences, there are some remarkable convergences between their
analyses of biopower/biopolitics and capitalism, and that these concern above
all the investigation of power, life and time under conditions ofmodernity and
the nexus between them.As regards power, bothMarx and Foucault study first
and foremost the productive face of power, its productive way of operating.
This does not mean that power for them is not repressive, but that its repres-
sivity becomes intelligible only through studying its productivity. Further, for
both Marx and Foucault, life is a key resource for this type of power. In fact,
life is a genuinely modern resource in that it is the resource that can be si-
multaneously used/exploited and improved/increased. Life is the subject, the
resource and the product of modern productive power. And finally, for both
Marx and Foucault, time is key. Time in modernity, or rather temporality, is
the mode of existence of (bio-)power and capital. Both (bio-)power and capi-
tal share a performative ontology in that they exist only in action, only when
and insofar as they are being performed.Moreover, as I will show, capital and
biopower/biopolitics share an inbuilt temporality that is not sufficiently cap-
tured by the concept of futurity. This temporal structure is characterized by
an ongoing, unlimited process of ever-increasing productivity, thus directed
at the future but not at future fulfilment. Instead, it is a permanent, unlim-
ited process of maximizing and optimizing that cannot possibly come to a
meaningful end.
7.4 Power and Productivity
Marx’ Critique of Political Economy and Foucault’s work on biopolitics belong to
the highest ranks of social theory3, seeking to capture the epochal features
of modern sociality. Neither is content to study merely a single segment of
society:Marx does not study ‘the economy’ but the ensemble of social relations
3 For discussions of Foucault’s studies on biopolitics as work in social theory, see Braun
and Gerhards 2019 and Geisler and Struwe 2019.
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in “societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails” (Marx 1990,
125). And biopolitics in Foucault does not denote a particular policy domain,
defined e.g. by reference to medicine or biology (Braun and Gerhards 2019;
Wehling 2008), but a historically specific mode of social integration, one that
promises to integrate the individual into the social order in a way that benefits
both at the same time (Braun and Gerhards 2019; Foucault 2000a; 1994a).4
For bothMarx and Foucault, productivity, not repression or deprivation, is
key to understanding power in the modern world. In their view, it is pointless
to battle the forces of repression without tackling the forms through which
social relations, social thought and the ways of being a social agent are being
shaped and created. This does not mean that repression, extraction, misery
and deprivation are insignificant in their analyses; they do not, however, hold
the key to understanding and ultimately overcoming the dominant forms of
social thought and practice in the present. The key is how we produce and
reproduce these forms and how they are imbued with power.
As is well known, the concept of power that Foucault introduces inTheWill
to Knowledge goes beyond the preoccupation with repression, misery and de-
privation, highlighting, rather, the productive dimensions of power. Power, he
insists, is not just the lid that holds down our boiling-up desires and unduly
constrains the forces of sexual and political liberation. Rather, it is a vari-
able constellation of forces within which subjectivities are forming and being
formed. For Foucault, the belief that sexual liberation, truth telling and self-
exposure will free us from power and allow us to flourish both personally and
politically, is itself a historically specific effect of power. Instead, he insists,
power produces truth, sexuality, subjects, and the relations between them,
and it is precisely the question of how they are produced that concerns him.
As long as we stay focused on the negative operations of power—such as the
4 Jacques Bidet (2016) also reads Foucault as a social theorist, placing him on a par with
Marx in that both, he argues, highlight two equally constitutive poles of instrumen-
tal reason that dominate the modern social order: capital and organisation. Both rely
on respective privileges that allow the dominant class to exercise power, namely the
privilege of property and the privilege of elite competencies. Power is here essentially
conceived as power over: managerial power over workers, medical power over the ill,
university power over students (Bidet 2016, 96). While I agree with Bidet that both
Marx and Foucault theorize the modern social order in terms of instrumental reason, I
will not highlight themoreWeberian conception of “power over” in Foucault but rather
seek to bring to the fore the shared logic of capital and biopolitics, their common, in-
built dynamics towards increasing human productivity.
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questions of how truth is being distorted or obscured, how sexuality is being
repressed, and howwe all are being alienated from our true selves—as long as
we focus on this, Foucault argues, we are trapped in a humanist mindset, ty-
ing ourselves to some hidden essence, some lost origins that prevent us from
truly trying something new. Rather than searching for the truth lost, Foucault
suggests, there is more to gain from understanding how truth is being pro-
duced. Only if we realize that the alleged nature of man, the essence of the
state, or the subject are nothing but historically contingent ways of thinking
and acting, will it be possible to do things differently, to live differently and
possibly feel differently. Hence, Foucault assumes, focusing on the produc-
tive operations of power will potentially give us more freedom to not merely
bemoan repression but think and do things differently.
Now, on the one hand, the shift from a ‘negative’ towards a ‘positive’ con-
cept of power is clearly deployed against Freudo-Marxism and its preoccu-
pation with sexual repression respectively liberation. Foucault consistently
distances himself from what he sees as totalizing approaches, approaches
claiming to deduce the effects of social and political power relations from
certain economic or political categories, for instance, seeking to deduce “the
status of the mad, the sick, children, delinquents, and so on, in our kind of
society” from the category of the state, or the category of the state from the
category of the commodity and so forth. “[T]hen I reply: Yes, of course, I am
determined to refrain from that kind of analysis” (Foucault 2008, 78). Instead,
he suggests to approach “our kind of society” through a critical history of the
present that would focus on the genealogy of practices and problematizations
and the struggles around them.
On the other hand, however, this shift was clearly inspired by Marx:
I willmake a presumptuous comparison.What didMarx dowhen in his anal-
ysis of capital he came across the problem of the worker’s misery? He re-
fused the customary explanation which regarded this misery as the effect
of a naturally rare cause or of a concerted theft. And he said substantially:
given what capitalist production is, in its fundamental laws, it cannot help
but cause misery. Capitalism’s raison d’être is not to starve the workers but it
cannot develop without starving them. Marx replaced the denunciation of
theft by the analysis of production. Other things being equal, that is approx-
imately what I wanted to say. It is not a matter of denying sexual misery, nor
is it however one of explaining it negatively by a repression. The entire prob-
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lem is to grasp the positive mechanism which, producing sexuality in this or
that fashion, results in misery. (Foucault 1977, 153f.)
In a word, Marx developed a positive, non-juridical concept of power that
serves as a model for Foucault. In a less well-known text dating back to a
1976 talk at the University of Bahia, Foucault explicitly refers to Marx’ Critique
of Political Economy as assembling the elements constituting this specifically
new, modern type of power. What are these elements? First, Foucault insists,
there is not one power for Marx, but different types of domination or subju-
gation that each have emerged from specific local and historical contexts and
show specific technologies and mechanisms. He mentions the workshop, the
army and the slave plantation to underline the scope of variety. “Society is an
archipelago of different powers” (Foucault 2012[1976], 4). Second, forMarx, ac-
cording to Foucault, the formation of sovereignty does not comefirst and soci-
ety second, as the juridical conceptions by Grotius, Pufendorf and the contract
theorists would have it. The reverse is true: The regional powers come first
and state power second. Third, and most importantly, these regional powers
do not primarily operate by means of restriction and prohibition; they do not
primarily operate juridically: “The original, essential and permanent function
of these local and regional powers is, in reality, being producers of the effi-
ciency and skill of the producers of a product” (Foucault 2012, 5).
Note that it is not primarily the product that is being produced here but
“the efficiency and skill of the producer”. In Marxian terms, this would be
the productivity of living labor. In Foucauldian terms, productive power is
biopower in that it turns the body and the population into a resource whose
vital forces are to be increased and enhanced. Both Marx and Foucault, thus,
are concerned with a type of power directed at shaping, increasing and en-
hancing the vital forces of the human, at maximizing human skills, capac-
ities, efficiency and functionality. Put differently, what distinguishes mod-
ern, productive power from other types of power is that its mechanisms and
technologies are directed at shaping, enhancing, optimizing and maximiz-
ing the productive life forces of the human. Moreover, for both Marx and
Foucault, technology is crucial to this form of power, although their atten-
tion is on different types of technology: big machinery in Marx and social and
political technologies in Foucault. Still, technology is of the essence as it is
through technology, or technologies, that human skills, capacities, efficiency
and functionality are increased and improved. Therefore, these technologies
themselves become the subject of constant optimization; they are constantly
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being refined, improved, made more efficient. This would be the fourth char-
acteristic element of productive power that Foucault finds in Marx:
these mechanisms of power, these procedures of power, it’s necessary to re-
gard them as techniques, which is to say as procedures that were invented,
perfected, that were unceasingly developed. There is a veritable technology
of power, or better still, of powers, which have their own history. Here, once
again, we can easily find between the lines of the second volume of Capital
an analysis, or at least the outline of an analysis, which would be the history
of the technology of power, such as it was exercised in the workhouses and
factories. (Foucault 2012, 6)5
Hence, Foucault says: Technologies of discipline precede the historical forma-
tion of capitalism; capitalism is not the origin of these technologies of power;
rather, it is the effect of their proliferation and intensification at different sites
and in different settings. The workhouse comes first; capitalism comes sec-
ond. And although technologies of discipline and control as developed in the
workhouse, but not only there, eventually proved functional for capitalism,
the type of power they manifest was not brought into being by capitalism.
This might also be the place to note that, in the course of the 20th century, it
turned out that biopolitical rationality was not confined to capitalist societies.
The prisons, penitentiaries, and psychiatric institutions, not to speak of the
camps under Stalinism and in many state socialist regimes, provide ample
evidence of that. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 2 of this book, it was not
uncommon for biopolitical rationalities to be linked to welfarist rationalities,
as in the case of socialist or social reform movements that promoted eugenic
policies as a means to build a functioning welfare state. In short, biopolitics
and capitalism share the logic of increasing the forces of life as a means of
increasing human productivity and functionality, but that does not mean that
this logic is the exclusive property of capitalist society. Rather, we can say that
welfarist, socialist and capitalist biopolitics share a modern, productivist ra-
tionality that may operate within different economic and political regimes.
To summarize, we have seen that Foucault is not at odds with Marx, but
in fact agrees with him regarding the heterogeneous origins, the historicity
5 Jacques Bidet, however, has noted that Foucault referred erroneously to Volume Two
of Capital here and that the editors of the talk repeated this error. In fact, Foucault
referred to Marx’ historical accounts of factory discipline in the chapter on machinery
and large-scale industry in Volume One (Bidet 2016, 22).
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and the distinctively productive nature of modern power. So far, however,
the commonalities we have seen concern only the historical accounts pre-
sented in Capital, not Marx’ more original, distinctive analytical approach,
namely form analysis. On the form-analytical level, one would expect more
fundamental differences between Marx and Foucault, given that form anal-
ysis was in fact Marx’ original way of seeking to capture and expose the to-
tality of power relations that characterize capitalist society. To be sure, it is
not a homogeneous, monolithic totality with which Marx presents us; it is a
fractured, distorted, even hostile totality constituted by inherent antagonisms
and contradictions and subject to struggle and contestation, but it is a totality
nonetheless, meaning that the critical, historically specific forms character-
izing the capitalist mode of production—such as commodity, money, value,
wage labor, or capital—are necessarily implicating and co-reproducing each
other. While Marx seeks to expose the ‘laws’ that govern this type of society
and themechanisms that tie these forms to one another, constantly reproduc-
ing this ‘wrong’ form of sociality, Foucault rejects “the inhibiting effect specific
to totalitarian theories, or at least […] all-encompassing and global theories”
(Foucault 2003, 6). He deliberately claims to replace them in favor of what he
calls local critique. All-encompassing theories, and he mentions Marxism and
psychoanalysis here, may be useful for local critiques if and only if:
…the theoretical unity of their discourse is, so to speak, suspended, or at least
cut up, ripped up, torn to shreds, turned inside out, displaced, caricatured,
dramatized, theatricalized, and so on. (Foucault 2003, 6)
It is at this point that Foucault parts company with Marx. He does not seek
‘laws’ that necessarily tie any form to any other, nor does he attempt to capture
the totality of any social formation. The new type of theory that may emerge
from local critique, he proclaims, “does not need a visa from some common
regime to establish its validity” (Foucault 2003, 6). Whether or not Fou-
cault—particularly in his work on biopolitics and biopower—complies with
his own stipulations and actually avoids any totalizing move, and whether
it is at all possible to articulate critique without theorizing social totality, is
debatable (see e.g. Geisler and Struwe 2019). In the following pages, I do not
discuss this question on a general level but point out that, notwithstanding
these theoretical–political differences, Foucault’s conception of power, as
manifested in his analysis of biopolitics and biopower, shows remarkable
commonalities with Marx’ conceptual analysis of value accumulation as the
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essence of capital. To allow these commonalities to emerge, it is necessary to
first revisit Marx’ analysis of capital accumulation as the heart of capitalism.
7.5 Enhancing the Forces of Life
The main focus and the starting point of Capital is, importantly, wealth, not
scarcity. More precisely, Marx starts from the form of wealth and wealth pro-
duction in capitalist society. Hence the much-quoted introductory phrase of
Capital:
The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails
appears as an ‘immense accumulation of commodities’;6 the individual com-
modity appears as its elementary form. (Marx 1990, 125)
Wealth, with its specific form and production, is the subject of analysis in
Capital. More precisely, the subject under study is wealth in capitalist society.
In the course of analysis, it results that wealth in capitalist society may well
appear as an accumulation of commodities; this is not wrong, but it is in-
complete. In fact, the specific form of wealth in societies with capitalist mode
of production is the accumulation of value, with accumulation not meaning ‘a
greater amount of ’ but the process of accumulation. Value, in Capital, is not a
thing or a quality, such as color or weight, nor is it a substance. I follow the
interpretation of Michael Heinrich (2004) here, who emphasizes that Marx in
Capital explicitly abandons the idea that value is created when isolated pro-
ducers spend private labor-time on the production of a certain use-value, so
that from the moment of production, value resides in the labor product. This
notion goes back to classical political economy and assumes that value-cre-
ation was a universal, ahistorical feature of human labor as such. In Capital,
Marx departs from this ahistorical, humanist assumption and demonstrates
that value and, consequently, value creation, are features of labor only un-
der the conditions of a fully developed capitalist mode of production. Labor
products, according to this reading, do not have value prior to and indepen-
dent of the act of being exchanged; accordingly, the value of a commodity
is not determined by the quantity of labor expended on it. Otherwise, a slow
and clumsy worker would automatically generate more value than a swift and
skilful one (Marx 1990, 129). Rather, the magnitude of value of commodities
6 Marx quotes his earlier text, Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, here (Marx 2015, 15).
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is determined by the ‘socially necessary labor-time’ that is required on aver-
age to produce “any use-value under the conditions of production normal for a
given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labor preva-
lent in that society” (Marx 1990, 129). This, however, cannot be determined in
advance, not least because it is subject to constant change. Therefore, Marx
argues that value is determined in the act of exchange. In the act of exchange,
the producers actively compare the products of their labor, abstracting from
the particular content of that labor. “They do this without being aware of it”
(Marx 1990, 166f.).7 The common parameter according to which commodities
are compared to one another is the expenditure of labor-time, that is, abstract
labor or labor sans phrase. Value has no existence independent from this act of
comparison in and through the act of exchange; the act must be performed
for value to exist.
In societies with a capitalist mode of production, commodities are regu-
larly produced for the market, which presupposes a certain level of division
of labor, and exchanged against money, meaning that the reproduction of
society is critically mediated through exchange. Under these conditions, pro-
ducers, in and through the act of exchange, do not merely relate the products
of their private labor to each other; rather, they relate the fragment of social
labor represented in their labor products to the total labor of society (Heinrich
2004, 55). Value, therefore, is essentially a social relation, a particular form of
organizing social life that dominates capitalist society. It assigns certain po-
sitions to its members and imposes certain imperatives on them, above all
the imperative to sell their labor power if they are owners of nothing but this
and to accumulate value if they are owners of means of production.
When the capitalist mode of production is fully developed, Marx argues,
and the dominant form of production is production for the market, the logic
of the market requires participants to strive for accumulation, for the val-
orization of value, if they want to maintain their economic existence. Ul-
timately, therefore, wealth in capitalist societies takes the form of an end-
less, perpetual, self-propelling process of value accumulation. Accumulation
is end-less in that is has no endpoint, no point of sufficiency, no ends in
the sense of attainable objectives. It is this uncanny, self-propelling, end-less
mode of existence that, for Marx, imbues capital with ‘life’ and makes it life-
like:
7 The German original is even more pointed here: “Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es“
(Marx 1972, 88).
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But capital has only one sole driving force, the drive to valorize itself, to cre-
ate surplus-value, tomake its constant part, themeans of production, absorb
the greatest possible amount of surplus labour. Capital is dead labourwhich,
vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives themore, themore
labour it sucks. (Marx 1990, 342)
Capital, for Marx, is feeding on life; it is consuming life in the form of living
labor. Under conditions of capitalism, the production process is at the same
time a process of consumption—consumption of living labor—and, poten-
tially, of the production of surplus value.Thus, labor is extracted, evenwasted,
and made productive at the same time. This is possible because living labor’s
potential to create value is not limited to creating the value of the goods nec-
essary to maintain its existence. Provided that surplus value can be realized
on the market, it can be reinvested to further increase the productivity of la-
bor and make some additional profit. Thus, capital does not simply consume
and waste labor but rather assimilates it to its own vampire-like form of exis-
tence, transforming labor into its own antagonist, capital. As if under a spell,
living labor is forced to feed both capital accumulation and an increase in the
forces of production.
We can now see how capital accumulation begins to resemble biopolitics,
how biopolitics resembles capital as analyzed byMarx, and in what sense Fou-
cault may have taken inspiration from this analysis. Biopolitics, in Foucault,
displays the same logic that characterizes the logic of capital accumulation:
the logic of a productive type of power that grows and proliferates while ex-
ploiting the forces upon which it is feeding. Both capital and biopolitics, in
other words, manifest the same historically new and distinctively productive
type of power that marks the era of Western modernity. It is a power
…working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the
forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and
ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them
submit, or destroying them. (Foucault 1980, 136)
Biopolitics and biopower, for Foucault, are particularly dominant manifesta-
tions of this new, productive type of power that co-emerged withmodernity, a
type of power geared towards preserving and enhancing human life, its forces,
strength and productivity, of “improving and enhancing the functionality of
biological human life” (Wehling 2008, 251).
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Yet the potential to increase the life forces and productivity of the individ-
ual is limited, not least by human mortality. Increasing human productivity
on the level of the population is not limited in the same way. While indi-
vidual bodies are necessary for the process to proceed, while they may form
targets of improvement strategies, while without the existence and function-
ality of individuals no accumulation or biopolitics could take place, the in-
dividual is nothing but a moment within an overarching process that pro-
ceeds on the supra-individual level. Biopolitics “is a technology in which bod-
ies are replaced by general biological processes” (Foucault 2003, 249). On these
grounds, Foucault points out, an overall policy of improving, maximizing and
optimizing the life, fitness and productivity of the population may be com-
patible with a politics of selection, racism and elimination as executed by
the Nazi state (Foucault 2003, 254ff.). In Nazi biopolitics, taking the lives of
some—the inferior, the weak, the deficient, unfit or unproductive or racially
unworthy—was a mechanism for improving life on the level of the master
race:
The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are elimi-
nated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the
more I—as species rather than individual—can live, the stronger I will be,
the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate. (Foucault 2003, 255)
Nazi biopolitics also demonstrates that biopolitics is by no means restricted
to liberalism. It thereby poses a challenge to government-centred approaches
as discussed above. If biopolitics is basically understood as a feature of liberal
governmentality, one can either stretch the term ‘liberalism’ so far as to in-
clude Nazism8 or bracket out Nazi biopolitics as an inexplicable exception to
the rule. Both solutions are theoretically unsatisfactory. The problem arises, I
suggest, from the equation of modern economic rationality with liberalism.
Once we shift the focus from liberal government to the modern logic of in-
creasing and improving human productivity, non-liberal or even anti-liberal
totalitarian biopolitics is no longer a contradiction in terms.
Note that, for Nazi biopolitics, the master race was not an existing entity,
nor was it co-extensive with the German nation; the master race was some-
thing to be actively created, and improving its life was a concerted, future-
8 In this vein, Nikolas Rose (2004, 23) asserts that, even in Nazi Germany, atrocities were
committed “in the name of freedom”, albeit the freedom of the Aryan people. Still, in
my opinion, this stretches the liberal idea of governing through freedom too far.
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oriented effort to be executed through policies that included selective fam-
ily allowances as well as forcible sterilization and organized mass murder. All
these measures were designed to improve the strength, health, and purity of
the coming master race. Anyone who would not conform to this vision con-
stituted a threat or a burden that needed to be eliminated. Hence, taking life
was a means of making life; destroying life in the present was a means of
optimizing life in the future. Death
now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influ-
ence on life, that endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it, sub-
jecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. (Foucault 1980,
137)
Like capital, biopolitics in its extreme form maximizes life on the supra-in-
dividual level by turning the living into the dead. Conversely, capital in Marx
assumes a life-like, self-sustaining, proliferating form of life through feeding
upon living labor and turning it into dead labor.
7.6 The Time of Capital and Biopolitics
Temporality figures prominently in Marx and Foucault. To summarize the
foregoing, the significance of temporality concerns three major aspects: an
emphasis on the historicity of the present, an ontology of performance, and
the diagnosis of a particular temporal dynamics which I will term ‘the dynam-
ics of end-less progression’. Let us recapitulate these three aspects of tempo-
rality:
Historicity:The point of critique for Marx and Foucault is to expose the
fundamentally historical, contingent status of the prevailing forms of social
thought and practice in the present. 9 They deploy historical analysis as a
way to undermine the belief in alleged universals and render contestable the
mechanisms that create the appearance of ahistorical universality and im-
mutability. Critique, understood thus, may enable contemporaries to contest
9 For Foucault’s model of critique in comparison to that of Horkheimer and Adorno, see
Vogelmann 2018.Much ofwhat Vogelmann states about the inherent nexus of diagno-
sis, critique and social change inHorkheimer andAdorno, I would add, in fact hearkens
back to Marx.
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thesemechanisms and ultimately replace themwithmore emancipatory prac-
tices and social relations. Neither value nor wage labor, nor the resulting form
of wealth as an accumulation of commodities, is a timeless universal; on the
contrary, these are rather recent ways of organizing social life. The same can
be said for the notion of life and the imperative to enhance it, the notion of
sexuality and the imperative to liberate it, the notion of the population and
the imperative to improve it. Realizing the fundamentally contingent charac-
ter of such alleged universals, according to Marx and Foucault, may enable us
to conceive of things differently and ultimately do things differently. Wealth,
for instance, must not necessarily take the form of an accumulation of com-
modities. This is in truth a poor, reductive and destructive form of wealth.
We should replace it with a different, a more sustainable, a more just and in-
clusive one that acknowledges and values nature and human faculties as its
sources. Rather than an accumulation of commodities, we could, for instance,
consider solidarity to be the form of wealth we want to achieve.
Ontology of performance: Foucault states explicitly that power “is something
that is exercized and that it exists only in action” (2003, 14). Power is neither
an entity nor an instrument or structure; thus, it is never static or fixed. In
order to exist, it must be actively performed. Similarly, Marx conceives of
value as existing only in action. Value must be realized, and it can be realized
only through the act of exchange; if this does not take place, value does not
exist. Moreover, all of the major forms analyzed by Marx turn out to be the
prevailingway of doing something: commodity, exchange value, value,money,
and wage labor are all historically specific forms of organizing social life.They
exist only in action: commodities, value, and wage labormust all be produced,
exchanged, realized, valorized, reproduced, or accumulated in order to be
what they are.Thismeans, in turn, that they will cease to exist when we invent
other ways of organizing social life.
End-less progression:Capital and biopolitics share a temporal structure that
can be described as the dynamics of end-less progression. The mode of ex-
istence of both capital and biopolitics, as shown above, is that of an ongoing
process that is simultaneously endless and directed: Capital accumulation and
biopolitics are end-less in that they have no attainable ends and no conceiv-
able end-point. Yet they are directed, namely towardsmaximization and opti-
mization: an increased accumulation of value and an optimized functionality
of life. In addition, it can be said that both capital accumulation for Marx
and biopolitics for Foucault proceed through using and increasing the pro-
ductive forces of life: The valorization of value includes the use of living labor,
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the production of surplus value, the realization of surplus value on the mar-
ket—and, in the interest of sustaining one’s economic existence, investing at
least part of the surplus value to further increase the productive forces of liv-
ing labor through deploying more efficient technology.Thus, exploiting life in
the form of living labor and constantly increasing its productivity ultimately
form two facets of the same historically unprecedented dynamic. Again, we
see the resemblance between capital in Marx and biopolitics and biopower in
Foucault, both allowing the extraction the forces of life at the same time as
their increase, optimization and maximization.
Above, I argued that the concept of biopolitics captures a specifically mod-
ernway of integrating the individual and the social whole—“omnes et singula-
tim”, all and one—as Foucault put it (1994a). Biopolitics, in this sense, provides
a set of social and political technologies that supposedly benefit the individual
and the social order at the same time. Yet this promise relies on the underlying
temporal structure of end-less progress. After all, it is only the presupposi-
tion of constant, irreversible and inexorable progress towards the better that
may render at least some credibility to the abovementioned promise, allow-
ing for the constant deferring of its fulfilment into the future.10 In fact, the
present constantly fails to deliver, and a harmonious integration of all and
one is nowhere in sight. Against this continuous experience, the promises
of modernity, capitalism, and biopolitics rely on the stipulation of progress.
Progress will bring increased productivity, which will bring improved living
conditions, which will bring increased productivity and so forth. Modernity,
in short, relies on the—joint and constant—improvement of life and produc-
tivity in time, or at least the promise thereof. Marx and Foucault expose this
nexus, which is why they shift our attention from repression to productiv-
ity and towards a new type of power that constantly seeks to optimize the
functionality and the productive forces of life.The problem is that optimizing
the forces of life coincides with reproducing social relations of exploitation
and subjugation as well as norms and standards of functionality, usefulness,
productivity and fitness. The counterpart of enhancing life is the devaluation
of those who do not meet these standards or are deemed not to meet them.
Thus, the imperative of optimizing life fuels the notion of life that is not good
enough, that does not meet the standards of fitness and functionality, that
10 Again, I thank Peter Wehling for making this point and for reminding me of Walter
Benjamin’s critique of the idea of irreversible, inexorable progress in empty, homoge-
nous time (Benjamin 1980, 258).
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is not strong, healthy, useful, fit or happy enough. Optimizing life implies
the construction, problematization, and devaluation of ‘deficient life’, a con-
struction which, in turn, fuels the demand for technoscientific investments
to ‘solve’ these ‘problems’ and optimize life further.
7.7 Conclusion
What, then, can be learnt about the relationship between biopower and capi-
talism from revisiting Marx and Foucault? How can we capture it by re-read-
ing one in light of the other? In any case, this reading does not support a
deterministic conception according to which capitalism could have caused
biopower and biopolitics or vice versa. It also does not support a functional-
ist conception indicating that biopower and biopolitics have emerged because
they perform certain necessary functions for capitalism or vice versa. Neither
of these constructions can be historically or theoretically substantiated, at
least not on the basis of Marx or Foucault. On the other hand, stating a mere
coincidence, a random overlap of two unrelated phenomena, would also fail
to harness the theoretical potential of such a reading. Rather, I suggest, we
can discern a common core of biopower and capitalism, a certain logic that
they share but that distinguishes them sharply from previous modes of pro-
duction and types of power, respectively. The key to understanding this logic,
I suggest, is a new and distinct connection of power and temporality that was
brought about by modernity and is characterized by the co-constitution of
productive power and a future-oriented, yet end-less movement that I have
termed the dynamics of end-less progression.What distinguishes productive
power from repressive, extractive, banning types of power is essentially its
capacity to turn human life into a resource that can be used and harnessed
and increased at the same time. This is what biopower and capital do: they
simultaneously harness and increase the forces of human life. This does not
mean that the forces of life need be understood in a bio-realist or vitalist way,
as an independent, ahistorical reality. It is the converse: life is that which can
be simultaneously harnessed and increased. As such, it is a fundamentally
historical phenomenon and contingent on productive power.
In short, productive power is the type of power geared at increasing the
functionality, productivity, efficiency and performance of human life, that is,
at increasing the production of productivity. Yet to avoid misunderstandings,
it must also be stated that productive power does not necessarily improve or
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prolong the lives of individuals, nor does it necessarily harness the poten-
tial of any individual. Using, wasting, damaging or even discarding the life
of individuals is not incompatible with the logic of capital and biopower—in
principle or in practice. At the macro-level, the level of the population, of
society, of the master race, or of whatever collectivity is constructed as a ref-
erence, the forces of life may well be increased and optimized regardless of
the damage done to individual lives. This constitutes a certain tension, how-
ever, within the logic of productive power. On the one hand, it is the claim
and the promise of modern biopower and capitalism alike to serve the bene-
fit of “omnes et singulatim” at once. Increasing productivity, functionality and
efficiency at the macro-level will automatically benefit the lives of the individ-
uals, and, conversely, increasing the productivity, functionality and efficiency
of individuals will benefit society at large. On the other hand, the epoch of
biopower and capitalism did not put an end to misery, poverty, insecurity
and suffering, at least not for all and not for long; the claim of improving
life for each and all is constantly refuted by lived experience. Hence the ne-
cessity of constant progression: If life has not yet improved for each and all,
it is because we have not done enough to improve the forces of life, to in-
crease the production of productivity. We must increase, improve, optimize,
and possibly accelerate them further. We must comply with the imperative of
constant improvement.With Marx, we can see the absurdity of this logic; it is
not only that producing productivity also produces misery and exploitation,
but that feeding the process also becomes an end in itself. Living labor be-
comes a means of propelling productivity instead of productivity becoming a
means of serving human needs. Moreover, within the confines of this logic,
there is no room to ask which needs productivity should actually serve and at
what cost, and what kind of society with which mode of production would be
needed to achieve these ends.With Foucault, in turn, we can see that improv-
ing life operates as a norm, and a norm implies the existence of the abnor-
mal. Thus, improving life also entails producing deficient life, life that does
not meet the standards, that is not productive, not functional, not fit enough.
The imperative of improving life thus implies the degradation of human lives
considered deficient, abnormal, unworthy according to norms and standards
that are never stable—because there is always room for improvement.
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